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ABSTRACT
Gambling with Lives: A History of Occupational
Health in Southern Nevada,
1905-2010
By
Michelle Ann Turk
Dr. David Wrobel, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In April 2009, the Pulitzer committee awarded its public service prize to the Las
Vegas Sun for its coverage of the high fatalities on Las Vegas Strip construction sites.
The newspaper attributed failures in safety policy to “the exponential growth in the Las
Vegas market.” In fact, since Las Vegas’ founding in 1905, rapid development in the
region has always strained occupational health standards. From transporting hazardous
railroad cargoes to building Hoover Dam, chemical processing at Basic Magnesium,
nuclear testing, and dense megaresort construction on the Strip, workers, residents, and
tourists alike have been exposed to the threat of living in close proximity to large-scale
industries. In the process, workplace injuries and fatalities became an accepted risk. The
safety lapses produced several cataclysmic disasters– carbon monoxide poisoning at
Hoover Dam, atmospheric nuclear testing and the Baneberry disaster at the Nevada Test
Site, the MGM Grand and Hilton fires, and the Pacific Engineering Production Company
of Nevada (PEPCON) explosion. After each disaster, public outcry prompted federal,
state, and municipal governments to implement rigorous changes. But in the probusiness state of Nevada, laissez-faire always prevailed. Adherence to occupational
health has therefore been historically boom and bust in southern Nevada.
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This study examines the region’s most hazardous industries, emphasizing how the
medical community interpreted and responded to the risks they posed. While existing
scholarship discusses the region’s political, economic, and cultural history, none
examines the intersections of medical and labor history. It advances the scholarship by
providing the first comprehensive history of occupational health at southern Nevada’s
public works, defense, and resort industries. Since no other place contains this mixture of
industrial and postindustrial sites, the region offers unique opportunities to evaluate the
development of health care and safety in the twentieth century American workplace. By
providing a deeper understanding of the history of occupational health crises and
responses, the study informs efforts to address present and future crises in the region.
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INTRODUCTION
DEAD ROSES IN A BLOOMING DESERT
They died to make the desert bloom. The United States of America will continue to
remember that many who toiled here found their final rest while engaged in the building
of this dam.
Memorial at Hoover Dam (1935)
Harold “Rusty” Billingsley started his workday like any other. October 5, 2007
typified early fall in the desert, sunny and warm in temperature. After arriving at the
CityCenter construction site, he began his normal duties as an ironworker. CityCenter
was the hottest megaresort project on the Las Vegas Strip. Replacing the Boardwalk
Hotel and Casino, architect César Pelli designed an “urban metropolis” consisting of
high-rise hotels and condominium towers on 66 acres. With a projected cost of $4
billion, it would have three boutique hotels, 550,000 square feet of retail shops, and 1,650
condominium units. CityCenter opened in December 2009 and was the largest privatelyfinanced construction project in American history, with a final cost of 8.5 billion. It was
an “exciting departure” from the past, according to MGM Mirage President Jim Murran,
and “the next evolution of Las Vegas.”1
CityCenter joined a $32 billion construction boom on the Strip, alongside the
Wynn and Encore, Palazzo, Trump International, Cosmopolitan, Fontainebleau, and
Echelon. Each competed to construct the next greatest experience and finish the
quickest. Since the Strip’s inception in the 1940s, construction always moved at a rapid
pace. Contractor Del Webb encountered considerable pressure from Benjamin “Bugsy”
Siegel at the Flamingo to finish early. While constructing the International and MGM
1

For the history of CityCenter, see Liz Benson, “MGM Plans Massive Strip Project” (November 10, 2004),
“MGM Mirage Picks Perini to Build CityCenter” (May 13, 2005), “Boardwalk Closing to Clear Way for
CityCenter” (September 16, 2005), in Las Vegas Sun; and T.R. Witcher, “How One Giant Casino Could
Turn Around Las Vegas,” Time Magazine.(September 29, 2009).
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Grand, the Taylor Construction Co. faced penalties for missing deadlines and was
rewarded bonuses for finishing early. To manage 1990s megaresort construction, the
contractors built the massive structures in phases. After imploding the Sands in 1996, the
Las Vegas Sands Corp. established a master plan spanning over a decade. In 1999, it
unveiled the first phase, the Venetian, and in 2003, the Venezia. By 2008, it opened the
Palazzo and began constructing a condominium tower. But 2000s megaresort
construction followed a more aggressive timeline. Under the same contractor, Pernini
Building Co., CityCenter and Cosmopolitan sought to finish construction in three years.
This meant building eight high-rise towers at the same time! Reminiscent of constructing
Hoover Dam almost a century earlier, the nature of work reached a new level of
complexity. To avoid costly penalties, Pernini instructed the crew to work rapidly under
extremely crowded conditions. With everything happening at once, “everyone [was]
fighting for real estate,” one foreman remarked. Pernini confronted a labor shortage as
well, so it hired out-of-town workers, inexperienced in the demands of megaresort
construction. The conditions made the workers stressed and exhausted. According to the
foreman, MGM Mirage was “just asking for someone to make an error.”2
On October 5, 2007, CityCenter bustled with activity. Alongside his crew, Harold
Billingsley worked on the second floor. Nicknamed “Rusty” for his red hair, Billingsley
was a seasoned journeyman ironworker. In the early 1990s, he went into ironwork,
helping construct the towering Stratosphere. Billingsley loved adventure, and ironwork
provided plenty of thrills. Described as an “adrenaline junkie” by his family, he enjoyed
balancing on high beams and other elements of danger. He took a job at Cosmopolitan in
2

Alexandra Berzon outlines the working conditions at CityCenter and other properties in a Pulitzerwinning series published in the Las Vegas Sun. The series exposes the lax construction safety standards on
the Las Vegas Strip. See Berzon, “Pace is the New Peril,” Las Vegas Sun, (March 30, 2008).
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2006 and began working 70 hours a week. But the work, entailing the alignment of
support columns, scared him. Even though Billingsley took safety classes on preventing
falls, he did not feel safe. Therefore, he decided to transfer from Cosmopolitan to
CityCenter, working at the latter for less than a month. On the morning of October 5,
Billingsley walked along a skeletal frame of temporary metal decking. He tripped.
Normally, several safety measures should have protected workers from a fall. First, the
decking would have caught him. But at that exact spot, there was a 3x11 hole. As
Billingsley surged forward, he fell through it. Second, a safety harness should have
stopped his descent. But it was not attached. Third, safety regulations required
temporary flooring or netting, but neither existed. A simple trip thus ended his life.
Billingsley fell 59 feet to his death. It was the fourth fatality at CityCenter in eight
months.
Since early 2007, death had shrouded the project. In February, a 7,300-pound
wall collapsed, crushing two workers to death. In August, an elevator “man-lift” system
struck an operating engineer. Cosmopolitan experienced causalities as well. In
November, an apprentice ironworker died after a beam broke, prompting a fall. His
safety harness had been attached to the beam. In January, an iron post collapsed and a
safety engineer plummeted five stories to his death. The Trump, Palazzo, Fontainebleau,
and Echelon experienced similar tragedies. By 2008, the Strip’s dangerous working
conditions had become infamous. Enduring the most fatalities, CityCenter employees
started calling their workplace “City Cemetery” or “Cemetery Center.”3

3

For coverage of the death of Harold Billingsley, see Berzon, “Pace is the New Peril” (March 30, 2008),
“OSHA Goes Easy” (March 31, 2008), and “Not In This City” (April 1, 2008), in Las Vegas Sun; Brian
Haynes, “Iron Worker Falls to Death on Strip,” Las Vegas Review-Journal (hereby referred to as ReviewJournal); and Arnold Knightly, “Workers Walk Off Job,” Review-Journal, (June 3, 2008). See also Berzon,

3

Within eighteen months, there were twelve fatalities at CityCenter, Cosmopolitan,
Trump, Palazzo, Fontainebleau, and Echelon. Every six weeks, a worker died. Pernini
accumulated the majority, totaling nine. CityCenter alone had six causalities. Not since
Hoover Dam had a construction project in southern Nevada produced so much death. In
early 2008, Las Vegas Sun reporter Alexandra Berzon began investigating the unusual
number of deaths. By the end of the year, she had written 53 stories and 21 editorials. In
her series, Berzon recounted the cramped, rushed, and unsafe conditions. She revealed
federal and state regulatory agencies did not protect workers. In fact, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) actually weakened safety requirements. Even
though the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Nevada OSHA)
investigated the accidents, it withdrew or reduced violations after meeting with the
contractors, who blamed accidents on human error. Local unions also failed to advocate
for workers as well. Berzon’s reporting, coupled with editorials by David Clayton and
Matt Hufman, led to congressional hearings and reforms in worker safety. The workers
forced changed as well. Shocked by the Las Vegas Sun revelations, 7,000 workers at
CityCenter and Cosmopolitan walked out in June 2008, shutting down the site. Pernini
quickly negotiated a truce. By the end of the day, it agreed to create a rigorous, 10-hour
health and safety training class, and periodic safety assessments. The combination of

“Pace is the New Peril,” “OSHA Goes Easy,” and “Not In This City;” David Kihara, “Two Workers Killed
at Project CityCenter,” Review-Journal, (February 7, 2007); Francis McCabe, “Worker Killed on Strip
Project,” Review-Journal, (August 10, 2007); Tony Illia, “Rise in Construction Deaths Alarm Many, But
Work Goes On,” Review-Journal, (August 26, 2007); David Kihara, “Construction Worker Plunges to
Death,” Review-Journal, (November 28, 2007); and Arnold Knightly and Howard Stut, “Worker Dies on
Strip,” Review-Journal, (June 17, 2008), for the other Strip construction deaths.
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events prompted a culture shift on the Strip, favoring occupational health and safety. The
final death occurred at Echelon on June 16, 2008. After that, the deaths stopped.4
Berzon refers to the Strip construction deaths as a “disturbing trend” in Las
Vegas. During the 1990s megaresort boom, she writes, only 9 construction workers died.
By the 2000s, Las Vegas had “pinned its addiction to growth” and a subsequent “body
count emerged.”5 Indeed, it was disturbing, but the trend existed before the 2000s. In
fact, the Strip construction deaths were consistent with the history of occupational health
in southern Nevada. Since Las Vegas’ founding in 1905, rapid development
continuously strained safety standards at the region’s industrial and postindustrial sites.
Transporting hazardous railroad cargoes, building Hoover Dam, chemical manufacturing
at Basic Magnesium Inc., nuclear testing, and dense megaresort construction exposed
workers, residents, and tourists alike to the perils of living in close proximity to largescale industries. The pressure to maximize profits, while providing the next greatest
experience in technology and entertainment, consistently eroded the quality of
occupational health. Injuries and fatalities became an acceptable risk. The lapses in
safety eventually produced cataclysmic disasters – construction deaths and carbon
monoxide poisoning at Hoover Dam, atmospheric nuclear testing and the Baneberry
accident, the MGM Grand and Hilton fires, and the Pacific Engineering Production
Company of Nevada (PEPCON) explosion. After each disaster, public outcry prompted
the federal, state, and municipal governments to implement rigorous changes. For a
See Berzon, “Pace is the New Peril” and “Construction Worker Dies at Echelon,” Las Vegas Sun (June
16, 2008); Mary Watters, “Lessons Learned from Las Vegas,” Occupational Health and Safety, (June 3,
2009); Robert Gavin, “9 Deaths at Pernini Stir Questions,” The Boston Globe, (September 10, 2008); “Las
Vegas Sun Wins Pulitzer Prize,” Las Vegas Sun, (April 20, 2009); Marshall Allen, “Sun Wins the Pulitzer
Prize: Worker safety coverage honored for public service,” Las Vegas Sun, (April 21, 2009); and Tina
Susman, “5 Pulitzers for NY Times: Vegas Paper’s Reporting on Worker Deaths Also Honored,” Chicago
Tribune, (April 21, 2009).
5
Berzon, “Pace is the New Peril.”
4
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while, occupational health boomed. But it was usually brief. In the pro-business state of
Nevada, laissez-faire always prevailed. Consequently, occupational health in southern
Nevada was a boom and bust approach for over a century.
This dissertation examines southern Nevada’s most hazardous industrial and
postindustrial sites– the Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad, Hoover Dam, Basic
Magnesium Inc., the Nevada Test Site, and the Las Vegas Strip. As a medical history, it
emphasizes how the medical community interpreted and responded to the unique risks
posed. While scholarly works by Eugene P. Moehring and Hal K. Rothman discuss the
political, economic, and cultural history of southern Nevada, none examine the
intersections of medical and labor history in the region. Additionally, most academic and
popular books highlight the region’s infamous association with corruption and vice. This
dissertation advances the scholarship by providing the first comprehensive history of
occupational health at southern Nevada’s public works, defense, and resort industries.
Since no other place contains this mixture of industrial and postindustrial sites, the region
offers unique opportunities to evaluate the development of health and safety in the
twentieth century American workplace. It examines the conditions and hazards at each
site, along with the safety procedures implemented, evaluating the historical processes
related to the Strip construction deaths. By providing a deeper understanding of the
history of occupational health crises and responses, this dissertation informs efforts to
address present and future crises in the region. Its findings should be of interest not only
to historians, but also scholars of medicine, labor, and the law.
Occupational health has been a central issue in industrializing America. But most
literature focuses on its origins during the nineteenth century and early twentieth,

6

neglecting its important development throughout the twentieth. For example, Dr.
Leonard Kreisler, the medical director of Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company
(REECo) at the Nevada Test Site, listed occupational health as one of the most significant
specialties of health services during the twentieth century. Trained in occupational
medicine, Kreisler’s job was to identify the risks associated with “man and his
environment, and in the workplace” at the Nevada Test Site. Besides radiation exposure,
the site had common workplace hazards: accidents, slips, trips, and falls, electrocutions
and explosions, dust and chemical exposures, hearing loss, ergonomics, communicable
diseases, and psychological effects. Kreisler sought to control the risks, outlining a
program that protected workers, employers, families, customers, nearby communities,
and anything impacted by the workplace.6
Occupational health is a vast subject matter, meriting an interdisciplinary
approach to historical study. First, it is a history of medicine and science. This
dissertation focuses on how physicians interpreted hazards in the workplace. Most
worked as company doctors, treating workers at onsite hospitals, first aid stations, and
local hospitals. The various occupational health departments, industrial hygiene, safety
engineering, and health physics, also incorporated medicine and science. Second,
occupational health is a history of industry, and the evolution of the industrial and
postindustrial workplace. The founding of each industry, how it was established, and its
function is integral to understanding its relationship with health and safety. Third, it is a
labor history, providing descriptions of the nature of work, and how unions responded to
the conditions. Fourth, occupational health is an environmental history, describing the

6

Interview with Leonard Kreisler, M.D., April 20, 2005, Conducted by Suzanne Becker, Nevada Test Site
Oral History Project, Las Vegas, Nevada.

7

relationship between the human body and the workplace, and its effect on the
environment. Finally, it is a legal history, discussing employer liability suits and changes
in the law, including workers’ compensation and regulatory agencies. Taken together,
the interdisciplinary components of occupational health construct a rich and diverse
historical narrative.
Dying to Work
The Strip construction deaths reflect America’s long history of exposing workers
to dangerous and unregulated industries. Following the Civil War, the nation rapidly
built an economy based on agricultural and industrial production. Adapting the European
industrial model to fit their geographical and economic needs, Americans utilized
technologically-advanced machinery to save time and labor. This significantly increased
production. At the time, employer liability to safety was rare. The legal doctrine of the
day, “assumed risk,” stated that employees assumed all risk for injuries or illness at the
job. Consequently, while their production methods were efficient, American industries
were extremely dangerous. For example, the railroad industry emerged as one of the
most hazardous. As early as the 1820s, railways developed simultaneously in the United
States and Europe, evolving from little steam engines that hauled ore out of British
mines. By 1873, American carriers operated the largest railroad network in the world,
boasting over 70,000 miles of track. European technological innovations shaped much of
the process, including safety. Coupled with little federal regulation, the United States
created an institution that was exponentially more dangerous than in Europe. American
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carriers also substituted cheap resources for expensive capital and labor, aggravating the
risk.7
During the nineteenth century, workplace accidents were perceived by employers
as the employees’ fault. Edward Dickinson, General Manager of the Union Pacific,
commented that 90 percent of railroad accidents were caused by “carelessness or rather
willful, disobedience of well-defined rules” on part of an employee.8 Generally, the
railroad did not apply safety precautions because it was immune from employee liability
suits. Workers assumed all risks when accepting employment; workplace hazards were
negotiable only before the worker took the job. Most importantly, the employers were
protected by legal precedent: Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp.9 Nicholas
Farwell, a railroad engineer, became disabled due to a coworkers’ negligence. In the
landmark decision, the court held that workers could not recover compensation from
employers for injuries caused by coworkers. Farwell determined that allowing workers

See Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of Work Safety, 18701939, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xx; and Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails,
American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006),
10, 15. For coverage on technology and the American Industrial Revolution, see David Hounshell, From
the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in
the United States, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology
and American Economic Growth, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). The literature on the development
of safety in the railroad includes Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails and "The Peril of the Broken Rail: the
Carriers, the Steel Companies, and Rail Technology, 1900-1945," Technology and Culture 40, no. 2
(1999): 263-291; Robert Shaw, Down Brakes: A History of Railroad Accidents, Safety Precautions, and
Operating Practices in the United States of America, (London: P. R. Macmillan, 1961); Steven Usselman,
“Air Brakes for Freight Trains: Technological Innovation in the American Railroad Industry, 1869-1900.
”Business History Review 58 (1984): 30-50; and John White, The American Railroad Freight Car,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
8
Maury Klein, Union Pacific: Birth of a Railroad, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1987), 503.
9
The Farwell opinion has been interpreted by some legal scholars as providing the financial stability
necessary to secure the success of the railroad industry. However, legal historian Christopher Tomlins has
argued that the decision was an attempt to preserve the status quo. By rejecting that assumption that labor
law emerged out of “need” during the early phases of industrialization, Tomlins asserts that American
capitalism was relieved of an enormous financial burden for industrial accidents. See Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester R.R. Corp, 45 Mass. 49 (Mass. 1842) and Christopher L. Tomlins, “A Mysterious Power:
Industrial Accidents and the Legal Construction of Employment Relations in Massachusetts, 1800-1850,”
Law and History Review, Fall 1988, Vol. 6, No. 2.
7
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to recover damages created a moral hazard in the workplace. Over the following
decades, the courts continued to favor employers, assuming that hazards were the
assumed risks that came with the job, or were the consequence of their own negligence.
According to historian John Fabian Witt, the rulings made it difficult for injured
employees to recover damages during the nineteenth century.10
Subsequent cases continued to broaden this defense. While employers were
required to exercise care and warn employees about dangerous conditions, they did not
have to fix them. In 1905, another landmark case, Lochner v. New York, held that the
“right to free contract” was implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court established that the law in question did not protect the
health of workers, calling it an "unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference
with the right and liberty of the individual to contract.” Ultimately, Farwell and Lochner
determined that employers were not obligated to protect their employees. In Accidental
Republic, John Fabian Witt finds that Farwell, Lochner, and other nineteenth century
legal experiments ultimately shaped American accident law, laying the foundation for the
welfare state during the twentieth century. The cases eventually caused a legal
transformation from the “ideology of free labor” to the categories of “insurance and
risk.”11

10

The best coverage of the transformation of American accident law from the nineteenth to twentieth
century is John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workmen, Destitute Widows, and the
Remaking of American Law, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). See also William
Novak, The Peoples’ Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America, (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the
Nineteenth-Century United States, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1956); Christopher
Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 232-58; and John Fabian Witt, “Federal Employers' Liability Act (1908),” Brian K.
Landsberg, ed., Major Acts of Congress, (New York: Macmillan-Thomson Gale, 2004).
11
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Aldrich, Safety First, 31; and Witt, The Accidental Republic,
4-5.
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By the late nineteenth century, the railroad entered a new phase of business. The
industry had outgrowth the capacity to handle its roads. Upper management directed
capital towards new construction, ignoring the needs of existing lines. Radical cutbacks
forced supervisors to overwork employees and run equipment until it fell apart. The
policies did not go unnoticed. Railroad regulators, managers, and workers began
campaigning for better equipment and tighter regulation. During the 1890s, George
Westinghouse and Ely Janney developed new technology, air breaks and automatic
couplers, fostering higher productivity. As an added bonus, the new technologies
doubled as safety measures, improving the existing system. At the same time, Congress
established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which published railroad fatality
statistics. The campaign culminated in the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, mandating that
all trains install the new inventions. While it took a decade for the equipment to be
widely used, it was the first federal law that improved worker safety. It also has been
credited with the decline of trainmen accidents in the early twentieth century.12
The drop of fatalities and accidents, and rise in productivity presented an
interesting concept to reformers. Maybe they could expand federal regulation and coax
the railroad to the safety cause in the interest of saving profits? This approach eventually
prevailed. When Senator William Clark founded the San Pedro, Los Angeles, and Salt
Lake Railroad in southern Nevada, occupational health experienced a major shift in
policy. And it was needed. In 1908 alone, 281,641 employees were injured at work and

12

Federal Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, (1893). Prior to the establishment of the ICC, state
governments were not completely inactive. In 1850s, the New York State Railroad Commission began
publishing casualty lists. For information about the founding for the ICC, see Interstate Commerce Act, 24
Stat. 379, (1887); Klein, Union Pacific: The Rebirth, 503; Aldrich, Safety First, 9; and Richard D. Stone,
The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad Industry, (New York: Praeger, 1991).
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over 12,000 killed.13 The reformers, known as the progressives, led the charge.
Progressivism refers to the broad attempt to address economic and social reform from the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Progressives responded to industrialization
and its social byproducts. Referring to it as a movement suggests more unity than there
actually was. From Chicago’s socialized progressivism at the municipal level to Robert
La Follette’s populist reform in the state of Wisconsin to Teddy Roosevelt’s conservative
progressivism in Washington D.C., it had many faces. Nonetheless, the label
“progressivism” refers to one of the qualities they shared: the goal to realign their lives,
communities, and nation towards progress.14
Progressive reformers inspired the installation of several occupational health
measures on the federal, state, and municipal levels. In 1913, the federal government
established its health and labor agencies, the Public Health Service (PHS), and the
Department of Labor (DOL). While the departments oversaw occupational health in
World War I defense industries, its powers shifted to state and local agencies during the
1920s, a reflection of the Republican desire for less federal regulation.15 Progressive
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reformers also inspired significant federal legislation to safeguard the health of
Americans as well as regulating its industries. They backed the Pure Food and Drug Act
(1906) and Meat Inspection Act (1906), which required companies to accurately label
ingredients in processed foods and ensure the cleanliness of meat processing plants.
Moreover, the newly-created Food and Drug Administration (FDA) forced all drug
companies to label their medicines, clearly listing all of their ingredients for the
consumers. The federal government also approved the protection and harnessing of the
natural environment. The Newlands Reclamation Act (1902) facilitated the building of
dams and irrigation systems using money from the sale of public lands. This led to
significant dam building in the arid American West, most notably Hoover Dam. At the
same time, reformers raised the specter of job safety and urban epidemics. They worked
with insurance companies, eager to hold down the cost of claims, to pressure lawmakers
into creating municipal and state public health boards. As one of the most dangerous
industries, the railroad instituted measures that ensured the safety of locomotives and
freight cars. However, theses initiatives were only moderately advantageous to workers
until decades later.16

History, Spring 1985, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 365-381. Like the PHS, the Department of Labor (DOL) also had
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Workmen’s compensation emerged out of progressive reform as well. Instead of
suing for damages, the law automatically compensated workers at a fixed rate. The
concept appealed to employers and employees alike. It provided injured employees
compensation, and made costs predictable for employers and decreased the risk of labor
conflict. Jurisdictions eventually adopted the gender-neutral label “workers’
compensation,” but the term “workmen’s” reflected its true nature. Most compensation
statutes only provided for dependant widows, not widowers.17 In 1908, workmen’s
compensation first appeared on the federal level. The Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA) provided liability “for the benefit of the [dead employee’s] widow and children,”
paying death benefits in cases where employees left a “widow, or a child or children
under sixteen years of age, or a dependant parent.” Essentially, FELA administered
conditions where injured workers of any interstate railroad could receive compensation.
Additionally, it made several changes to the law, abolishing the rule established by
Farwell that employers were not liable for a coworker’s contributory negligence.
Workers also received damages if an injury resulted from their own negligence. Of
course, FELA had a catch. In order to take advantage of it, workers had to be engaging

Brief History of the Origins of Occupational Health in the United States,” Origins of Occupational Health
Associations in the World, (Elsevier Press: New York, 2003); Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring,
(Washington D.C., Island Press: 1993); and John Duffy, “Social Impact of Disease in the later 19th
Century,” in Sickness and Health in America: Readings in the History of Medicine and Public Health,
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), for scholarship on the origins of the occupational health
movement.
17
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Wengler v. Druggists’ Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). For the best discussion on employers’
liability and the origins of workers’ compensation, see Witt, The Accidental Republic; and Price Fishback
and Shawn Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers Compensation. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000).
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in interstate commerce, not intrastate, when receiving the injury. Establishing if an injury
occurred interstate or intrastate became the key component in railroad liability suits.18
At the same time, many states enacted workmen’s compensation legislation. In
1910, New York passed the first statute, providing compensation if an accident resulted
in death to “widows or next of kin.” 19 After 1910, a body of legal precedent gradually
made it easier to hold negligent employers liable for job-related accidents and even pay
compensation to injured workers—a dramatic shift from nineteenth-century practices.
Consequently, insurance companies did a brisk business-selling workmen’s
compensation policies to employers during and after World War I. Employees also
started gaining the benefit of early forms of health insurance. Some states provided
insurance covering occupational diseases, providing an alternative to state-sponsored
health insurance. The railroad, iron, lumber, and steel industries offered informal
assistance as well, developing plans that placed physicians on the company payroll. Until
the 1930s, workers’ compensation emerged as the primary means to seek damages. By
1914, 26 compensation statutes were enacted in United States jurisdictions. One such
state was Nevada.20
The State of Contradictions
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There is no denying the state of Nevada is unique. The state is politically
conservative, yet it hosts legalized gambling and prostitution. Its official slogan is
“Battle Born,” but no soldiers fought on Nevada soil. 87 percent of the state is federal
land that houses water, defense, and industrial projects, yet it prides itself on the concept
of individualism. Nevada is the 7th largest state in geographical size, but it only has a
population of several million, ranking 35th in population nationally. Indeed, these
paradoxes make the state vastly interesting for historical study, especially in regard to its
treatment of occupational health.21
Before discussing Nevada’s approach to protecting workers, it is important to
understand three distinct features about industry in the state. First, the state has a close
relationship with the private sector. Historically, Nevada has attracted aggressive
investors because its economy revolves around lucrative and risky industries. In the
nineteenth century, its main industry was mining. Mining attracted venture capitalists,
businessmen, and bankers, all of whom became dominant forces in politics and industry.
The private sector’s centralization of economic power and influence over politics
eventually shaped Nevada’s future. As historian Hal K. Rothman argues, throughout the
state’s history one economic source dominated nearly every era and its respective
decisions greatly influenced the state’s political leaders. Second, Nevada is a federal
state. It consists of 87 percent federally-owned land, the most in the United States. The
state hosted numerous important reclamation and defense projects, and continues to
house military bases. Nevadans are proud of this while loathing it at the same time.
During the Cold War, the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was a major source of state pride for
These themes are covered in Michael Bowers, The Nevada State Constitution: A Reference Guide,
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), xxv. In 2008, U.S. Census Bureau Population Division
estimated that the population of Nevada was 2.6 million.
21
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its contributions to national defense. Yet, the 1980s the “Sagebrush Rebellion” called for
the return of federal lands to the state. Throughout Nevada’s history, federal lands posed
interesting questions regarding jurisdiction. Did the state have the authority to enforce
occupational health laws on federal lands located within its boundaries? The answer was
typically no. Third, Nevada institutionalized the vice industry, including gambling, prize
fighting, and prostitution. While the state outlawed the consumption of alcohol in 1918,
it did not strictly enforce prohibition, and permitted marriages and divorces without
major restrictions. Most notoriously, legislators passed a bill legalizing gaming during
the 1930s. The vice stigma continues to define the state and affect all of its industries.22
While Nevada is a distinctive state, its constitution is “rather unremarkable”
according to the political scientist Michael Bowers. Based on California’s and New
York’s constitution, its state government is composed of the legislative, judicial, and
executive branches, and the regulation of occupational health is shared among them. The
legislative branch appropriated regulatory agencies and passed acts pertaining to
occupational health regulations. The judicial branch, headed by the Nevada Supreme
Court, dealt with employer liability cases. Nevada is one of the few states without a
system of intermediate appellate courts. Additionally, the court lacks the power of
discretionary review, so it must hear all appeals.23 As a result, its judicial system is
extremely overcrowded, affecting the speed and quality of employer liability suits.24
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The executive branch housed the state’s regulatory agencies. The first agency
created to safeguard the health of workers focused on public health. By the midnineteenth century, communicable diseases emerged as a serious threat to
industrialization and urbanization. As the horrific conditions of Civil War threatened
public health, urban centers in Europe experienced widespread epidemics. Overcrowded
with human filth and corpses, an Asiatic cholera ravaged London. But little was known
about what caused the disease, how to stop it from spreading, and how to cure it. Due to
increased transcontinental travel, the spread of infectious diseases concerned the United
States as well. By the 1870s, scientific breakthroughs reaffirmed the need for improved
public health. Louis Pasteur’s germ theory prompted Joseph Lister to spray his operating
rooms with coal tar. The move spearheaded the use of antiseptics to prevent infections,
inoculation vaccines, laboratory diagnostic work, and other hygiene measures. Nevada
began distributing vaccines to local physicians, prohibited the reuse of the clothing and
the exhuming of the human remains of those who had died of contagious diseases. But
the measures were not enough. The state needed a regulatory agency. In response to an
outbreak of cholera in the East, Nevada established the State Board of Health in 1893. At
first, the underfunded agency had mixed results. While it recommended public health
standards and threatened penalties to municipalities and industrial areas, it had little
enforcement authority.25
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By 1909, legislators established the first regulatory agency devoted to
occupational health: the State Inspector of Mines. Indeed, the mining boom prompted
action. In 1909, Nevada ranked 6th in production of gold, silver, copper, and lead. Its
dividends amounted to more than the mines in Montana, Arizona, Idaho, and Alaska
combined. But three years prior, the state’s output was smaller than any of those states.
While the mining boom increased its production and profits, it also brought attention to
working conditions. Lieutenant and Acting Governor Denver S. Dickerson noted that
“the occupation of the miner is a hazardous one” and many managers failed “to properly
safeguard the health and lives of employees.” Therefore, the Inspector of Mines would
“compel” the mining industry to “insure the fullest protection possible of the health” of
workers. Besides safety inspections, the Inspector of Mines produced statistics on the
mining industry and mineral resources, reporting to the State School of Mines at the
University of Nevada, Reno. Of course, the Inspector of Mines was not well received at
first. Several managers charged that the regulations placed “unrealistic burdens” on the
industry. But the complaints eventually subsided. Since safety saved money, the
Inspector of Mines had little trouble convincing the suggestions were necessary and
practical.26
Nevada’s biggest contribution to progressive reform was the establishment of
workmen’s compensation. In the 1890s, a group of America’s leading businessmen, the
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National Civic Foundation (NCF), began discussing how “free contract” may contribute
to cyclical recessions, strikes and lockouts, social distemper, and political unrest. The
group determined that a “special tax” could meet the annual cost of compensating injured
employees and death benefits. In 1911, Governor Tasker Oddie delivered the NCF report
to the legislature, determining that “ the root of much of the friction between employer
and employee” lied in the “universal defeat of justice in the matter of compensating the
victims of industrial accidents and fatalities.” Since there were “continual cases of
flagrant injustice to maimed employees and their dependents,” a workmen’s
compensation system would be “a rational system of atonement.” The legislature
subsequently passed Nevada’s first workmen’s compensation bill. By 1914, it
established the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act in 1913, a regulatory agency maintaining
and dispersing the insurance funds. The agency became known as the Nevada Industrial
Commission (NIC). At first, the NIC was remarkably cost efficient, as it did not require
industries to provide medical care. However, the state soon realized that medicine was
integral to quality occupational health, and began requiring industries to administer first
aid and medical attention to accident victims. Most large companies already provided
health care, but small businesses complained that it was financially burdensome.
Consequently, the NIC started collecting “accident benefit” premiums, furnishing
medical and hospital treatment to employers without health care.27
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The final regulatory commission in the executive branch was the Labor
Commissioner. Founded in 1915, the Commissioner facilitated “just contractual
relations” in the workplace and prevented the “defrauding of workmen.” In the process,
the agency protected occupational health by monitoring overall conditions in the
workplace. At first, the Commissioner discovered wage laws were “very unsatisfactory”
in the state. From 1915 to 1917, the agency received 33 complaints for nonpayment of
wages. Moreover, the Commissioner enforced the 8-hour day, a slogan of organized
labor “for years” in Nevada. In 1917, the agency reported that the 12-hour day was
“rare” and the 10-hour day was “becoming a thing of the past.” Lastly, the
Commissioner enforced a statewide ban on child labor. By the 1900s, most Americans
objected to child labor. As historian David Tanenhaus reveals, states inspired by
progressivism sought to ban the practice, passing compulsory attendance laws, enacting
vaccination requirements, and establishing the juvenile court system. The state
essentially became “a parent.” As early as 1912, the legislature banned child labor.
Children under 14 years old needed a permit from a district court judge to work.
Moreover, the legislators banned children under 18 from begging or “any indecent of
immoral exhibition” that compromised their morality.28
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The executive branch’s regulatory agencies eventually served as important
mediators in occupational health-related disputes. But at Las Vegas’ founding in 1905,
the agencies did not exist. The railroad had embarked on a challenging feat, launching a
railway link between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles. And situated between the cities
was the arid desert of southern Nevada. It was a sparsely-populated wasteland, with a
scorching temperatures, limited water supply, and no medical infrastructure. But the
railroad need a half-way point and ultimately decided to make the desert “blossom as the
rose.” As it recruited thousands of workers to the region, the history of occupational
health in southern Nevada began. The desert subsequently bloomed and flourished for
over a century, but often with devastating consequences to the ones who created it.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RAILROAD
One of the leading railroad builders of the United States remarked to me that it takes
nerve and a great amount of money to construct railroads under conditions prevailing in
Nevada.
Governor John Sparks (1907)
August 1905 Las Vegas was busy, active, and full of the western spirit, with
rowdy saloons and dives, and swaggering guns and prostitution. The town was in a
valley surrounded by endless miles of desert, sagebrush, and cactus bloom. Three
months prior, the San Pedro, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake Railroad created Las Vegas
after auctioning off commercial and residential lots primarily to land speculators from
southern California. The town closely resembled the tough towns that sprung up around
the transcontinental railroad during the nineteenth century. However, Las Vegas is
different. It was a company town in the broadest sense. The railroad had founded Las
Vegas because it needed a division point between Utah and California with enough water
for its steam engines, repair shops, and worker home sites. Desert prospectors filled the
town bound for mining districts in Goldfield, Tonopah, Searchlight, Bullfrog, and
Manhattan. One such prospector was Roy Martin, who was 32 years old. Since his midtwenties, he had enjoyed a streak of moderate luck selling real estate in Oklahoma. Real
estate, however, was a summer job. Martin was a physician. Intrigued with the
American West and its endless financial potential, he had heard about the Goldfield boom
and decided to try his luck at mining, settling on the Bullfrog Mining District in
Rhyolite.29
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When Martin arrived in Las Vegas, he noted that “there was only one train a day
then. I was going to take it the same night.” During his wait, he learned from the locals
that Bullfrog was a “has been” district. But the news did not discourage Martin.
Something impressed him about the locals’ confidence in their fledging community. He
met a disillusioned physician offering to sell his practice for 10 dollars, the cost of a
railroad ticket to Los Angeles. Martin did not have the money, but he devised a plan. He
found the fastest sprinter in town and challenged him to a foot race. An avid runner in
college, Martin easily won the race, bought the practice, and remained in Las Vegas for
38 years. Within four months, Martin became the chief surgeon for the Las Vegas and
Tonopah Railroad (LV&T) to augment his meager income as a local physician.30 He
held this position until the railroad closed in 1919. The LV&T provided a tent to operate
the railroad hospital with ten cots and a makeshift operating room for minor surgery. By
1907, Martin established a “modest hospital” to meet the requirements of the community,
the railroad, and the surrounding mining camps.31
In most cases, Martin worked alongside Dr. Hal Hewetson, a railroad physician
for the Salt Lake Road. Arriving in October 1904, Hewetson established the first hospital
in the valley.32 The son of an Ohio doctor, Hewetson graduated from the University of
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Pennsylvania’s medical school with honors.33 In 1886, he joined the Army Medical
Corps and organized a chair of pathology and bacteriology at the University of Omaha.
While teaching, Hewetson became associated with Union Pacific Railroad and contracted
pulmonary tuberculosis. To treat the disease, he decided to move west. Hewetson later
claimed that the arid climate cured him. In 1901, Hewetson assumed a full-time position
with Union Pacific, and joined the Salt Lake Road in 1903. After establishing a hospital
tent near Fremont Street, Hewetson stayed until his death in 1930.34
According to Charles “Pop” Squires, the Las Vegas Age editor, Martin and
Hewetson rarely performed surgeries in their hospitals. The standard procedure was to
stabilize patients and send them to Los Angeles. However, the doctors carried out some
surgeries at 4:00 am to beat the desert heat. Since there was no air conditioning, the
operating rooms were located in the back of the hospital and next to shady trees, with
installed windows for improved ventilation. While Hewetson usually only treated
railroad workers, Martin made house calls, delivering babies throughout southern
Nevada. His daughter, Mazie Martin Jones, recalled that he answered “calls for help
from anyone, anywhere, anytime,” driving to Mesquite, Moapa, Overton, and Death
Valley. He always treated minorities, traveling on horseback to visit the Paiute Indian
Reservation, and regularly visited Mexican railroaders and U.S. Gypsum workers in
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Arden. Martin’s daughter described his practice as “pretty wild at times,” treating mostly
gunshot and knife wounds.35
One thing was certain about Martin. He loved Las Vegas. Years after his death
in 1943, newspapermen John Cahlan wrote a narrative about Martin for the Las Vegas
Sun. The doctor deeply influenced Cahlan and his dreams for Las Vegas. Cahlan wrote
of a fictional “dream school” that had “a fraternity of followers,” including Al Cahlan
and John Cashman, Sr. In this school, Martin taught a curriculum that focused on how
“to promote the city of Las Vegas into a metropolis.” Cahlan reveals that the doctor was
the “first person who planted the seed for a resort hotel in Las Vegas.” While Martin
built “at least” 10 resort hotels in his mind, he owned only one, the El Patio. 36
Cahlan’s narrative was more truth than fiction. During his lifetime, Martin
actively put forward “idea of Las Vegas.” He lobbied for a highway connection between
Las Vegas and California. Highway 91 and later, Interstate 15, followed his proposed
route. Martin also served on the first Colorado River Commission to promote Boulder
Dam Project, traveling to Washington D.C. to promote the Swing-Johnson Bill.37 Like
Cahlan, Charles “Pop” Squires similarly interpreted Martin’s legacy. According to
Squires, “no citizen of Las Vegas during all those long, lean, and disappointing years had
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such supreme faith in the high destiny of Las Vegas, or sacrificed so much of him in the
effort to bring destiny to fruition.”38
Las Vegas was more than a dusty railroad town to Martin. He saw the city’s
immense potential to house various industries, and believed it could sufficiently support
the health of workers, residents, and tourists alike. “Having lived in this vicinity for more
than twenty-five years and as the consequence of my vocation,” he wrote in 1931, “I am
somewhat of an authority on conditions that affect the health of the people residing here.”
To say ‘the climate is healthy’ was entirely inadequate. It was much more than that. The
sun shines continuously, producing a year-round climate especially conducive to outdoor
living.39 Martin knew Las Vegas was special. Eventually, the region produced vast
public works and defense projects as well as the ultimate postindustrial resort site. And it
began with the railroad.
Desert Company Town
In the mid-1850s, it seemed impossible for southern Nevada to ever house major
industries. While it contained an abundant water supply and fertile ground for crops,
long-term settlement proved difficult. In 1855, Brigham Young ordered Mormon settlers
to establish a homestead in Las Vegas, but the mission disbanded in 1858. By the late
nineteenth century, the state as a whole emerged from a 20-year economic depression
after the discovery of various lodes in central and eastern Nevada. Still, state politics
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continued to favor the northern mining industry. Nevertheless, the location of southern
Nevada elevated the region to prominence, situated between Utah and California.40
At the turn of the century, there was no link between Salt Lake City and Los
Angeles, and Senator William Clark of Montana wanted to get into the railroad business.
Clark was a corrupt, mining king, described as “one of the strangest millionaires.” Mark
Twain commented that he was “as rotten a human being as can be found anywhere under
the flag… a shame to the American nation.”41 At the same time, Union Pacific’s
Southern Pacific Railroad wanted to build a rail between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles.
Established in 1862, Union Pacific was founded under wartime pressure to link the
Pacific Ocean. By the 1890s, it declared bankruptcy and a group of financiers bought the
company. Headed by Edward Harriman, the financers forced major improvements, a
vision that ultimately created the modern American railroad. While Union Pacific had
proposed building a southwestern route, the company abandoned the plan during the
bankruptcy process. Consequently, Clark won title to the land. In 1900, Clark chartered
the San Pedro, Los Angeles, & Salt Lake Railroad Company, organizing a construction
company to build the line. But Harriman had other plans. By March 1901, Harriman and
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Clark filed their claim in court, and began simultaneously constructing lines southwest of
Uvada in the Clover Creek Canyon.42
Confrontation soon became unavoidable. Offering a significant pay raise, Union
Pacific heavily recruited their rival crew. Union Pacific ultimately swept the Salt Lake
Road off the grade. In response, the Salt Lake Road erected barbed wire, and barricades
made of rocks and wood. The mood was “ugly, but not restless,” with both sides anxious
to avoid violence. But a clash was inevitable. Some newspapers reported an “all out
war,” but with the exception of bloody noses and harassment allegations, work continued
without significant interruption. Eventually, the courts shut down production, and Clark
and Harriman reached a compromise in 1902. Clark agreed to operate the railroad in
exchange for furnishing Union Pacific with 50 percent stake in the company. By early
1905, workers completed the railway in Jean and special trains began running. Several
months later, they applied the finishing touches and passenger service began on May 1,
1905.43
Finishing the track marked an important milestone for southern Nevada. The line
not only ran through the region, it was also a division point between Salt Lake and Los
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Angele, providing a railroad yard, repair shops, and residences. In 1902, Clark bought
Helen Stewart’s 2000-acre ranch in the Las Vegas valley with the intention of
establishing a company town. After completing the track, Clark organized an action for
commercial and residential lots, forming a subsidiary, the Las Vegas Land & Water
Company (LVL&W Co.), to handle the land transactions. Las Vegas became a major
transshipment site virtually overnight. Supplies from California and Utah were briefly
stored and loaded onto wagons traveling northwest to construction camps. The town also
benefited from Clark’s decision to establish another railroad, the Las Vegas and Tonopah
in 1907.44
As historian Michael Green shows, Las Vegas was “a company town in the
broadest sense.” The traditional view of a company town is an employer controlling
every aspect of the town. Company towns typically covered all aspects of their
employees’ lives. Las Vegas did not use script, but the railroad was behind practically
every feature of the town. It constructed a master planned community, complete with a
station, ice houses, a meeting hall, and repair shops, increasing the local workforce from
175 to 400 workers. The railroad included paved streets on Fremont Street and oiled
secondary streets to reduce dust, and a public school.45 It brought water, building a
network of redwood pipes to supply the steam engines. Moreover, the water lines
boosted occupational health, serving as fire protection. The railroad installed several
hydrants in the shops and various areas throughout town. But inadequate water pressure
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was a frequent problem. When several fires erupted in 1919, the pressure was “of little,
if any value in controlling the fires.” The railroad helped establish a more centralized
government. It influenced the creation of Clark County in 1909, with Las Vegas as the
county seat. Finally, historian Eugene Moehring notes that the railroad’s “paternal
obligation” influenced it to provide employees with housing. The decision enhanced
occupational health as well. To maintain a healthy workforce, the railroad provided
employees with sanitary and comfortable housing. Since the railroad determined that
homeowners fashioned better workers than free housing recipients, the workers applied
for mortgages based on their salaries. It worked. The railroad reported that the program
ultimately attracted “a more desirable class of men” to the workforce.46
By May 1920, Clark sold his interest to Union Pacific. 47 The transfer of power
put Las Vegas in an interesting predicament. The leadership, located in Omaha and New
York, was less paternalistic and more concerned with profits. Union Pacific instantly
fired 60 repair shop employees. By the summer of 1922, tempers peaked and a strike
became inevitable. The workers supported the railroad strike of 1922, stopping trains
nationally. Violence flared in Las Vegas when the scabs arrived. Frank McNamee, the
railroad’s counsel, wrote Governor Emmet D. Boyle about the situation. According to
McNamee, pickets gathers to “intimidate” and “put fear” in strikebreakers. The railroad
46
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tried its best to rectify the situation. It filed a restraining order against picketing
interference, and separated strikebreakers from strikers in the rooming houses. The
federal court also served a temporary injunction. Regardless, the strikers continued to
harass strikebreakers. McNamee reported nightly shootings and a trainmaster was
assaulted, tarred, and feathered. While the assailants were identified, they fled town
before being formally charged. Mrs. Andrews, the wife of a strikebreaker, was also
assaulted by four women. The women beat her with their “hands, sticks, bottles, or
whatever was available” as their husbands cheered them on.48
With the trains stopped, the local economy took a significant blow. After the
strike, Union Pacific moved its repair yards to Caliente, which cost Las Vegas over 300
jobs. Eventually, the town recovered and the economy remain fairly strong throughout
the 1920s. However, it was clear Union Pacific needed to establish its authority in Las
Vegas. Another factor inhibited its ability to control the workforce. By the 1920s, the 8hour day was practically universal in the railroad industry, increasing the amount of spare
time. Union Pacific quickly noticed the danger of leisure in Las Vegas, with the local
night life posing numerous problems. Even though the railroad limited gambling, liquor,
and prostitution to Blocks 16 and 17 on Fremont Street, the area turned into a hot spot.
During prohibition, most casino gambling was abolished, but the speakeasies
masqueraded for clubs. Workers frequented Fremont Street, staying up all night.
Exhausted and fatigued, they performed poorly on the job. Workplace intoxication was
48
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problematic as well. The railroad decided it needed to “bring about a broader and more
wholesome relationship,” determining that the situation fostered poor work ethic and
“dissatisfaction and unrest of the masses.” Therefore, it founded welfare clubs, seeking
to instill the following principles:
1. A sincere appreciation of the employees’ obligation to render faithful and
loyal service to their daily work.
2. To teach and respect the laws of “our nation.”
3. To deal with each other in all matters as we would have dealt with us.
Eventually, the clubs offered sporting teams and entertainment features that encouraged
social relationships between employees rivaling the “demoralizing influence” of Fremont
Street.49
Railroad Slaughter
The early twentieth century was a transition for railroad safety. As the railroad
industry expanded, it upgraded existing lines to accommodate a rise in passenger and
freight traffic. Yet, the expansion increased the frequency of accidents. Even though the
railroad invested in high-tech breaks, couplers, signals, and other safety measures, worker
and passenger fatalities rose 30 percent and 60 percent, respectfully. During the first
years of Salt Lake Road operation, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) reported
over 5,000 deaths and 75,286 injured in railroad accidents nationwide, an increase of 755
deaths and 8,577 injured from previous years. To be sure, this spike in deaths and
injuries sparked controversy for the railroad industry. Congress responded by briefly
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assuming control of all railroads during World War I. It also passed the Accident Reports
Act, which required the railroad industry to report all accidents involving injury or losses
of over $150.00 to the ICC. To combat the negative publicity, the railroad studied how to
improve technology, investing in better track, communication devices, and control
features. Additionally, it created comprehensive safety programs and created public
positions on safety, hiring the American Railway Association (ARA) to speak on its
behalf. The combination of higher accident costs and establishment of safety programs
eventually improved conditions. Railroad worker fatalities steadily declined after 1910.50
This is not to say that accidents were infrequent on the Salt Lake Road. In fact,
industrial accidents were very high in Nevada. This is most likely because the state
hosted dangerous industries like mining and smelting in remote locations that lacked
comprehensive occupational health programs until the 1920s. From 1913 to 1916, 4,145
accidents occurred in all industry classes. Comparatively, the railroad was not Nevada’s
most dangerous industry. Mining involved the most risk, with 4.84 out of 1,000 workers
accidentally dying each year. But railroad workers also confronted frequent industrial
hazards. 1.49 out of 1000 workers were accidentally killed, and 84.82 out of 1,000
experienced some form of injury. 51
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Most injuries on the Salt Lake Road resulted from equipment and human failures.
The most visible accidents were derailments caused by weaknesses in road equipment,
erratic desert storms, axel failures, inability to enforce speed, and track debris including
livestock. Derailments plagued the American railroad industry throughout the nineteenth
century, but steadily declined due to various technological advancements. However, the
economic upswing of 1897 reversed the trend, increasing passenger and freight traffic. In
1902, 1,609 derailments occurred nationwide. By 1920, the total reached 11,172. Even
though derailments had escalated, improvements in technology helped the causalities to
simultaneously decline. In Death Rode the Rails, Mark Aldrich reveals that the railroad
industry increasingly moved towards scientific technology to improve reliability, but
rises in traffic and costs also encouraged investments in improved track and roadbed.52
The majority of derailments on the Salt Lake Road were directly caused by desert
storms. As large clouds gathered and dumped “sheets of precipitation,” the track
splintered and washed out. The trains literally plunged off bridges. This was a recurrent
and very costly problem. From January 1 to June 15, 1910, it suspended all traffic due to
numerous washouts. Quite frequently, the line was impassable for hundreds of miles,
requiring the railroad to continuously rebuild the track. In 1907, Lou Martin, a trainman,
described to a dramatic derailment 25 miles outside of Caliente. After heavy rainfall
gradually washed away the roadbed, his “blood almost froze” when he saw “three cars
next to the engine topple into the river.” He desperately tried to save two carloads of
horses, releasing several before its slipped into the river. After water flooded the train,
Martin and his coworkers walked back to Caliente drinking a quart of liquor. It was “all
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they could do to get that liquor away from me,” he recalled. Several months later,
portions of the train were found as far away as Moapa Valley. A year later, the railroad
dug up the engine, submerged in deep mud.53
Derailments were caused by defective track, wheels, and electrical wires as well.
The railroad blamed bad steel and construction defects for the accidents, while
manufacturers countered that train weights, speed, and improper maintenance triggered
the issue. In 1926, electrical wiring burst into flames on a sleeping Pullman man. The
train stopped immediately, evacuating the passengers. Firemen subdued the blaze except
for some smoldering sections of the roof. Assuming the risk passed, several passengers
boarded the train to collect their belongings. They were smothered by carbon monoxide
from the fire extinguishers and burning of curtains, cushions and inflammable materials
in the car. All of them perished. In a trial to determine negligence, a jury found the Salt
Lake Road innocent of criminal activity. But they determined it did not follow proper
safety precautions to protect passengers, prohibiting reentry. Additionally, the jury
mandated that the railroad needed to arm their trains with large fire extinguishers because
small hand pumps were inadequate.54
As in most industrial workplaces, human failures were the biggest threat. Errors
in operating machinery and equipment on the train and railway yards, fatigue, limited
work experience, and inadequate hazard awareness caused most accidents. Trainmen in
the railway yards often experienced crush injuries while switching operating doors and
53
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hatches, and loading cars. Miscommunication especially cased accidents, especially
when there were limited lines of sight. Oncoming trains regularly struck trackwalkers,
responsible for tightening bolts and clearing off track debris. Operators simply could not
seem them until it was too late. In 1918, trackwalker A.R. Nelson was hit outside of Las
Vegas and transferred to the Hewetson Hospital. Dr. John Fuller was on-call and
described his horrific condition:
I knew Nelson during his life. He was delivered to me in an injured condition.
We removed him to the hospital and found he had a compound fracture on the
front part of his skull. He afterward died in the hospital. There were two open
wounds on the head from which brain matter was protruding - from one of them.
He was bleeding from both wounds and from the nose. Every time he breathed
the air escaped from the wounds in his head. He died at 8:30. There were no
wounds on his body. He died from the fractures of the skull.
Traditional construction-type accidents plagued the workers on the line or the railway
yards. Hoisting cranes toppled over while repairing flat cars and repairing washouts.
Engine oil tanks exploded, fatally burning workers. A general foremen caught his shirt
sleeve in a concrete mixer, was pulled in, and whirled around. He broke nearly every
bone in his body and died several hours later. Workplace violence also attributed to
deaths. During track construction, the postmortem remains of a worker was found in his
bunk. While it appeared the man died of natural causes, a coroner from Los Angeles
discovered he had been shot in the heart. The crime was committed after the man had
been “paid off” to quit.
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The most notable examples of carelessness and miscommunication were
collisions. Head-on collisions were less frequent after the railroad industry began
limiting the use of single tracks and enhanced signaled crossings. But reduced visibility
due to extreme weather conditions, carelessness, and poor communication often led to
collisions. In 1907 a night train traveled Caliente to fix a washout. After working all
night, they forgot to move several cars loaded with timber off the main line. The crew
also did not communicate that the washout had been fixed. Without the warning, a
passenger train crashed into the loaded freight cars. Seeing the imminent disaster, several
workers jumped off the train, experiencing slight injuries. However, most were not as
lucky. The incident killed 4 workers and “horribly mangled others,” injuring 50. Drs.
Hal Hewetson and Roy Martin arrived at the scene, treating fractures and performing
numerous amputations. Las Vegans were furious about the accident. The Las Vegas Age
demanded a “thorough investigation” be made “in interest of humanity” for the railroad’s
plain negligence.56
Passengers were not always passive victims. Their own foolishness contributed to
injuries as well. Passengers received injuries from falling off the unfenced platform or
when trying to board moving trains. Their carelessness was often attributed to
intoxication. In 1917, a passenger died after attempting to board a moving freight. The
train decapitated him, mangling his body. The Las Vegas Age reported that he had been
drinking heavily in the saloons for “several days” and the death was very “common here
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[in Las Vegas]” because it was due to “booze.”57 Trespassers confronted numerous
hazards as well. During the early twentieth century, vagabonds or “hobos” had become a
terrible nuisance for the railroad industry. Trespassers were injured or died while
boarding moving trains or crushed by heavy freight cargo. As the causalities rose, the
railroad industry publicizing the dangers of “trespasser evil” to force action. Indeed, its
motives were a mix of humanitarianism, economics, and politics. Trespassing was
especially problematic on the Salt Lake Road because it was a transcontinental highway
linking Los Angeles from the Mountain West. Migrant workers regularly hitched a ride
to find work in southern California. In 1914 alone, 16 trespassers were killed and 30
injured. The railroad felt trespassers were responsible for the widespread belief that
railways were dangerous, calling them a “menace to the lives of trainmen.” It was right.
Most trespassers were killed in preventable manners, not by railroad negligence.
Unfortunately, there was little the railroad could do. It was difficult to discourage
trespassing in a legal manner, as federal laws did not exist and magistrates tended not to
prosecute offenders.58
Local residents were also subject to railroad-related causalities due to unfenced
lines and unguarded crossings. Crossings were traditionally only problematic in urban
settings involving horses, wagons, and pedestrians. But after the invention of the
automobile, rural areas became much more dangerous. The speed and noise of early
automobiles increased dangers, especially when visibility was obstructed. By 1910,
fatalities at crossings to non-trespassers rose 27 percent nationally. In response, the
“Cut to Pieces Under the Wheels,” Las Vegas Age, (October 20, 1917).
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railroad industry installed bells at heavily traveled crossings to warn motorists. It also
placed “Stop, Look, Listen” articles in local newspapers. As a rural town, Las Vegas was
especially susceptible to crossing accidents. In 1938, a train struck a light Ford truck on
Charleston Boulevard, killing the driver and seriously injuring his small daughter. The
accident was caused by inadequate crossing protection; an arm on the railroad crossing
sign had broken off. Local residents had complained about it for years, and the accident
clearly indicated that improved safety measures were needed. The Salt Lake Road was
ultimately sued for damages and the railroad installed proper crossing signs throughout
the town thereafter. 59
Public health threatened the Salt Lake Road as well. Throughout the state, the
State Board of Health had great difficulty regulating Nevada’s industries. According to
Dr. Simeon Lemuel Lee, Secretary of the Board of Health, most industries were
“temporary” and “distant from other habitations,” like mining. The seclusion led to the
dismissal of industrial hygiene. Additionally, Lee was frustrated with Nevada’s lack of
concern for public health. “Diseases, endemic, and epidemic, as grave as the character
and results of those Asiatic cholera or bubonic plague” confronted the state, but it did not
study diseases, and report and tabulate findings. The “maintenance of health” was the
“duty of the government,” and that physicians were “lawfully required to report promptly
every death, every birth, and every cause of contagious disease in his practice.” At Lee’s
urging, the Board of Health began publishing vital statistics in 1911. Clark County began
reporting in 1913, with Dr. Roy Martin serving as the Chairman of the Clark County
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Board of Health. The statistics revealed Clark County was not the most dangerous
county in the state; Washoe County had the distinction, leading in accidental deaths and
suicides.60
At first, the Salt Lake Road was fairly sanitary because of its new construction.
But conditions deteriorated in the 1930s due to environmental weathering, age, the
economic depression, and influx of Hoover Dam-induced population. The yards were
cramped, and the terminal was overcrowded and subjected to air and water
contamination. Communicable diseases, however, always threatened workers, especially
influenza, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Las Vegas experienced its first endemic in 1918,
the “Spanish flu” following World War I. Since the 1600s, influenza outbreaks occurred
roughly three times a century. Influenza is a viral infection, affecting the respiratory
tract. There are three types of influenza: ordinary, affecting humans during the winter
months; avian, a wild bird virus; and pandemic, a strain of avian that develops the ability
to infect humans. Since the latter is a new virus, humans do not have immunity and it
spreads rapidly. While some pandemic strains resembled the ordinary flu, others mutate.
This was the case in 1918, one of the most deadly disease events in human history. In
one year, more humans died of influenza globally than died during all of World War I.61
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There is much debate over the epicenter. Some epidemiologists propose a
Chinese or Vietnamese origin, but others theorize it spread eastwards to China from
Europe.62 In the United States, the first outbreak occurred at Camp Funston in Kansas.
Within several days, hundreds were ill, with cases reported in every state. The first wave
was highly contagious but not lethal. But the virus mutated. Over the next year, a second
wave spread. Victims experienced more intense symptoms, accompanied with
pneumonia or pulmonary consolidation. By 1920, the epidemic waned, with 20 million
Americans sickened and over 500,000 dead. But it got worse. American soldiers
transported the virus abroad, and the Spanish flu traveled from Europe to Asia to Africa
to South America. 16 months after the initial outbreak, the Spanish flu was gone. In its
wake, 25-30 percent of the world had contacted the disease. The estimate of deaths
ranges from 21 million worldwide to 50 to 100 million! Dr. Anton Sohn, pathologist and
medical historian, commented that commented that even the HIV Virus “has circled the
globe and killed as many so quickly as the 1918 flu virus.”63
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Like many western states, Nevada was hit hard by the second wave of the
pandemic. The cases were diagnosed in Reno and Las Vegas in fall 1918. The State
Board of Health reported that the Spanish flu spread until there was “scarcely a village or
hamlet that did not pay toll to it in human life,” sickening nearly 5,000 and killing 734.
Fatalities were few in uncomplicated cases, but the death rate was high in patients with
pneumonia. When the virus hit, the medical community was “up in the air” about
treating the disease because viruses resisted medications. Most doctors thought it was
caused by “bacillus of Pfeiffer,” but the opinion faded by the end of the pandemic. To
fight the disease, the Board of Health required that patients were quarantined and wore
masks. Neither precautions were successful. In the end, most doctors felt “fear” was the
greatest cause of the disease, as heightened anxiety reduced natural resistance. In fact,
the Board of Health suggested “fear should have been entered into the death certificates”
as the true cause of death. Likewise, Dr. Rupert Blue, Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service (PHS), shared the sentiment, asserting the virus only felled 5,000
Americans and “fear and worry killed the others.” 64
As a transient railroad town, Las Vegas was highly affected. Dr. Hal Hewetson
had been commissioned to serve in the Medical Department during World War I, staying
until Armistice. He arrived to a horrific sight. By October 1918, 150 residents had been
sickened by the disease. 5 new cases were reported daily, mostly accompanied by
pneumonia. As sick toll rose, local doctors were understaffed and overwhelmed, and
there was not enough burial space or coffins for the dead. By December, 10 new cases
were reported each day and 50 had died from the disease. As the Spanish flu heightened
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public fear, the railroad was forced establish improved public health precautions. It
enforced control measures, including isolation, personal hygiene requirements, the use of
disinfectants, and prevented public gatherings. The railroad also issued a hygiene list to
employees:
1. Ventilators in office should be kept freely open, and if there is heat it the
building the temperature of the quarters would not be permitted to go over 68
degrees.
2. At noon all windows of offices should be opened and the rooms cleared of all
clerical help possible during lunch time.
3. Avoid crowds and congregating in groups.
4. Elevators should not be crowded.
5. Everyone coughing and sneezing should do so in handkerchiefs.
6. Use individual drinking cups.
7. Keep hands clean by frequently washing, as they are conveyers of disease
germs.
8. Do no visit anyone suffering from “Influenza,” “Pneumonia,” and “Epidemic
Colds.”
9. Remember that the germs of “Flu” and “Pneumonia” are found in the
discharges from the mouth and nose of not only those so infected, often in
persons who seem to be healthy.
10. Avoid getting feet and clothing wet.
11. Protect others by observing these health rules just as you would have others
protect you.
The public health measures had little effect on isolating the virus. But by the end of
1919, the Spanish flu became less lethal and eventually disappeared from Las Vegas.65
Throughout the 1920s, the health of railroad workers and their families was
generally fair. Respiratory diseases, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis, was the biggest
menace, contributing to 20 percent of all deaths in Nevada. But there were no large-scale
epidemics, thanks to the newly-instated public health precautions and advances in
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immunizations. The Public Health Service (PHS) instructed communities and industries
to protect their water supply from sewage and industrial waste, preventing cholera and
typhoid fever, and monitored residents for disease-carrying mosquitoes and flies.
Additionally, the Board of Health distributed smallpox, diphtheria, and other vaccines to
Clark County. Consequently, death rates in diphtheria declined significantly; Clark
County reported only two fatal cases in 1927. While the vaccinations were beneficial,
workers often elected not to take them. When news spread that poor protection of
vaccination sores and impurities caused deaths, they refused treatment. Many were
weary of advances in medicine.66
Roadside Health
The Salt Lake Road’s occupational health program emerged out of an effort to
quell little accidents. Indeed, minor injuries were the biggest menace to workers. Even
doctors were subjected to them. While jumping the track with a gasoline speeder, Dr.
Hal Hewetson broke his leg. After setting the fracture himself, he traveled to Los
Angeles with Roy Martin for treatment. In response, the railroad instituted a Safety First
campaign in 1913. Safety First was the brain child of Ralph Richards, created for the
Chicago and North Western Railroad in 1910. Since most workers died from little
accidents, he proposed a program based on “common sense.” If the railroad industry
limited minor injuries, there would be an overall reduction of causalities. Richards
created the motto: “It is better to cause a delay than an accident.” The slogan Safety First
66
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was genius, implying that safety was the most important part of the job. By all
appearances, the workers’ health was top priority. At first, the program was difficult to
implement, as many managers continued to focus on production numbers. However, the
technical press eventually publicized it, and Safety First appeared in most railroad
companies. Ultimately, the broadening of workplace safety was tied to economics.
Safety First corresponded with the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, which
made workplace injuries very expensive. Decades prior, the railroad industry took
chances with long working hours and cheap equipment. But, facing mounting financial
obligations, it slowly encouraged safety after the 1910s.67
Safety on the Salt Lake Road reflected national trends. From 1905 to 1913,
accident rates were high and safety procedures loosely adhered to. But rising media
scrutiny, traffic density, and collisions encouraged the railroad to install modern safety
equipment. It invested in automatic signals and major extensions in block signaling,
improving the ability to communicate and control trainmen. By 1916, the railroad spent
$400,000 on a block-signal system. It was very effective. Collisions significantly
decreased and by 1922, the railroad had blocked nearly 45 percent of the main track and
installed 21 percent with automatic signals. To augment the equipment, it also
announced the inauguration of a Safety First campaign, writing a bulletin to employees:
We are each of us, in truth, our brother’s keeper, and once convinced of the
seriousness of the situation and the large field for intelligent effort, we believe
that all will lend to the movement that mutual helpfulness and cordial cooperation
which is so essential to the success of any undertaking.
The railroad described the Safety First campaign as removing “the causes of fatalities and
accidents.” It appointed a committee on safety and efficiency, which conducted studies
“Dr. H.L. Hewetson Injured,” Las Vegas Age, (March 30, 1907); Aldrich, Death Rode the Rail, 190-191;
Welke, Recasting American Liberty, 35-37, 38, 41, 59, 225.
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on the cause and prevention of accidents, and provided recommendations. By 1914, the
railroad submitted an annual report to the Safety and Efficiency Bureau. It revealed that
employees were able to 50 percent of the recommendations. While 16 trespassers died,
there were no passenger fatalities and 3 worker deaths. More importantly, only 30
workers received injuries, a one-third reduction from the previous year. While the Safety
First campaign could not remedy the “trespasser evil,” the railroad achieved real results
within a year.68
After the Union Pacific acquired the railroad, it expanded the “Safety First”
program to comply with new Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations. The
new program ultimately enhanced conditions on the road. The company formed a safety
department headquartered in Los Angeles, hosting monthly meetings. In 1924 alone, it
held 99 meetings, made 2,149 safety recommendations, and published 1,579 safety
bulletins for workers. The company also created signal tests to demonstrate efficiency,
observing signals by trains and engine crews, telegraphers, and dispatchers. In an effort
to improve medical care, it built an emergency hospital in Los Angeles. While only used
for short-term trauma, it also temporarily housed employees with serious injuries and
illnesses on route to a main hospital. Lastly, the company improved overall maintenance
of equipment and track, rehabilitating the main line and branches. It replaced bridges,
installed firefighting equipment, rehabilitated decayed buildings, oiled tracks to settle the
dust, and built safety railings. In southern Nevada, the company replaced zinctreated/redwood ties with creosoted ones, reducing general maintenance cost and
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bettering the track conditions. Unlike the past employer, Union Pacific constantly
improved its equipment, purchasing heavier steel and applying higher standards for
material. It organized inspections, utilizing research from Omaha on detecting broken
metals, and investigated failures due to material or human error. Overall, Union Pacific’s
acquisition of the railroad changed the face of occupational health. By modernizing and
adhering to stricter safety procedures, the company reduced engine failures, breakage,
and personal injuries on the railroad, improving conditions for both workers and the
public.69
The Union Pacific promoted occupational safety in several ways. First, it drew
for their employees the analogy that workplace safety was similar to a baseball game.
Players should know the rules of the game. Hiring a new employee was like choosing a
player for your team. Someone with inferior sportsmanship would not be retained as a
first basemen. This was also the case in selecting a trainman. If rules were violated in a
game, players were thrown out. Similarly, workers that do not follow safety rules would
be eliminated from the company. 70 Second, the Union Pacific involved employees in
contests that promoted safety. The company submitted its units, Union Pacific Railroad,
Oregon Short Line, Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Company, and the Salt
Lake Road, in nationwide contests such as the E.H. Harriman Memorial Medals and
National Safety Council awards. Throughout the 1920s, the Union Pacific consistently
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won the E.H. Harriman Memorial Medal for Class A American Steam Railroads,
rewarding “superior excellence in protecting the lives and health” of workers and the
public. The National Safety Council also recognized the Salt Lake Road with an
individual award. From 1923 to 1927, it established a Group D safety record: only 3.49
accidents per million man-hours worked, “one of the lowest ever attained” in the
classification.71
To create healthy competition, the Union Pacific established a system-wide
program to promote safety as well. Founded in 1921, the Safety Banner Contest awarded
the system with the lowest number of injuries to employees, passengers, and contractors,
and time-lost as the result of an accident. The contest was popular among workers.
According to A.S. Halsted, General Solicitor of the Salt Lake Road, the Safety Banner
Contest did a “great deal of good in stimulating interest in the safety movement.” But the
program was also slightly counterproductive. Since ICC classification only reported
injuries that resulted in over three days lost work, competitive workers often returned to
their jobs before fully healing. Halsted called it a serious problem, stressing that “fraud
should not be condoned.” During its first year participating, the Salt Lake Road won
second place, experiencing 4,998 injuries. It narrowly lost out to Union Pacific Railroad.
While the number of injuries were still high, it was an improvement from prior years.
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Beginning in 1936, workers also participated in a system-wide Safety Emblem Contest,
awarding individuals with no operating accidents for that year.72
Overall, safety contests worked well to promote occupational health in the
railroad industry. American Railway Association (ARA) calculated that in 1923, 1,866
fatalities and 148,146 injuries occurred nationally among railroad workers. By 1929, the
numbers dropped to 606 fatalities and 28,706 injuries. But by the 1930s, the National
Safety Council declared the safety movement had “passed the ‘rah rah’ stage” and needed
redirection. Since 99 percent of workers did not want to get hurt, it suggested that
occupational health programs teach safety procedures to employees rather than focusing
on “enthusiasm” for accident prevention. But according to the Union Pacific, its program
was not based on enthusiasm, affirming that its safety program actively and efficiently
promoted worker safety. Indeed, after decades of slaughter, the railroad had become one
of the safest industries in the nation.73
Another component of the occupational health program was medical care. At Las
Vegas’ founding in 1905, it had no existing medical infrastructure. In fact, most of the
state lacked medical recourses. In his annual address to the legislature of 1907, Governor
John Sparks stressed the importance of the railroad industry in Nevada. But he also knew
72

Rules and Regulations Governing Safety Banner Contests Year 1927, Union Pacific Collection, Union
Pacific Engineering and Industrial Development, Safety Matters, Box 82, Files 21-21, Vol.1-9, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas Special Collections; E.E. Calvin to A.S. Halsted, November 5, 1923, Letter; A.S.
Halsted to E.E. Calvin, Letter, November 13, 1923, Union Pacific Collection, Union Pacific Engineering
and Industrial Development, Safety Matters, Box 82, Files 21-21, Vol.1-9, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas Special Collections; W.H. Comstock to All Employees, March 7, 1924, Letter Union Pacific
Collection, Union Pacific Engineering and Industrial Development, Safety Matters, Box 82, Files 21-21,
Vol.1-9, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Special Collections; American Railway Association, Safety
Section, Circular No. 254, Committee on Statistics, January 20, 1930, Union Pacific Collection, Union
Pacific Engineering and Industrial Development, Safety Matters, Box 82, Files 21-21, Vol.1-9, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas Special Collections.
73
F.H. Knickerbocker to W.R. Armstrong, J.F. Long, R.L. Adamson, and W.R. Spettigue, June 25, 1930,
Letter; R.L. Adamson to A. R. White, C.B. Reynolds, F. Nicholson, and J.F. Gorham, June 26, 1930,
Letter, Union Pacific Collection, Union Pacific Engineering and Industrial Development, Safety Matters,
Box 82, Files 21-21, Vol.1-9, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Special Collections.

50

it was a risky business, commenting that it took “nerve” and a “great deal of money” to
construct a railroad “under the conditions prevailing in Nevada.” Nevada was
unpopulated and undeveloped, stretching for “hundreds of miles or more before an object
of uncertainty can be reached at the other end.”74 Certainly, one of the greatest concerns
of the Salt Lake Road was the lack of medical facilities in southern Nevada. This was a
common theme in the American West. There were simply no clinics or hospitals to care
for workers and passengers. As a result, the remote setting prompted the creation of a
uniquely western form of employee-funded hospital care.
Since its founding, the railroad industry provided medical care to their employees
due to the hazardous nature of work.75 At first, the programs were casual. The railroads
hired a “railroad doctor” or contracted with local physicians on a need basis. There were
no formal contracts. By the late nineteenth century, liability concerns and labor conflict
eventually encouraged the railroads to establish a formal medical system. Consequently,
as Mark Aldrich demonstrations, three distinct forms of medical organizations emerged
in the 1880s reflecting “the differing economic and geographic circumstances” of each
See “Message of Governor John Sparks,” and “Report of the Board of Health,” Appendix to the Journals
of Senate and Assembly, Twenty-Third Session, Vol. 1, (Carson City, NV: State Printing Office, 1907), 10.
75
No comprehensive scholarship exists on railroad medical programs. The best coverage is Mark Aldrich,
“Train Wrecks and Typhoid Fever: The Development of Railroad Medicine Organizations, 1850 to World
War I,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Vol. 75, No. 2, Summer 2001, 254-289. See also Emory
Johnson, “Railway Relief Departments,” U.S. Department of Labor, Bulletin, 1987, 8: 39-57; and Ronald
Numbers, “The Third Party: Health Insurance in America,” in The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the
Social History of American Medicine, Morris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg, eds., (Philadelphia:
University of Philadelphia Press, 1979), 177-200. Railroad programs are covered briefly in Henry B.
Selleck, Occupational Health in America, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962); John Duffy, The
Healers: A History of American Medicine, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979); William Rothstein,
American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to Science, (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1992); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, (New York: Basic
Books, 1982). Most railroad histories ignore medical programs, with the exception of James Ducker, Men
of the Steel Rails: Workers of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, 1869-1900, (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1983), which briefly discusses the Santa Fe medical department. For details on other
medical programs, see Henry J. Short, Railroad Doctors, Hospitals, and Associations: Pioneers in
Comprehensive Low Cost Medical Care, (Upper Lake: CA, H.J. Short, 1986); R. Jay Jones, The Old
Central Pacific Hospital, (San Francisco: Western Association of Railroad Surgeons, 1961); and Logan
Eib, “Pacific System’s Big Human Repair Plant,” Southern Pacific Bulletin, 1921, 10: 3-5.
74

51

carrier. The first form existed in the East and Midwest. Most carriers established
contractual arrangements with local physicians. But they did not build company-run
hospitals or require employees to contribute to a health plans. The system only covered
work-related injuries, not illnesses. The second model, instituted by the Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad (B&O), was a mutual-benefit society. Following strike agitation in 1877,
the B&O established a beneficiary plan offering health care and workmen’s
compensation to workers. The program contracted with hospitals in major cities to
provide free medical care. Members were entitled to medical care for injuries and
illnesses from several hundred doctors practicing on the B&O route, as well as relief
payment for injuries. Ultimately, the program reduced lawsuits because employees that
sued the company forfeited benefits.76
The third form existed in the West. Due to low population, carriers faced an
almost complete lack of medical resources. As a result, they developed an employeefunded occupational health organization that provided medical services and built
company-run hospitals. The carriers’ motives were twofold. While humanitarianism
motivated this workplace advancement, they sought to maintain a healthy labor force to
protect profits. The Central Pacific Railroad was the first railroad to create such a
medical organization, patterning its health plan and hospital after the U.S. Marine
Hospital Service. In the late 1860s, the carrier employed a salaried chief surgeon and
division/district surgeons, as well as contracting local surgeons for major emergencies. It
established a temporary hospital in Sacramento and by 1870, built a permanent structure
with 125-bed capacity. For the health care benefits, the Central Pacific charged
employees 50 cents per month. The plan provided free medical care for all ailments apart
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from preexisting conditions or venereal diseases. All workers were required to
participate except for the Chinese, who were excluded. Eventually, improvements in
American hospital care prompted most large western railroads to emulate the CP model
of occupational health care. In 1879, the Missouri Pacific and Texas Pacific set up
identical services, and in 1882, the Northern Pacific established a hospital association and
built facilities in Brainerd, Minnesota, and Missoula, Montana. By 1883, the Denver and
Rio Grande joined forces with the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company to build a hospital in
Salida, Colorado. The next carriers to follow suit were the Santa Fe, Wabash,
Milwaukee, Great Northern, and Union Pacific. By World War I, hospital plans covered
one-fourth of all railroad workers, providing medical care to nearly 2 million employees
and employing 10 percent of American physicians on a full or part-time basis.77
Las Vegas posed many of the same problems for Senator Clark, along with
searing heat and limited water supplies. The town’s location ultimately forced him to
establish a medical infrastructure in the company town, closely resembling the Central
Pacific facilities in Sacramento. This move was voluntary. The Nevada Industrial
Commission (NIC) did not require industries to furnish medical facilities until 1917. It
also antedated the advent of workmen’s compensation for interstate railroad employees.
Clark’s mining company also helped fund a miner’s hospital in Butte, without being
forced by the federal government. Before the town site auction, the railroad worked to
established first aid services. Dr. Hal Hewetson arrived in Las Vegas in 1904, setting up
a medical tent with four cots in the railroad yard. The railroad completed a permanent
structure in 1905, officially establishing the Medical Department to “the care of sick and
injured employees, but without gain or profit.” For employment consideration, workers
77
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were required to contribute each month to receive medical benefits. In 1925, the payroll
deduction was 75 cents per month. By the mid-1940s, it rose to $3.00. The workers also
signed a release discharging the company “of all liability of every character on account of
any act or omission” connected to any “hospital, physician, surgeon, nurse, or any
employee connected.” The monthly contributions often did not meet expenses, and
management provided additional funds to ensure continued function.78
For the first few years, the workers maintained remarkably good health. There
were no epidemics of small pox, diphtheria, typhoid and scarlet fevers. Hewetson
remained the only railroad until the arrival of an assistant surgeon, Dr. John A. Fuller,
practicing in Las Vegas from 1910 to 1917. When Fuller arrived in town, there was a full
moon and the “desert seemed to pulsate with violet light glowing against the surrounding
mountains. From Fremont Street, Fuller could see Block 16, the red light district, which
he referred to as “the girls down the line.” “If a townsmen was down on his luck,” he
recalled, “[the prostitutes] were always ready to pass the hat to help them out.” On one
occasion, Fuller picked up a woman hitchhiker out of “desert courtesy,” even though he
“knew what she was.” When the doctor reached the outskirts of town, the woman
“insisted on getting out… because it would hurt [his] reputation to be seen in her
company.”79
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When Fuller arrived, there were no trained nurses, only untrained male attendants.
He described the medical facilities as “pretty primitive.” The hospital did not have an xray, laboratory, or decent surgery facilities. Eventually, Hewetson rented a building to
use as a hospital for 40 dollars a month, paying the cost of fuel, laundry, meals, and
supplies for approximately $500.000 per month, the amount necessary to hospitalize an
of 4 patients for $21.00 a week. The most severe cases were sent to Los Angeles or Salt
Lake City. According to Fuller, doctors “accompanied patients themselves hoping to
keep them alive until they reached “the City.” For example, when a worker “knocked
out” his eye, Hewetson rode to Los Angeles with him. Upon his arrival, surgeons
removed the worker’s eye, relieving “constant hemorrhage.” Since he made no claim, the
company allowed him to draw his salary as usual, and met his railroad and hospital
expenses.80
Since the company town had limited resources, the railroad hospital treated
workers and their families. However, the latter was not covered under the health care
plan and patients paid out-of-pocket. With limited paved roads, Fuller rode his bicycle to
make house calls and deliver babies. At the same time, Dr. Roy Martin founded the Las
Vegas Hospital to accommodate families. The Las Vegas Age described it as a “modest
hospital that met the requirements of the community, the railroad, and surrounding
mining camps.” By 1920, the Las Vegas Hospital installed state-of-the-art technology,
including a x-ray machine similar to the equipment of any “metropolitan hospital.” All
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the doctors worked together, routinely traveling to the various railroad sites to treat
workers for heat prostration or other injuries. Once, Fuller went to Moapa to treat
railroad workers “overcome with heat.” He found one man dead and another barely
breathing, although “rigo moris had already set in.” The doctor was not surprised they
died, given the scorching 135 degree temperature in the desert.81
As an enhancement to railroad medicine, several world-class physicians moved to
Las Vegas to obtain a divorce. Nevada had liberal divorce laws, requiring six months
residency for a divorce. Beginning in 1906, several well-publicized case in Reno
revealed the state’s lenience on the issue. As historian James W. Hulse explains, the law
permitted divorces on vague grounds such as “mental cruelty.” Entrepreneurs quickly
capitalized on the industry, opening dude ranches or hotels designated for couples to
establish residency and obtain a hassle-free divorce. At the same time, the marriage
industry flourished. It was easy for couples to marry because Nevada did not require a
waiting period or medical examinations. While Reno remained the divorce and marriage
center, the budding town of Las Vegas capitalized on the industry as well. In May 1918,
Dr. Silas Lewis, a prominent surgeon from New York, arrived in Las Vegas. Described
as a “middle aged, distinguished looking man wearing a Van Dyke beard,” he brought his
two children and a young nurse. After staying in the town for a week, Lewis decided to
remain permanently and became associated with Martin’s Las Vegas Hospital. Local
residents were flattered that a prominent physician chose to practice in town, especially
since World War I created a scarcity of doctors and nurses. Lewis was ultimately
instrumental in helping the town fight off the Spanish flu. Nonetheless, after remaining
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in Las Vegas for six months, the doctor obtained a divorce from his wife, scandalously
married his nurse, and left to establish a practice in Beverly Hills.82
During the 1920s, rumors of a proposed dam project enticed physicians to move
to town, further supporting the medical infrastructure. Martin hired Dr. Forest Mildren,
bought the Palace Hotel, and converted it into the Las Vegas Hospital. The hospital
opened in 1920, with 8 rooms and operating facilities. At the same time, Hewetson,
convinced the railroad to build a new hospital for workers. He suggested that Las Vegas’
railroad medicine needed to reflect the standards in Los Angeles. For $21.00 per week,
Hewetson sought to provide between first aid and surgical care. He contented that it
would “cost the company less than at present and give the employees the desired care and
attention necessary.” The railroad complied, remodeling a former rooming house. The
Hewetson Hospital had 14 beds and a nursery, with a wing indigents. Hewetson lived on
the ground floor of the building. Throughout the 1920s, the Las Vegas Hospital and
Hewetson Hospital adequately served the community until dam construction demanded
larger facilities.83
By 1929, the existing medical infrastructure could not adequately provide for the
growing community. After Hewetson’s retirement and subsequent death in 1932, the
railroad contracted out medical care to Drs. Ferdinand Ferguson and R.D. Balcom,
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transferring them the Hewetson Hospital. Ferguson and Balcom sought to provide
healthcare insurance to not only workers, but also their families. They organized the
Guaranteed Medical Service, Inc., a health plan that provided medical, surgical, and
dental attention to families at a yearly cost. But the situation continued to worsen for
local medicine. After running into financial problems, Martin closed the Las Vegas
Hospital. It could not have come at a worse time. Thousands of potential dam workers,
seeking work during the economic depression, had flooded the valley. Las Vegas not
only lacked housing but also medical facilities to accommodate the influx. The situation
prompted Martin, Ferguson, and Balcom to form the Las Vegas Hospital Association.
The doctors pulled together their resources, constructing a two-story structure in 1931.
Costing $100,000, it had 35 beds, a laboratory, maternity ward, x-ray machine, 5
treatment rooms, a tilting operating table, and advanced lighting system in the operating
room. Drs. John R. McDaniel and Clare W. Woodbury later joined the Las Vegas
Association. Mildren, mistreated by his associates, eventually broke away and opened
the Mildren Clinic. The Las Vegas Hospital Association eventually dissolved over a
series of disagreements between Martin and his associates, and the hospital was renamed
the Las Vegas Hospital and Clinic, which served the community until the 1970s. 84
While the railroad initially contracted with Ferguson, it actively sought a
permanent replacement for Hewetson. It first appointed Dr. H.C. Vander Meulen, but
was unhappy with his performance. Dr. J.C. Landenberger, Chief Surgeon of the Union
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Pacific, decided not to appoint a local doctor to the job, contending that it aroused “envy
in the remaining doctors.” He decided to select an “outsider,” Dr. Hale B. Slavin, a
young surgeon from Salt Lake City. Landenberger arranged for Martin to show him
around town. Slavin’s first impression of Las Vegas was that it was rather “uneventful,”
and the heat in Salt Lake was “far worse.” He found Martin to be “pleasant” and “not at
all selfish,” and hopeful they might “cooperate to our mutual benefit.” 85 Slavin assumed
the position in 1934 and became the county physician in 1939. Upon his arrival, the
railroad rehabilitated the Old Hospital Building that Hewetson had occupied in the early
1920s, covering all renovation costs. They did not charge Slavin rent, but required him to
cover electricity and water expenses.86
By the mid-1930s, railroad workers enjoyed more health care options than
previous decades, as the Union Pacific expanded coverage and options. New doctors
continued to move to Las Vegas with various specialties, and Slavin began referring
injured patients to them. However, the policy was tricky. In order to receive treatment
from a specialist, workers had to obtain an order from Slavin. Moreover, workers had to
obtain a new order for each month of continued treatment. The railroad had a hard time
enforcing the policy. The workers did not have acquire orders but continued to seek
treatment and bill their employer. Consequently, the Medical Department had difficulty
maintaining their financial records.87
Volenti Non Fit Injuria
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As occupational health initiatives improved working conditions, personal injury
suits also gained momentum. During the nineteenth century, most proceedings favored
employers. Employees rarely won large settlements. Moreover, personal injury suits
seldom occurred in remote industrial areas because attorneys typically lived in urban
settings. But after the Civil War, the number of lawyers skyrocketed, especially among
first and second generation immigrants specializing in personal injury litigation. As John
Fabian Witt explains, the legal profession expanded nearly 150 percent from 1870 to
1900. From 1890 to 1900, the number of native-born lawyers with immigrant parents
also grew 80 percent. The lawyers created a new group of professionals associated with
the working class. As their numbers grew, competition inspired a new type of business.
Lacking traditional connections, the lawyers solicited injured workers to file personal
injury claims. Several created a system of “runners” who provided case leads, paying off
workers and policemen alike. Others committed fraud, fabricating claims and accepting
questionable settlements for under-the-table payments. At the same time, corporate
defenders developed unethical strategies, exploiting overlapping jurisdiction rules of the
federal and state courts. Some railroad carriers paid employees not to testify on a
coworkers’ behalf, and insurance agents approached injured workers to sign off on
settlements. Defense attorneys struck corrupt bargains with the plaintiffs’ counsel. By
the twentieth century, personal injury litigation had developed a nasty reputation. Elon
R. Brown, a New York politician and lawyer, observed in 1908 that personal injury
litigation was “marked by a lower tone of professional ethics of the Bar.” It contributed
to “the sentiment, all too prevalent, that litigation is speculative and that the views of the
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lawyers and judges in any particular case are haphazard.” Likewise, Walter Bracken
referred to lawyers as “sharks” that got a hold of workers.88
In response to rising personal injuries costs, the Salt Lake Road established a legal
department in 1913, headed by attorney Frank R. McNamee. The son of Irish
immigrants, McNamee moved from to mining boomtown Eureka in 1883 and was
admitted to the Nevada Bar in 1895. Serving as District Attorney for Lincoln County
from 1896 to 1903, he practiced in both Delmar and Caliente. After his son, Leo, passed
the Nevada Bar and Las Vegas was established as the Clark County seat, the McNamees
founded McNamee & McNamee in town, opening law offices in Los Angeles in 1912
and Las Vegas in 1913. The railroad ultimately appointed McNamee as General
Attorney because of his experience with Nevada law, and his son as Assistant General
Attorney in 1915. The McNamees eventually became a staple of the Las Vegas legal
community, retained by Salt Lake Road and Six Companies, Inc., the builders of Hoover
Dam. Additionally, after Union Pacific assumed control of the railroad, the McNamees
worked alongside the company’s legal team until 1946. The McNamee’ law firm
remained open in Las Vegas until 1978, spanning four generations of the family.89
The railroad’s legal department usually fought damage claims rather than settle,
basing its cases on the general principles of American employers’ liability law. In 1910,
journalist John Gitterman wrote on the dangers of working in the railroad industry,
implying that fatalities were a part of daily operations and the American court system
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greatly mishandled accident litigation. Moreover, Gitterman revealed the law of
employers’ liability. If a person objected to working in hazardous conditions, he had “the
privilege of throwing up his job.” A worker was “not a slave.” He could not “be
compelled under his broiler, or have head scraped off while attempting to couple cars.”90
Therefore, employers’ liability was based on employees’ assumption of risk, or the Latin
phrase volenti non fit injuria, “there is no injury to one who consents.” A 1895 tort law
handbook explained that “no action can be maintained for damages resulting from
conduct suffered by consent.” The McNamees based most of their cases on the assumed
risk doctrine. In Kuckenmeister vs. Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Company, a 16
year old worker lost his eyesight while grinding an emery wheel. The McNamees
determined that the case would be based upon whether “the minor was warned” of the
danger and if “goggles were available.” They argued that assumption of risk was
“wholly dependent upon the servant’s knowledge.” While the doctrine was negated if an
employee was youthful and “did not know or appreciate the dangers [to which] he was
exposed,” the railroad had clearly revealed the “dangers of employment.” The worker
was injured “by a known risk of employment assumed by him.” Since he knew “the risks
of the work in which he [was] engaged,” the worker could not “recover for injuries
caused by his inattention to his surroundings, and failure to take due precautions against
known or obvious dangers.” The McNamees concluded that the “disobedience of rules or
orders” do not “merit negligence” on the employers fault.91
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While personal injury suits rarely provided compensation, workers had other
options. Prior to 1913, the railroad offered life and disability insurance options through
the National Causality Company. After the creation of the Nevada Industrial
Commission (NIC) in 1913, it accepted the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act and allowed
employees to purchase additional coverage with Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company.92 If an employer rejected the NIC provisions, he was denied all defenses in
actions brought upon them. The courts would assume that all workplace injuries were
caused by employer negligence. Consequently, Leo McNamee commented that it was
“almost compulsory” for Nevada industries to accept the provisions. However, when the
Union Pacific assumed control, it decided to reject the NIC. Since it was a larger
company, the Union Pacific had established its own group insurance plan in 1917,
covering life, permanent disability, accident, and health insurance. 93 It offered
employees the insurance at a “very low cost” and “without medical examination,”
providing they were under 60 year old and had no “lost time due to illness.” The plan
deducted from their salaries in monthly installments, 60 cents per month. At the same
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time, employees could purchase additional policies from several private insurance
carriers.94
The final option was to rely on the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),
which awarded damages to injured employees engaged in interstate commerce. FELA
had its drawbacks. A worker could only collect compensation if the injury occurred
while engaging “in commerce between any of the several States,” not commerce within a
state. Eventually, FELA raised legal questions regarding the boundaries of interstate and
intrastate commerce. From 1908 to 1934, the Supreme Court decided 45 cases on
whether an injury occurred within interstate or intrastate lines. As John Fabian Witt
explains, the court’s ad hoc decisions created contradictory legal precedents. Pumping
water on an interstate train was determined interstate commerce. However, loading coal
on the same train was considered intrastate commerce. Likewise, a nighttime watchman
of an interstate train engaged in interstate. But if he received the injury while pursuing
stolen goods from the train, it was intrastate. FELA ultimately led to much confusion.
Distinguishing between interstate and intrastate commerce for statutory or constitutional
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purposes was ultimately pointless. Many attorneys believed it was an unworkable
concept.95
After a workplace accident, the McNamees immediately prepared to contest an
form of compensation. If the injury occurred intrastate, an employee filed with the NIC.
If it was interstate, he sought damages under FELA. Employees often filed under both.
After the filing, the McNamees then determined “whether or not the employer and
employee were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury.” Since the
Union Pacific rejected the NIC, FELA was usually a cheaper option. After repairman
Juan Lomeli slipped on loose gravel at a railroad quarry, the District Court held that the
rock was intended for repairing roadbeds in Nevada. Therefore, Lomeli engaged in
intrastate commerce. This was not good for the Union Pacific. The state automatically
assumed that employers were negligent, citing “the burden of proof … upon the employer
to rebut the resumption of negligence.” The McNamees did not have a case. Their only
option was to argue that the injury occurred interstate, and that Lomeli assumed the risk
of the job. The Union Pacific’s chief attorney, Fred E. Pettit, Jr., advised that McNamees
that “a judgment would probably do against our company for the full amount of the
plaintiff’s demands.” The company decided to settle. This pattern was typical among
most workmen’s compensation cases, with the legal department advising the company to
settle in intrastate cases. Under Nevada laws, Frank McNamee determined that the
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railroad was “deprived of all ordinary defenses on account of not accepting the
Compensation Act.” Unless the company exercised “great and extraordinary care” to
prevent an injury, it was guilty of even slight negligence.96
Ending the Road
By the end of the 1920s, the railroad industry had made significant strides in
protecting its workforce. However, the occupational health movement as a whole was at
a crossroads. While federal agencies such as Public Health Service (PHS) enjoyed broad
power to oversee industrial health during World War I, its powers shifted to state and
local agencies during the conservative 1920s. The enforcement of worker’s
compensation laws also proved difficult. After 1910, a body of legal precedent gradually
made it easier to hold negligent employers liable for job-related accidents and pay
compensation to injured workers— a dramatic shift from nineteenth-century practices.
As a result, insurance companies did a brisk business-selling worker’s compensation
policies to employers during and after the war. However, the 1920s was predominately
pro-business, as relations between the various Republican administrations and big
business flourished. Employers held off reformers by lobbying sympathetic lawmakers,
actively contesting suits in court, and hiring physicians who questioned whether workers’
diseases could be traced to the workplace rather than to the neighborhood and home. In
most cases, conservative judges ruled in favor of management, a trend that discouraged
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personal injury litigation. Still, legal pressures forced many big employers to invest in
occupational safety and even fund academic research into occupational job issues.
At the onset of the great depression, the occupational health movement continued
to wane. 25 percent of Americans faced unemployment, but the ones with jobs suffered
too. Forced to accept low salaries and endure long hours, industrial workers confronted
dangerous and unsanitary working environments to ensure their employers remained in
business. While in previous decades workers fought to better their working conditions,
most felt lucky to have a job. Additionally, towns and counties hosting highway
construction, dam building, and other large public workers projects were confronted with
massive increases in population they could not support. While Las Vegas had grown
significantly since 1905, the announcement that Hoover Dam would be built 30 miles
away prompted thousands of unemployed men to flood southern Nevada. Suddenly, the
town’s population spiked tenfold. After years of relative success in occupational and
public health in the town, Las Vegas could no longer provide the adequate living
arrangements, medical care, and public health standards needed to accommodate the new
residents. Throughout the 1920s, the railroad had gradually relinquished its paternalistic
responsibility to Las Vegas as well. Since it was no longer a company town, the railroad
stopped protecting the town’s public health. Las Vegas needed to fend for itself, turning
to its county health department. However, it was understaffed and underfunded. When
Chief Surgeon of the Union Pacific, Dr. J.C. Landenberger, visited the town in 1930, he
was horrified. The doctor commented that Las Vegas was “probably the most unsanitary
in the country” and if not the worst, “a decidedly close race for honors.” The ReviewJournal agreed, writing that conditions that existed downtown “would be permitted in no
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other city in the United States.” It declared that the town was “courting disaster to the
health of the community.” Las Vegas could no longer provide for the health of southern
Nevada.97
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CHAPTER 2
THE DAM
We make no contention that carbon monoxide is not dangerous under certain
circumstances and in sufficient concentration. Our position is, and we have proved it, that
there is no sufficient concentration of carbon monoxide in any said tunnels at any time to
be in the slightest degree dangerous.
Six Companies Inc. (1931)
Nine states did not have a Veterans Bureau Hospital in 1931. All but four had
medical institutions such as naval hospitals or services provided by the Public Health
Service (PHS). Three of the remaining four, South Carolina, Vermont, and Delaware, had
contracts with private hospitals to care for their disabled veterans. And then there was
one.
Nevada was the only state with no federal hospital and no provisions made for the
care of disabled veterans. The American Legion, a congressionally chartered veteran
organization, launched a campaign to contract the creation of a hospital for the diagnosis,
care, and treatment of Nevada’s veterans. It presented the cause to the Subcommittee on
World War Veterans in Washington D.C. on January 23, 1931, stressing the need for a
hospital based on the impending reclamation project in southern Nevada. In 1928,
Congress had passed the Swing-Johnson Bill, which authorized construction of a dam at
Black Canyon to harness the Colorado River’s enormous power. Southern Nevada’s
veteran population ranged between 5400 and 7000 men in early 1931. But the American
Legion worried that the “Boulder Dam situation” would aggravate this number. 98 In fact,
the U.S. Employment Service, in charge of hiring for the Boulder Canyon Project,
98
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advertized it would give preference to “ex-service men who have served in the World
War, the Philippine insurrection, or the War with Spain… as far as practicable for
employment…” 99 Southern Nevada did not have the medical infrastructure to
accommodate the massive influx. A Veterans Bureau Hospital seemed the logical
solution.
The campaign worked. Congress allocated a $625,000 Veterans Hospital to the
Nevada and began evaluating possible sites. Requirements included at least 30 acres for
the building site, and close proximity to city water, sewer, power and electricity.100
Reno, Ely and Las Vegas built their case for the hospital. Reno made a “particularly
strenuous” effort, enlisting the help of the Southern Pacific Railroad, though they
“indicated that they were sure of getting it.”101 Nevertheless, Las Vegas had a persuasive
case. The Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce appointed a committee to aid the local
American Legion post. Next, it solicited the Union Pacific for help. If the railroad
donated 30 acres of land, it would be “repaid from a financial as well as moral
standpoint.” Passenger fare revenues from veterans visiting the hospital would pay for
the land, and water rental by the government would be “very large.” The committee also
stressed the threat of Reno, commenting that “their influence, both political and
otherwise, is very great, and it will take great effort to obtain this hospital for Las Vegas.”
Most importantly, if the hospital went to Reno, the Union Pacific could not “possibly get
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any benefit from it.” The railroad accepted the offer, authorizing Walter Bracken to
donate or require a “very reasonable charge” for over 20 acres north of the railroad
yard.102
After securing the Union Pacific, the committee began preparing its case, arguing
that it was a “practical and logical location” because of its railroad facilities and water
supply. After the completion of the dam, southern Nevada would also have “the cheapest
power in the world.” But above all, the region desperately needed a boost to its medical
infrastructure. As a whole, the southwest had no veteran facilities. Once conservative
estimate had at least 1500 veterans living in southern Nevada, western Arizona, western
Utah, and a great portion of southern Nevada. Additionally, southern Nevada had a
bright future for growth, citing Hoover Dam. Swing-Johnson gave ex-servicemen
employment preference under law, which would contribute to a sharp rise in veteran
population. Leonard Blood, Superintendant of the U.S. Employment Office, expected
“thousands” of veterans to apply, estimating the workforce would be 50 percent
veteran.103
By 1931, the Las Vegas medical infrastructure was grossly insufficient. The
American Legion described it as “extremely inadequate or more properly, entirely
wanting.” In previous decades, personalized care provided by Drs. Roy Martin and Hal
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Hewetson were high regarded. But Las Vegas never fully modernized its hospitals,
lacking surgical facilities and enough beds. The town was “completely reliant” on
southern California, which was “crowded beyond capacity” as well. In one case, it took
45 days for a local veteran to get a bed. Since southern California was full, he had to
travel to Wyoming. This was a common scenario. To be admitted in southern California,
it took several weeks. The American Legion called the lack of hospital facilities in the
southwest “notorious.”104
Local residents developed the theory that southern Nevada’s climatic and health
conditions would offset the competition. The railroad worked on the “theory that
climatic conditions are very much superior to the northern part of the state.” Even Dr.
J.C. Landenberger supported the idea. While he considered the public health conditions
to be unacceptable, Las Vegas was an ideal location for a “tuberculosis sanitarian” due its
altitude and dry climate. Local doctors agreed. “To simply say the ‘climate is health’ is
entirely inadequate,” wrote Dr. Roy Martin. Southern Nevada had the healthiest climate
in the state. Dr. Ferdinand Ferguson emphasized that Clark County’s death rate was
“one-half of the average death rate for the country.” Moreover, infections were “very
rare” and mortality “practically negligible,” and patients enjoyed outdoor life “at all times
of the year.” Drs. R. D. Balcom and Forest Mildren contended the dry climate was
“conducive to the cure of tuberculosis” and better suited for a tuberculosis sanitarian than
Arizona and New Mexico. Dr. John McDaniel also observed the climate was good for
nephritics, asthmatics, and sinus conditions. Southern Nevada had an absence of fog,
smoke and dust in the air, and high percentage of sunshine. These factors sped up a
patient’s recovery. Lastly, Dr. H.C. Vander Meulen anticipated southern Nevada needed
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a hospital based upon dam construction and its aftermath, predicting that Las Vegas
would grow into a “resort and tourist center,” and experience “industrial growth.” The
location was also “readily accessible” to the railroad line. The doctor predicted that the
workers would confront numerous hazards at the dam. “Already we are handicapped for
accommodating disabled veterans,” he concluded, and with Hoover Dam, “this is going
to increase.”105
Las Vegas ultimately lost the bid to Reno. While southern Nevada desperately
needed to expand its medical infrastructure to accommodate dam workers, due to
statewide politics the Veterans Bureau awarded the hospital to Reno. Indeed, this event
would contribute to a North-South split in the Nevadan medical community, which
persisted throughout the twentieth century. While it is impossible to determine if a
veterans hospital would have saved lives at Hoover Dam, one thing is clear. Southern
Nevada was completely unprepared to support of the health its workers.106
The Boulder Dam Situation
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In 1923, Congressmen Phil Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson led a legislative
effort that introduced the first Boulder Canyon Project Act.107 However, before Congress
could appropriate funds, it needed to determine a location for the dam. Since 1902,
government hydrographers and geologists identified potential sites on the lower Colorado
River. As historian Joseph Stevens reveals, three factors influenced the location: the
geological and topographical nature of the site, the water and silt-storage capacity of the
reservoir, and proximity to the railroad and markets for hydroelectric power. Applying
this criteria, the Bureau of Reclamation narrowed the choice to two sites: Black and
Boulder Canyons, situated 20 miles apart and southeast of Las Vegas. During the study,
the project experienced its first fatality. In 1922, a reclamation worker slipped off barge
and drowned in the Colorado River. In a bizarre twist of fate, his son fell to his death
from an intake tower 13 years later. Father and son were the first and last to die on the
project.108
Congress deliberated on a bill soon after. By December 1928, President Calvin
Coolidge approved the Boulder Canyon Project Act, which authorized the construction of
a dam and reservoir by the Secretary of Interior. It was an ambitious project. Hoover
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Dam would be the highest dam project in the world, towering 700 feet, and host the
largest reservoir in the world. Reclamation expected the dam would take six years to
complete. Construction was slated to begin in 1931, with the first units operating in
1935. To construct the dam “efficiently and economically,” Secretary of Interior Ray
Lyman Wilbur determined that the dam site was a federal reservation in March 1931.
Since it was located on the Colorado River between Nevada and Arizona, he recognized
that workers would cross from one state to the other. Under these conditions, it would be
difficult “to determine which system of municipal or statutory law is applicable” which
would “increase the cost of the work.” The reservation afforded the federal government
complete control, with limited interference from the states. Nevada complied, forfeiting
authority and acquisition rights to the federal government. 109 The agreement began a
lasting relationship between the federal government and the state, housing federal
projects throughout the twentieth century.110
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After locating a site, the federal government contracted to the private sector to
build it. Incorporated in February 1931, seven separate companies founded Six
Companies Inc. The newly-formed corporation sought to control all aspects of the
building design, constructing Hoover Dam, the power plant, and all other works. Bids for
the project opened on March 4, 1931 in Denver. Six Companies submitted the lowest,
$49 million, and by March 11, Wilbur awarded them the contract, alongside Babcock &
Wilcox Company, and the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing and Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Companies.111
After winning the contract, Six Companies authorized engineer Frank T. Crowe,
the nation’s foremost dam builder, to hire workers to build a railroad to the site and
temporary camp, and engineers to outline plans to begin construction. The contractor
provided employment through the U.S. Employment Service in cooperation with the
State of Nevada. Leonard Blood, appointed superintendant in charge, established a
public employment office in Las Vegas. Since the formal announcement in 1930, the
Boulder Dam Project attracted hundreds of prospective workers. The workers were a
colorful group of characters, ranging from experienced construction workers to cowboys
from Nevada and Utah. The largest group, factory workers, mechanics, sales clerks,
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lawyers, bankers, and students, had never experienced hard labor in the desert. The
influx of people created a “pitiful and pathetic site,” according to Charles “Pop” Squires.
While soup kitchens fed some potential workers and their family members, hundreds
were starving. The situation became so dire that the Interior Department issued an
official statement that the project would not begin for another year. It actually urged
workers not to seek employment, citing that no worker should travel to Las Vegas
without assured employment or “financially able to tide over an uncertain period of
unemployment.” The warning did not stop workers. Thousands traveled to Las Vegas,
resulting in a very large number of idle men. As mobs swarmed the employment office
to submit applications, Blood struggled to maintain order. Within only a few months, he
received 2,400 applications and over 12,000 letters inquiring about employment.112
Consequently, public health in Las Vegas worsened, prompting Dr. J.C.
Landenberger to call it “probably the most unsanitary in the country.” The once neatlyorganized company town looked more like a Hooverville.113 Communities of tents and
shacks scattered the desert landscape. One newspaper wrote that the “bonanza days of
the Old West” were “being reenacted in the Nevada town.” It was “one of the strangest
in the country today,” with people “streaming in from everywhere.” Thousands lived in
tents, as there was not enough hotels, homes, or stores, and the two banks could not
finance building construction. Journalist Edmund Wilson described the scene as a
112
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“battlefield.” Las Vegas was “thronged with wanderers looking for work” and the train
station was “full of sleeping men.” The start desert condition astonished several
journalists, describing it as a “deadly desert place” with “unsympathetic mountains,” and
“furnace-like winds.” But while conditions were poor, the dam was far worse. The
Boulder Dam situation fostered extremely hazardous working and living conditions,
grossly inadequate in the realm of occupational health.114
The Deadly Desert Place
The workers were aware of the harsh conditions. Indeed, Leonard Blood
commented that there were inherent “hardships of pioneering” a groundbreaking project.
At first, workers were recruited by word of mouth. Supervisors found employees that fit
their needs, and brought appointments to the U.S. Employment Office. Blood furnished
men if a foreman could not fill the position as well. In spring 1931, only 28 percent of
the dam workers were veterans, with an estimated 89 foreigners toiling on the project.
After a strike in August 1931, the U.S. Employment Office took over all aspects,
eliminating all but 19 foreigners. Eventually, 47 percent were veterans. Dr. Richard
Schofield, Six Companies’ Chief Surgeon, reported that out of 22,000 men examined for
work, 920 were rejected. Of the rejections, 33 percent had cardiovascular problems, 22
percent had hernias, and 20 percent had defective hearing. The rest had “manual
deficiencies.” Blood received a fair amount of criticism for his hiring techniques, but
maintained the practices were “entirely fair.” Workers were represented from nearly
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every state, with California and Nevada providing the majority. Most were white and
married, with a medium age of 31.6 during the summer and 35 during the winter.115
The sheer number of employees tested the contractors’ commitment to
occupational health. After construction began in April 1931, the workforce varied from
520 to 700 men in May. By 1932, the number increased from 800 to 3,000 men. At the
height of construction in June 1934, it employed 5,128. Schofield described that the
“occupations included practically every form of work done by man.” The project
employed engineers, miners, mockers, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, engineers,
railroad employees, clerical force, commissary attendants, truck drivers, riggers,
mechanics, chemists, steelworkers, cement workers, and all forms of general labor.
Unskilled labor salaries ranged from 50 cents to $1.00 per hour, working an average of 8
hours per day. Skilled labor, including engineers, and inspectional and clerical forces,
earned $1,400 to $5,600 per annum.116
The workers and their families lived in a makeshift, rag-tag community along the
riverbank. They were in no position to insist on their rights. Consequently, the
contractor paid little attention to appropriate sanitary, healthcare, and housing needs.117
The community was named Williamsville, but called Ragtown by workers. Indeed,
Ragtown was a more suitable title. The workers and their families lived in flimsy tents,
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cardboard shacks, cars, and trailers, and endured extreme heat, strong winds,
thunderstorms, and flooding. At its height, Ragtown housed over 550 residents.
Although Six Companies built temporary housing for tunnel workers, both settlements
offered little comfort. The camps were “more difficult to maintain” than Six Companies
anticipated due to the “higher heat conditions along the river and humidity due to the
location near the water.” However, it asserted that “every effort is being made to provide
as much comfort” to the workers “as practicable.” Dr. John McDaniel, who made house
calls out to Ragtown, described the temperature as “about 130 in the daytime and would
not cool down much during the night.” The community did not have “adequate
refrigeration for food or anything.” The residents bathed and drew drinking water from
the Colorado River contaminated by bacteria, pathogens, and disease-producing bacteria
and viruses. While no epidemics occurred at this time, waterborne diseases such as viral
and bacterial gastroenteritis and typhoid fever contaminated the river and the drinking
water tanks. McDaniel found that the other major problem “was dysentery from spoiled
meat and vegetables.”118
Although Bureau of Reclamation Director Elwood Mead was aware of these
brutal conditions, he did little to help. Mead thought the workers could survive the first
summer without “great losses” and move to Boulder City in the fall. But he was wrong.
On June 24, 1931, the Review-Journal reported that the dam site was 140 degrees
Fahrenheit in the sun and 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade. The average temperature
118
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during the summer of 1931 was 119.9 degrees Fahrenheit. Intense sweating subjected the
workers to heat dehydration, also referred to as heat prostration or exhaustion, which
resulted from a combination of thermal and cardiovascular strain. They experienced
fatigue, dizziness, confusion, an increased pulse and respiration rate, and developed dry
skin. The workers’ condition often developed into heatstroke, experiencing high body
temperature, convulsion, swelling of the brain, coma, and even death. In their reports, the
doctors explained that their patient’s “regulating center” rose above normal. Over the
course of the next five years, numerous workers passed out or died of heatstroke.
Although no one knows how many suffered acutely from the heat, Six Companies’
records indicate that 17 workers died from “heat prostration” in the summer of 1931. It is
unknown how many family members died during this time. 119
To its credit, the contractor recognized the problem and revised the employees’
schedules to limit exposure to the sun. But the summer heat made the labor situation
“somewhat difficult” for them, increasing labor turnover and delayed construction
progress. Six Companies generally blamed the high number of fatality on the workers,
noting that it seemed “evident that the fatal cases were in fact due to a fundamental lack
of vitality or induced overeating or some other ailment.” Besides heatstroke, the workers
experienced terrible burns on the skin from the sun and wind, leading many to believe
they had caught a water-borne disease from the river. While no epidemics occurred in
1931, there was an outbreak of spinal meningitis as well as several pneumonia cases, with
at least 4 dying from the former and 5 from the latter. During the first year of
119
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construction, 46 workers and family members died on or near the dam site. Since Six
Companies and the Bureau of Reclamation documents most fatalities as “accidents
sustained on and off duty” as well as “heat prostration” and “natural causes,” it is difficult
to determine the actual cause of death.120
Of course, the men and women who toiled on the Boulder Canyon Project
contended with a variety of other hazards besides heat. Given the larger economic
context, the workers were lucky to have a job and accepted the long hours, low wages,
and inhuman working conditions. According to a 1932 Six Companies physical exam
report, 100 out of approximately 3,000 employees received medical attention at either the
Boulder City Hospital or the two first aid stations per day. More than 5,200 injuries
occurred during this period of construction, with an average of four to sixteen accidents
daily that required a physician’s help. The report also calculated that a fatal industrial
injury occurred every 13,620 hours worked. 121
The injuries were not isolated to the workers. As the “greatest peace time project
since the building of the Panama Canal,” Hoover Dam became a popular tourist
destination. Through the cooperation of the federal government, Six Companies and the
Union Pacific, the railroad operated regular sightseeing excursions every Saturday night
120
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from Las Vegas. Of course, visiting the site was highly dangerous. The contractor
stressed that “no visitors, women, or children, shall be allowed to rise on cable ways,
monkey slides, trains or trucks.” After several accidental fatalities and injuries, Six
Companies discontinued the trips and increased their liability insurance “arising out to
the public visiting the dam operations.” But tourists still could observe the dam site from
afar at several viewing stations.122
Initially, the contractor went through the motions of promoting safety. It posted
Safety First signs, held weekly first aid classes, and distributed safety helmets, belts,
goggles, and protective mechanical devices. The Florence Nightingale Institute even
awarded 6 honorary fellowships to encourage project safety. The fellowships were
awarded to the foremen whose crews showed the least number of fatal accidents. As with
most Safety First campaigns during the depression, Six Companies was more concerned
with the rhetoric of safety than with ensuring safety. Although contractor distributed
helmets, it did little to enforce or require use.123
Consequently, human error and carelessness was the leading cause of death.
Failures in operating machinery and equipment, falling rock or cave-ins, and fatigue, lack
of sleep, poor communication, lack of experience, or inadequate risk perception caused
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most accidents. Speedups was also a severe hazard. 124 Dr. John McDaniel remembered
treating numerous fall victims. One time, a worker slipped while scaling the cliff and
waved goodbye to the doctor as he fell. Of course, McDaniel was unable to save his life.
When he went to retrieve the body, “the worker was impaled on the rocks.” Constructing
the diversion tunnels also exposed workers to indoor threats. Before dam construction
began, workers diverted the Colorado River around the construction site. While carving
the diversion tunnels out of the mountainside, blasting and falling rocks also threatened
safety. Additionally, workers were exposed to air pollutants. While lead poisoning,
silicosis, and asbestos posed some threat, carbon monoxide was the most lethal.125
Gasoline-fueled trucks transported rocks and gravel from the tunnels, emitting exhaust
and dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. The high concentrations of gas accumulated
in the tunnels because of poor ventilation. Since the carbon monoxide was clear,
odorless, and tasteless, the workers were unable to detect its existence. Long-term
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exposure produced mild symptoms for some workers, but had lasting neurological effects
for others.126
At the same time, outbreaks of contagious diseases afflicted the project. From
September 1931 to February 1932, Boulder City and Las Vegas experienced a spinal
meningitis outbreak. Even though the Las Vegas board of education and Boulder City
closed schools for 10 days to quarantine the disease, health officers referred to the disease
outbreak as “not of the epidemic type.” But at least one worker and three children died of
complications of spinal meningitis during the outbreak. In fall 1933, influenza affected
over a thousand Boulder City residents. In the next year, scarlet fever and measles
debilitated the community. Numerous cases of typhoid fever, scarlet fever, polio,
tuberculosis, measles, mumps, gonorrhea, diphtheria, influenza, whooping cough,
chicken pox, bronchitis, and syphilis also threatened the population intermittently over
the next few years. Airborne disease certainly contributed to these epidemics, as did
contaminants in the municipal water supply and pollutants spawned by the generally
unsanitary conditions of the project. 127 A percentage of workers also contracted venereal
diseases from prostitutes on Block 16 in Las Vegas, forcing city health officers to
administer the workers and prostitutes alike with shots of arspehamine for syphilis
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prevention. Boulder City manager Sims Ely did what he could to prevent workers from
going to Las Vegas to drink, gamble, and pay for sex, but it did little good.128
Occupational health problems on the dam site were inevitable, especially in the
first year. By starting the project six months early, Six Companies was not equipped to
provide adequate housing, sanitary facilities, and medical care. Certainly, if the Bureau
of Reclamation or contractor had established an adequate occupational health system
before starting the project, fewer workers would have died or been left disabled. In fact,
the worst of the developments could have been avoided had the federal government
honored its original industrial medicine contract. 129
Federal officials began discussing providing hospital services to employees of the
Boulder Canyon Project in 1930. As a medical doctor, Secretary of Interior Ray Allen
Wilbur projected the project would pose considerable health risks. The inaccessibility of
the work, magnitude of operations, and severe weather conditions would inevitably
challenge “the health, comfort, and general welfare” of the workers. Therefore, Allen
commissioned the establishment of a government town, Boulder City. Since it was a
federal project, Elwood Mead assumed that the Public Health Service (PHS) would
provide medical care. He wrote Dr. Hugh S. Cumming, the U.S. Surgeon General,
asking if the PHS could staff and operate a hospital. The PHS, however, did not have
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enough funding, and declined the offer. Consequently, the Interior Department and
Bureau of Reclamation opened bids for the project’s industrial medicine contract in
March 1931.130
Local doctors jumped at the opportunity, with Drs. Roy Martin, Ferdinand
Ferguson, and R.D. Balcom leading the charge. For decades, Martin had contracted out
to southern Nevada industries, providing industrial medicine to the Las Vegas and
Tonopah Railroad and local mining community. He also actively campaigned for the
dam project in the early 1920s. Martin enlisted Ferguson and Balcom, established the
Las Vegas Hospital Association, and submitted a bid for the contract. Moreover, he hired
Drs. John McDaniel and Clare Woodbury. Since the federal government slated Las
Vegas to be the central point of the project, they were initially awarded the contract.
However, when Ray Wilbur visited Las Vegas, he determined that gambling, drinking,
and prostitution was not the proper environment for workers. Consequently, Wilbur
decided to build Boulder City and ordered Six Companies to create a comprehensive
occupational health program, revoking Martin’s contract.131
Six Companies offered informal assistance to their employees, developing health
care plans that placed physicians on the company payroll. Ultimately, the contractor’s
team of doctors would promote a healthy workforce to boost production and protect the
employer from workers’ compensation and liability lawsuits. The doctors’ most visible
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practice of defensive medicine was pre-employment examinations. By the 1930s,
growing number of fraudulent liability cases led most companies to institute physical
examinations. The practice began in the railroad industry in the late-nineteenth century
in response to compensation insurance. Most railroad doctors rejected seven to thirteen
percent of all applicants based on physical injuries or ailments. For example, the Santa
Fe and Northern Pacific Railroads screened for not only injuries but also excluded
individuals with venereal diseases, tuberculosis, or cancer. The companies’ motives were
not only for legal protection; they also prevented future accidents. Most examinations
tested vision and hearing, and for hernias, loss of fingers, and heart or lung problems, all
ailments that could prevent a worker from safely performing his job. By 1900, the
American Railway Association instituted a standard physical examination and the tests
were widespread among the railroad industry. After World War I, most industries
required employment examination and periodic physicals to screen for disabilities.
Although these examinations could have helped diagnose occupational diseases, many
doctors were loyal to their employer and rarely reported their findings to the workers or
their colleagues and medical journals. They also served as consultants on increasing
production, concealed potentially harmful industrial hygiene issues, and reduced
workmen’s’ compensation obligations. As a result, workers often mistrusted company
doctors.132
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Six Companies’ physical examinations documented preexisting ailments and the
overall health of an employee as well, a practice that proved useful in compensation
hearings. It required workers to sign a disclaimer relinquishing the right to sue their
employer for the compensation of preexisting conditions.133 Moreover, the workers were
required to pass the pre-employment examination to gain employment. Six Companies
hired Dr. John McDaniel to administer the exams, paying him for $250 a month. The
workers were in bad shape, with most “starving pretty much before they got here.” They
also had high blood pressure. McDaniel attributed it to “their work or everyday lives” or
worry that they would not find a job. Heat caused ailments as well. While at the River
Camp, McDaniel noticed a thermometer in the shade. “The darned thing only registered
120 degrees,” he recalled. “It broke on the first day I was down there.” From 1931-33,
McDaniel and other physicians ultimately rejected 101 out of 2000 men for ailments and
disabilities.134
Besides physical examinations, the contractor provided limited care and first aid
stations during the summer of 1931. Doctors administered physicals and staffed first aid
stations, but on-site medical care was not available. However, Six Companies did
establish a rudimentary medical facility on May 22, 1931, in Boulder City. It placed
Charles Christal, the medical director for the California State Compensation Insurance
fund, in charge. Though Christal referred to it as a “first class aid station,” his assistants
told workers their only job was to examine them to “see if they can do a day’s work
before we give them a job.” The doctors never treated women or children. At the same
133

For an original copy of the disclaimer, contact the Boulder City Museum and Historical Society Special
Collections.
134
Interview with John R. McDaniel; “Report of the Commissioner of Labor,” Appendix to Journals of
Senate and Assembly, Thirty-Sixth Session, Vol. I, (Carson City, NV: State Printing Office, 1933), 12-15;
Dunbar and McBride, Building Hoover Dam, 36-37.

89

time, Six Companies announced plans to build a hospital for Boulder City and bought
two ambulances to transport seriously injured workers to Las Vegas. The ambulance ride
was not complimentary. Until they finished the hospital in Boulder City, they contracted
out medical care to Las Vegas Hospital Association. The contractor covered insurance
for treatment in Las Vegas by deducting from workers’ paychecks to cover the
ambulance ride and all medical costs. The ambulance transported patients to Las Vegas
Hospital. The facility, however, was inadequate for most trauma care; Dr. Roy Martin
continued to send his most serious cases to Los Angeles. As an added inconvenience,
patients had to travel to Las Vegas to fill their prescriptions at White Cross Drug. Of
course, first aid stations were available at the dam site to treat injured workers, especially
the “tunnel men” who worked near compressor number three. Six Companies ran these
stations. In fact, the attendant in charge of the first aid station for “tunnel men” also
worked for the Six Companies’ insurance department.135
By July 1931, the hazardous working conditions, bad food, contaminated drinking
water, and housing situation had become unsustainable. To rectify the situation, Six
Companies made a few policy changes; it discontinued to practice of pumping the River
Camp’s drinking water from the murky Colorado and began fetching cool water from Las
Vegas’ artisan wells. It also transferred the blasting supplies to the Arizona side, away
from hazardous electrical lines and machine shop welding equipment, and banned the use
of gasoline as a cleaning fluid after several fatal explosions. However, one variable was
out of the contractor’s control: the blazing heat. July 1931 was one of the hottest on
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record in the Las Vegas vicinity, with an average daily temperature of 119.9 degrees. The
hottest days and nights reached 128 and 103 degrees respectively. On July 20 alone, heat
prostration incapacitated five workers, and a worker’s 15 year old daughter died in
Ragtown. A few days later, several more Ragtown women died and four workers were
overcome by the heat. The workers became angry and frustrated. After their shifts, they
would return to Ragtown only to learn about more deaths and hospitalizations. Then, the
workers would continue to fester in the evening heat, which averaged 95 degrees, and
barely slept at night. Numerous workers began to contemplate the possibility of a strike.
All they needed was a spark.136
On August 7, Six Companies provided them with one. As the swing-shift crew
arrived to work, their foremen informed them of a wage cut implemented for all diversion
tunnel workers. The unexpected announcement put the workers over the edge. For
months, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a radical labor union known as the
Wobblies, had tried to solidify bargaining power on the project.137 In general, the
Depression’s spiraling unemployment decimated union membership nationwide. From
1929 to 1933, trade membership fell 20 percent, from 3.6 to 2.8 workers.138 The union
jumped at the chance to stage a walkout. At 5:00 pm, the Wobblies addressed 400
workers at the River Camp cookhouse about the possibility of strike. The debate was
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brief and the men voted unanimously. By 7:00 pm, 600 workers congregated at the
Boulder City camp to vote in favor, and the following day, a delegation of strikers urged
the crews preparing for work to remain idle. All project construction worked stopped.
L.L. “Red” Williams, head of the strike committee, presented their demands:
1. Cancel the pay cut and establish a raise to $5.00 for surface men; $5.50 for
tunnel workers; $6.00 for miners; and $6.00 for carpenters
2. Improvements in the sanitary conditions of the River Camp
3. All men be returned to their jobs without discrimination
4. Workers be supplied with ice water on and off the job until drinking fountains
were installed
5. Rates for board set at $1.50 flat per day
6. Strict adherence to Nevada and Arizona mining safety laws
7. Changing rooms be installed at portals in tunnels so the workers could get out
of their wet, dirty clothes before traveling back to the camps
8. An eight-hour day included time spent traveling from camp to dam site
9. Safety miners be placed at each tunnel to provide first aid to injured workers
Of course, Frank Crowe publically denied any wrongdoing and criticized his workers for
walking out. In an interview with the Review-Journal, he asserted that safety was the
contractor’s top priority and the July records showed “no reported accidents.” Crowe did
not acknowledge that 11 workers died from the heat, 2 from drowning and 1 in a car
accident. Technically, he was right. Work activity had not “directly” caused any of the
deaths. But his comments were dishonest nonetheless.139
By August 10, Six Companies rejected the strikers’ demand and issued all the
striking employees a notice of dismissal. The harsh response stunned the workers. Their
solidarity began to crumble. The workers banned the Wobbly agitators from playing a
formal role in strike negotiations, sending a telegram to Secretary of Labor William Doak
that requested “protection on Hoover Dam in the case of deportation.” The strike
committee’s plea was ignored. During the Hoover Administration, the federal
139
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government’s role was not to safeguard the workers’ rights, but protect its investment and
ensure efficiency. While the project was six months ahead of schedule, discontinuing
dam construction posed a huge problem. Elwood Mead thought that the striker’s
demands were “impossible.” Therefore, federal authorities began policing the
reservation, establishing semi-martial law. Although it claimed to be neutral, the federal
government clearly aimed to break the strike. Nevada also did not offer much help to the
workers. Governor Fred B. Balzar flat out refused to help, replying to the workers that
the Nevada was “absolutely neutral in all labor disputes” and that the “matter should
properly be referred to Department of Labor, Washington.” 140
With no support from the state or federal governments, and Six Companies
rehiring new workers to resume construction, the strikers accepted defeat. However, the
walkout was not in vain. On August 13, Six Companies agreed to 4 of the workers’
demands. It installed lights and drinking fountains at the River Camp, and built changing
rooms in the tunnels. The corporation also accelerated work on the completion of
Boulder City. While the weather was out of Six Companies’ control, the heat abated to a
tolerable level by mid-August. On August 15, the corporation rehired 750 workers
involved in the strike and resumed construction.141
It is important to note that 163 workers did not strike. To be sure, most wanted
improved working conditions, but it was the Great Depression. Many felt lucky to have a
job. Bob Parker, a general laborer, thought the Wobblies were just “trying to stir up
trouble” so they could “dictate” to Six Companies and the federal government about
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“labor rules.” Additionally, residents of Las Vegas were not supportive of the strike or
labor unions in general. The Union Pacific strike of 1922 continued to haunt them.
Newspaperman John Cahlan remarked that the unions had “lost their hold in Las Vegas
when they had the strike in 1922.” Some residents were still “absolutely fighting mad”
about the 1922 strike because the Union Pacific moved its rail shops. They feared that
the federal government would move the Boulder Canyon Project. The strike could have
affected “the future of the city,” and residents were “determined that the labor unions
were not going to get a big hold on the community.”142
After the strike, it was clear that the working conditions were inadequate. To
hamper future strikes, Six Companies discussed how to improve operations. The
consensus was to enhance sanitary conditions at the River Camp and to close Ragtown.
Additionally, to initiate an occupational health program that stressed safety. The
corporation decided that “no men should be put to work until proper living and sanitary
conditions are provided.” The federal government also took action. It stressed that Six
Companies’ production needed to become more efficient. The strike and poor health had
been “contributing factors in the lower efficiency” during the summer months.
Consequently, President Herbert Hoover personally enlarged the federal government’s
role in Black Canyon by eliminating the wasteful practice of employing and maintaining
unhealthy workers. The policies included workers receiving regular physicals and
medical care, and having access to modern hospital facilities. To oversee the initiatives,
Hoover authorized the Bureau of Reclamation to play a more active role in supervising
occupational health at the site and in Boulder City. Consequently, the federal
government gave Six Companies an ultimatum. The corporation had to build and
142
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manage a comprehensive occupational health program improving living and health
conditions or it would lose the contract.143
Regulation and Research
Historians have often argued that until the New Deal, the states and cities
regulated occupational health in America’s industries. However, the Boulder Canyon
Project’s considerable health risks forced the federal government to force Six Companies
to undertake major initiatives to protect its workers. In response, the corporation
developed a system that provided job-related healthcare on the dam site and in Boulder
City before the New Deal, actions which boosted the entire occupational health
movement.144
The Bureau of Reclamation ordered Ragtown to close permanently in 1932
because of its insanitary conditions.145 The agency not only required Six Companies to
build a hospital, but also to construct a sanitary community by drafting a city plan that
implemented federal recommendations pertaining to the water supply, waste disposal,
and public health.146 Six Companies deducted $1.60 per day for board and lodging for
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single men housed in their dormitories. Each had their own rooms. The workforce grew
larger, as previously unemployed men not only built Hoover Dam, but also Boulder
City’s sewers, sewage treatment facilities, and water purification plants. The Bureau of
Reclamation ordered the construction of a pumping, filtration, and distribution system to
divert and purify the muddy waters of the Colorado River for use in Boulder City.
Completed in 1932, the sanitation system pumped two million gallons of water to the
town daily. Water analysts rigidly monitored the bacterial and chemical levels to
maintain decent drinking water supplies. At the same time, Six Companies erected a
sludge digestion sewage plant to chemically treat the disposal of a half million gallons of
waste daily, which Las Vegans used as fertilizer for their lawns.147
Federal officials were also concerned with safeguarding food consumption. By
1932, regular inspections by the Bureau of Reclamation occurred at all establishments on
the Boulder City reservation that sold, handled, or served food and drinks. The federal
government also inspected bathrooms and toilets in houses, and public facilities.
Additionally, the Board of Health took part in the health assessments On May 11, 1932,
it inspected the River Camp facilities and reported that conditions had changed
dramatically. There were no flies present in the mess hall, and all facilities were
equipped with heat, ventilation, and cooling. It also deemed the First Aid station to be
adequate, with modern medical instruments, two cots, an emergency table, hot and cold
water, and all necessary drugs. Overall, the Board of Health was impressed.148
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Finally, the Anderson Brothers Supply Company developed a state-of-the-art
system for transporting milk through the desert from Logandale in refrigerated trucks. It
even equipped its ranch with a water and sewage system, refrigeration plant, and steam
plant. No cases of milk-borne infections occurred in Boulder City, with the exception of
one case of typhoid that authorities traced to the homemade butter brought in by an Idaho
family. Clearly, the sanitary practices pushed by Bureau of Reclamation officials in
Boulder City greatly improved conditions on the project and symbolized the growing
federal role in safeguarding occupational health in the early 1930s. 149
Besides the sanitary standards, the Bureau of Reclamation also required Six
Companies to erect a hospital. The estimated cost for building the hospital was
$52,420.00. The facility opened on November 15, 1931, equipped with portable X-Ray
and fluoroscopic units, diathermy, infrared and mercury quartz lamps, a laboratory to
process blood and urine tests, and housed a pharmacy. According to the Review-Journal,
it was “as well equipped as hospitals in a large city,” with 20-beds, an orthopedic ward,
and an 8-bed isolation hospital for contagious diseases. Initially, Dr. Charles Christal
headed the hospital. Dr. Wales Haas of Elko replaced him as chief surgeon in 1932, and
Dr. Richard Schofield succeeded Haas after his death in 1933. The chief surgeons made
$750.00 per month and did not have a formal written contract with the contractor. This
proved useful for Six Companies in malpractice suits. If the doctors were not contracted,
the corporation could renounce all liability.150 By 1936, the hospital had grown into a 60-
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bed facility, retaining a chief surgeon, 4 assistant surgeons, 10 nurses, 4 orderlies, a
radiographer/pharmacist, and management staff, including a full-time auditor, office
secretary, and chef.151
Most workers barely remember Christal, but Haas and Schofield were regular
fixtures in their lives. Haas was a “rather big fellow,” weighing over 300 pounds. Bob
Parker described him as an “awfully good-natured doctor” who served in World War I
and was “a peoples’ doctor.” Haas concerned himself with caring for his patients, and
was not interested in the business functions of the hospital. But in 1933, the doctor
developed appendicitis and died. On his deathbed, he requested that Six Companies
retrieve Schofield to perform the surgery. The surgeons were friends, having attended
the same school and doctored together during the war. Unfortunately, Schofield did not
make it in time, and another doctor performed the surgery. While Schofield was friends
with Haas, he was the exact opposite in personality. According to Parker, the doctor
made a “big city hospital” out of the Boulder City Hospital “in a hurry.” Schofield
quickly garnered a bad reputation, often telling workers they faked their conditions.
Most workers did not care for him.152
Schofield remained as the contractor’s chief surgeon for the duration of the
project. In a memoir, he wrote a glowing review of the project’s industrial medicine
program from 1933 to 1935. Schofield claimed it was successful because industrial
medicine and surgery was “intimately associated with the State of Nevada.” In fact,
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individualism had made its medicine cutting-edge. Since the mining days, surgeons were
forced to solve “perplexing problems.” Practicing in isolated places made the doctors
resourceful, fostering research in industry surgery. In particular, the mining industry
studied the “hazards of extreme heat in the hot weather caverns.” Schofield argued that
these activities afforded future industrial groups to apply their groundbreaking methods.
At the Boulder Canyon Project, he described Six Companies as “safety minded” and
blamed the high number of deaths on “inadequacies” during the summer of 1931, namely
the weather and “high pressure system of construction.” Despite Schofield’s assessment,
there is little evidence that Nevada’s mining industry influenced the project’s
occupational health. His assessment offered sweeping generalizations rather than careful
evidence-based analysis. Certainly, any studies on the effects of heat and carbon
monoxide had little effect on the contractor’s safety protocol.153
But Schofield had one point right. After the Bureau of Reclamation implemented
changes in late 1931, Six Companies produced a remarkably comprehensive
occupational health program. Eventually, the Boulder City Hospital and the project’s
entire health care system served as a prototype for future industrial healthcare programs.
Henry J. Kaiser, a contractor in Six Companies and founder of Kaiser Permanente,
admired the project’s medical facilities and coverage so much that he modeled similar
establishments after it under Kaiser Permanente.154
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Six Companies’ employees were afforded this health care by paying health
insurance, deducting a $1.50 monthly premium from paychecks. 155 The contractor
deducted $.50 per month for industrial medical in accordance to the Statutes of Nevada
and Arizona, and $1.00 per month for non-industrial medical. To be sure, the coverage
was hardly comprehensive and did not cover health care at other hospitals. Moreover, it
only covered workplace injuries, excluding treatment for mental disorders, venereal
diseases, pregnancies, alcoholism, suicide, tuberculosis, preexisting conditions, and
infections or diseases contracted within 72 hours of employment. The distinction
between workplace and off-site injuries eventually became important in defining the
contractor’s legal obligations. While this medical coverage helped and maintained the
worker’s health, the program proved useful to Six Companies in workmen’s
compensation and employer liability suits. The corporation’s health insurance provisions
also demonstrated its commitment to offering employees just enough coverage to keep
federal regulators off its back. The hospital was ultimately a lucrative venture for Six
Companies. During operations up to February 1936, it reported a profit of over $25,000.
Of course, the proceeds transferred to the contractor and not their workers.156
As an added bonus to workers, occupational health was also augmented by
academic research. Since heat felled so many workers in summer 1931, a research team
from the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory traveled in Boulder City to study the “qualitative
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relationship between physical performance, heart rate, and external temperature.”157 The
researchers included Dr. David Bruce Dill, later of the Desert Research Institute (DRI) in
Las Vegas. According to Dill, the Laboratory “quite naturally was devoted to fatigue,”
focusing on the physiological, and applied physiological and sociological components of
the human body.158
Prior to Hoover Dam, the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory conducted studies at the
Panama Canal and Leadville, Colorado, studying tropical heat and high altitudes. Both
studies tested working conditions, heat and humidity, and the reduction of efficiency.
After Dill learned that 13 workers died at the dam during the summer of 1931, he decided
to study high and dry temperatures. He contacted Secretary of Interior Ray Lyman
Wilbur, a medical doctor himself, to make the necessary arrangements. During graduate
school, Dill had sparked a friendship with Wilbur and used it “as an opening” to carry out
his studies in Boulder City. It worked. After gaining the approval of Elwood Mead,
Wilbur authorized the research venture.159
The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory arrived in June 1932, and set up a laboratory in a
municipal building basement in Boulder City. There were 10 researchers. The Bureau of
Reclamation assigned each a cabin, army cot, and stove for cooking. They ate most
meals in the Anderson mess hall, paying 35 cents a day. The team consisted of clinical
investigators and doctors, one of whom was a young physician named Dr. J.H. Talbott.
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Upon his arrival, Talbott established a relationship with Dr. Wales Haas, and began
studying heat cramps among admitted workers at the hospital. All the researchers
conducted experiments on themselves, workers, and dogs. They were interested in the
workers who had consumed large amounts of water, and the “process of selection and
adaptation” to the desert climate. The researchers concluded that industrial hazards
occurred due to “hard work, high external temperatures, and profuse sweating.” They
determined that the first 3 days were a crucial period for workers. Those with “physical
deficiencies” and “poor mental stamina” usually quit. The workers that survived usually
continued indefinitely because their cardiovascular systems could withstand the heat.
Additionally, deaths occurred because workers lacked a “balance of electrolytes,
particularly the loss of sodium chloride” and could not replace it.160
After the researchers’ arrival, Cornelius Van Zwalenburg, a medic, discovered
that administering salt supplements prevented heat prostration. Throughout his career,
Dill was credited for the discovery, a distinction he adamantly denied. By early 1930s,
most academic medical centers recognized that human beings needed to consume salt to
endure high temperatures. However, it was not a yet a common practice among
American surgeons and industries. In Europe, the practice was empirically known. For
generations, mill workers in Germany added salt to beer. Since they drank a great deal of
beer, heat prostration was rare. England also recognized the need. Upon arrival in
Boulder City, the researchers came “fully prepared to look for salt deficiency.” They
160
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found that heat exhaustion and stroke occurred not because of lost body fluids. A loss of
salt excreted in sweat was the culprit, triggering approximately 150 hospitalizations and
17 deaths in 1931. To circulate their findings, the researchers told Wales Haas that
workers needed to add extra salt to their food. In the mess hall, Haas had posed a sign
that said “THE DOCTOR SAYS TO DRINK PLENTY OF WATER.” Talbott wrote
underneath “AND PUT PLENTY OF SALT ON YOUR FOOD.” Additionally, Haas
instructed workers to acclimate their bodies to the heat prior to work and consume a half
tablespoon of salt daily in addition to their usual food intake. Six Companies placed
multiple salt dispensers at the site, urging workers to drink the cool, sanitized water from
the water system throughout the day. Moreover, the Anderson Brothers started adding
extra salt to its food. In addition to salt, the meals had a high caloric content designed to
sustain the workers’ endurance. A typical breakfast consisted of cream of wheat, all
bran, sausage, bacon, omelets, fried potatoes, and hot biscuits. For suppers and dinners,
the chef served an assortment of meals, including roast leg of veal, Irish stew, fried veal
steak with country gravy, and chili con carne. The meals were available to nonemployees as well, with the Anderson Brothers charging $1.00 per sitting.161
The changes reduced deaths and hospitalizations from June to October 1932. The
researchers found that replacing salt and “a good night sleep” fostered improved worker
health. They concluded that heat cramps fell into three categories. First, most workers
had not been properly acclimated to the environment. Salt concentrations decreased in
those who worked in the desert a while. Second, many participated in “weekend binges
Interview with David Bruce Dill, March 13, 1975; Medic Who Aided Dam Workers Dies,” ReviewJournal, (July 25, 1935); Schofield, “Industrial Medicine and Surgery As Practiced in the Construction of
Boulder Dam,” 89; Anderson Brothers Menu,” Cahlan Collection, Box 5, Folder 25, Nevada State Museum
and Archives, Las Vegas, Nevada. “Minutes of Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors,” April 16,
1934, Six Companies Corporate Records, Vol. II, University of California, Berkeley, Bancroft Library.
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and did a lot of drinking and not eating” in Las Vegas, depriving themselves of the proper
level of electrolytes and naturally developed heat cramps. Third, some humans naturally
excrete more salt in sweat than others. Consequently, they developed heat cramps.
Although the greatly improved living conditions, sanitized, cool drinking water, and
acclamation to the desert climate were crucial to the reduction of heat-related illnesses,
the primary reason for fewer deaths were most probably milder summer temperatures in
1932. A smaller turnover rate also made it possible to retain workers who were in good
cardiovascular shape and acclimated to the environment.162
Over the following decade, these findings went far towards protecting dam
workers and their industrial counterparts. Even though the idea of administering salt
supplements was not unique to the project, the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory published
their findings, informing the entire industrial medicine community. The research
appeared in several medical and scientific journals, including American Journal of
Tropical Study and the Journal of Clinical Investigation. It is also noteworthy that
despite the initial apathy of Six Companies and the Bureau of Reclamation to
occupational health, the Boulder Canyon Project managed, through scientific research,
medical expertise, and federal government and private support, to improve industrial
hygiene conditions within a year.
After Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, the New Deal brought
other advances in occupational health to the project. Unlike his predecessor Ray Wilbur,
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes held no great political affection for Six Companies.
Ickes actively supported a federal investigation into the corporation’s adherence to the 8-
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hour day provision of their contract. John F. Wagner, a Six Companies auditor, informed
the Secretary that company violated several U.S. codes. This included keeping two sets
of books. One book recorded “regular time” and the other documented “emergency
time.” The corporation never showed the Bureau of Reclamation the second set of books,
which revealed that Six Companies continuously ignored the 8-hour day rule. Such
violations constituted a fine. Wagner calculated that Six Companies owed the federal
government over $300,000 in penalties. While Ickes did not want to delay the progress
of finishing Hoover Dam, he dispatched an investigator to study the matter. The
allegations outraged Six Companies. Henry Kaiser, a sophisticated lobbyist, contended
that the project was in “continuous emergency” and therefore not subject to the
restrictions. He launched a vigorous media campaign against Ickes, conducting radio and
newspaper interviews. Kaiser described the project as heroic for providing
unemployment relief during the Great Depression. He called the violations unfounded
and un-American, and bombarded Ickes with telegraphs that called to renounce the
investigation. In the end, Kaiser’s campaign worked. In 1936, Ickes agreed to a
$100,000 fine, two-thirds of the original penalty.163
Under the direction of Francis Perkins, the Department of Labor (DOL) also
expanded federal involvement in the project’s labor standards. However, the department
did not mandate universal labor standards for all American industries. The DOL
provided standards to clarify its role as advocates for workers, confirming that it sought
to exercise influence at the state level, not assume control. By 1935, it evaluated safety at
the dam, issuing a report on its findings. The DOL concluded what was known about the
project. Six Companies had made little use of organized accident prevention,
163
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investigation, and analysis, and effective safety programs that enlisted foremen and
workers. It recommended that the corporation keep detailed reports and investigate all
major disabling accidents, appoint a full-time “Safety Engineer,” and enforce the 8-hour
law. But although the DOL determined that death and accidents rates were “considerably
higher” than justified, it noted that no major catastrophes or serious failures occurred
because of inadequate safety measures after 1932. 164 Ultimately, New Deal regulations
fixed the project’s remaining safety issues, and fostered a legal environment that favored
the workers in workmen’s compensation, and employer liability suits.165
The Big Six Suits
Although the labor force benefited from workmen’s compensation and employer
liability suits, most lawsuits against Six Companies met limited success until 1935.
While workmen’s compensation provided workers with compensation regardless of fault,
often the system was not to their benefit during the 1930s. First, workers were denied
damages through the courts to compensate for their injuries. Second, the premium
incentives were generally not enough to force employers to enforce adequate safety
improvements. Third, statistics during the 1920s and early 1930s reveal that most
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industries actively evaded liability payments to compensate for falling profits during the
Depression.166
Six Companies was no different. It scrutinized each compensation hearing to pay
the least amount possible. Like the Union Pacific, Six Companies provided workmen’s
compensation through the Nevada Industrial Commission (NIC). In addition, it
contributed to the Arizona Industrial Commission (AIC) fund, covering worker injuries
that occurred on the Arizona side of the dam site. Six Companies also purchased a policy
with the Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, protecting it against worker and
outside party injuries on the federal reservation, and covering malpractice claims. For
example, when an intoxicated worker struck and killed a pedestrian while driving a
company car in 1934, the Employer’ Liability Assurance Corporation provided death
benefits to his family Lastly, some workers purchased supplemental workmen’s
compensation from private insurance carriers.167
The AIC employed a full-time inspector to make safety inspections and represent
the state in compensation hearings. The NIC did not provide an investigator until the
final year of the project and only because it was forced to by the DOL. By 1934, the AIC
and NIC settled numerous minor compensation cases. Nevada paid after 7 days of the
accident, depending on its seriousness, and Arizona, 15 days. Additionally, since
Arizona compensated workers with higher premiums than Nevada, workers fought hard
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to claim that their injuries occurred on the Arizona side. However, the line between
states was often blurred, so close it had to be measured. Altus “Tex” Nunley, a dam
worker, recalled such an incident. While mucking out the center of the dam, a worker
died. But it was unclear which side he died on. Nunley’s foreman gave him tape to
measure the location and privately told him, “Tex, make it Arizona.” Nunley ultimately
determined that he had died in Arizona, barely.168
Six Companies became quite concerned with the figures. Most of the dam site
was located within the Nevada borders, and the numbers did not add up. Six Companies
first discussed the problem in 1931, and determined a solution. To deter dependant
payments, it would only employ single men in Arizona. But the corporation failed to
pressure workers to accurately report injuries. Most conveniently experienced injuries on
the Arizona side. As a result, Six Companies’ Arizona costs soared. The workers
frequently dragged their coworkers injured bodies from Nevada to Arizona. For
example, when a worker was critically injured in an upper penstock tunnel, his coworkers
constructed a makeshift stretcher, carrying him to the Arizona side. The workers then
called for first aid, as they knew Arizona compensated higher than Nevada. Eventually,
AIC officials recognized the ploy and sometimes refused to approve payments, forcing
the workers to contest the decision in court. 169
As mentioned, Six Companies’ health insurance plan only covered workplace
injuries. This was also the case with workmen’s compensation. The distinctions between
“on-site” and “off-site” injuries, and “at-fault” or “accidental/natural causes” deaths
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became important to define the contractor’s legal obligations. The location of an injury
determined compensation. Six Companies did not cover off-site injuries. Additionally, if
a worker died of “natural causes,” the contractor did not compensate. In fact, dependants
only received benefits for “natural causes” if a worker purchased a private insurance
policy The policy infuriated workers. Many felt that Drs. Wales Haas and Richard
Schofield listed “natural causes” to release Six Companies of its legal responsibility. For
example, dam worker Eugene Schaver fell and hit his head on May 29, 1935. At the
hospital, Schofield listed the cause of death as “complications of spinal meningitis,” a
non-job related illness and therefore not compensable. Schaver’s coworkers were
outraged. Highly suspicious of Schofield’s allegiance, they demanded Clark County
officials to investigate the death. But an autopsy confirmed that Schaver died of spiral
meningitis. Schofield affirmed that the investigation “finally proved the thoroughness
and integrity of the Boulder City Hospital, which in the past has been in question.” Still,
the workers continued to mistrust their doctors. They believed that Schofield assisted Six
Companies in avoiding the payment of compensation.170
Private insurance carriers also fought compensation as well. One company, the
Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association, regularly contested benefits, citing a
violation of the contract. Most contracts carried the clause: “If application has been
falsified, the company will only be responsible to return of the premium.” The clause
denied coverage to numerous workers. Frederick Kassel, a jackhammer operator,
purchased a standard form 60W contract from the Mutual Benefit Health and Accident
Association in January 1933. The insurance company considered his occupation
“standard” because he drilled holes for excavation. But there was a provision. Kassel’s
170
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policy did not cover hazardous operations, including handling explosives or underground
mining. Kassel died in July 1933 during a dynamite accident. When his widow filed a
claim, the insurance company rejected it. Her husband, they asserted, had
“misrepresented his profession” and never disclosed that he handled dynamite. This
“barred his right to recovery under the provision of his contract.” His widow continued
to fight for compensation. In the process, she gained an unlikely ally. Six Companies
offered help, which probably did not want to pay more than the standard workmen’s
compensation settlement. The company’s insurance division charged that it was a
“matter of common knowledge” that jackhammers loaded dynamite and that the company
was “willfully evading payment of a just claim” Dan Costello, a Six Companies
insurance agent, commented that anyone that did not know a jackhammer handled
dynamite “must be blind, or else in his ardent desire to sell policies, grossly
misrepresented.” Six Companies eventually persuaded the insurance company to
compensate his widow, offering $750.00 in settlement.171
On a related front, some workers were able to extend the range of employer
liability in once hostile courts, using the carbon monoxide cases to establish a beachhead.
As early as 1916, the PHS warned industries about the dangers of carbon monoxide and
published guidelines to limit emissions. Several studies also confirmed that cumulative
small doses killed or seriously injured humans. In 1921, Yale University’s Yendell
Henderson carried out scientific experiments in a chamber that gassed human volunteers
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to study the effects.172 By 1931, carbon monoxide was an easily identifiable cause of
death, a fact that immediately put Six Companies on the defensive. Even though a
Nevada mining law prohibited the operation of gasoline-powered motor vehicles
underground, Six Companies operated large trucks to haul rock out of the diversion
tunnels. The trucks emitted carbon monoxide, which accumulated in the tunnels due to
poor ventilation. The company contended that the operation was neither prohibited by
Nevada law nor detrimental to worker’s health.173
Andy J. Stinson, the Inspector of Mines, knew that operating gasoline-powered
trucks underground would have deadly consequences.174 But Nevada had no authority
because the project was located on a federal reservation. After receiving numerous
complaints, the state decided to make its move. On March 25, 1931, the legislature
authorized Stinson to monitor the dam site’s tunnels, drifts, and underground excavation.
He inspected the dam site a month later, issuing several citations to Six Companies and
the Bureau of Reclamation. In most cases, the company satisfied the recommendations,
providing that Stinson did not interfere with the use of gasoline-powered trucks. The
Inspector of Mines also examined safety in the diversion tunnels, and made several
suggestions. The tunnels needed improved ventilation and the company needed to
provide sanitary water barrels. Six Companies complied with these orders. But
regarding the gasoline-powered trucks, the company took a different stance. Even though
172
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Stinson ordered Six Companies to discontinue to practice, the company avoided his
recommendation until the state filed charges. Gray Mashburn, the Nevada Attorney
General, recognized that the recommendation was a “considerable burden of expense.”
However, it was his “earnest desire to protect the health and lives” of the tunnel workers.
Experience had shown that it was dangerous to use “gasoline and gasoline engines in
such underground workings.” The situation concerned other state government officials as
well. Governor Fred Balzar complained of Nevada’s lack of authority, citing it was
“impossible to enforce” labor and safety laws on the project. Senator Tasker Oddie was
troubled by “more than a dozen fatalities” that occurred on the site due to the “lack of
supervision and inspection as to safety of the men and proper working conditions.” He
complained that there was “no reason why” Nevada was barred from enforcing
occupational health within its state boundaries. While Oddie wanted to contest the
decision in court, he assumed the project would be completed before a final decision was
rendered.175
In November 1931, Six Companies applied for a temporary restraining order
against Stinson, permitting it to proceed with tunnel construction. The corporation
claimed that its contract stated that it was a federal reservation and not subject to state
intervention. Therefore, Nevada lacked authority to enforce safety laws. 176 Six
Companies also argued that the Nevada statute, authorizing Stinson’s expanded role,
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violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The states could not
deprive a person of life, liberty, and property without the due process of the law. The
statute in question would therefore deprive Six Companies of its property, the gasolinepowered trucks, without due process. Additionally, it denied equal protection of the law.
Six Companies attorneys emphasized that there was no other “practical method of
removing the dirt and rock,” and there was “no reasonable relation” between the trucks
and violations in public safety. Consequently, it requested a writ of injunction to restrain
Stinson from enforcement.177
The court approved the temporary restraining order and set the trial date for
March 1932. Six Companies began assembling its defense. While the federal
government helped improve occupational health at the dam, the Department of Interior
and Bureau of Reclamation also fully supported Six Companies, probably because of the
immense pressure to finish the project on time and provide unemployment relief. The
federal backing was advantageous to the company. Ray Lyman Wilbur and Elwood
Mead were particularly instrumental, providing assistance to Six Companies’ attorneys.
While a medical doctor by trade, Wilbur seemed ambivalent to the threat of carbon
monoxide. He even told Governor Balzar that state mining laws did not apply because
intervention would “hamper the work.” Furthermore, he contacted William D. Mitchell,
the U.S. Attorney General, to help with the case. Wilbur requested that he appear
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“amicus curiae” or “take such of the measures” to ensure “the protect of interests of the
United States. Mitchell rendered all possible assistance to Six Companies. Ultimately,
both the Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. attorneys aided Six Companies’ counsel. While
the federal government could not interfere with the pending suits, its attorney’s appeared
amicus curiae. However, attorney H.H. Atkinson established clear boundaries. “It would
not be advisable,” he warned, “to become antagonistic towards the state,” causing “a real
disagreement or dispute.” Along with the Bureau of Reclamation’s attorney, Richard J.
Coffey, Atkinson met with Six Companies’ counsel in December 1931, and applied to
appear amicus curiae in a statutory court. 178 The judges granted permission. Next, the
attorney’s arranged an application for a preliminary injunction based on the following
grounds:
1. That the defendants were acting and threatening to act under an
unconstitutional statute of the state;
2. That the State of Nevada had ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States
over the Boulder Canyon Project Federal Reservation;
3. That the United States could not be required to conform to State police
regulations in the performance of its functions, and consequently the agents
through which it functioned were also immune from state interference.
Finally, they gathered evidence affidavits from expert witnesses. A. H. Ayers, the chief
engineer for Six Companies, stated that if the state enforced the recommendation, it
would cost the company over $1.5 million, delay work for “a number of months,” and
force it to fire 700 men. Other witnesses contended that the air conditions were “clean”
in the tunnels and did not affect the health of workers.179
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Both sides defended their case to a panel of federal judges on April 28, 1932. The
judges needed to established if the United States had legally created a federal reservation.
If so, Nevada statutes did not apply. The contractor’s legal team also presented
testimonies stating that the trucks were harmless. Ayers attested that “extreme care” had
been exercised by the plaintiff to ensure proper ventilation. Next, it retained several
chemical engineers, including L. H. Duschak, to inspect the air quality. Duschak
revealed that the tunnels contained carbon monoxide from exhaust and dynamite, but the
exposure varied. This was due to air currents in relation to the sources of carbon
monoxide and the worker’s location. He found a “natural circulation in the large
tunnels,” introducing fresh air throughout. Additionally, due to the high temperatures,
the exhaust rose to the “upper stream of the outgoing air,” naturally diffusing. Wind
conditions and fans contributed to improved ventilation as well. In 58 tests, Duschak
discovered that 48 revealed no carbon monoxide. The remaining 10 occurred above a
muck pile after it had been blasted. But he assured that the concentrations were
“momentary.” Duschak concluded that the gasoline-powered vehicles were “not
sufficient” enough to harm human health and there was a “fair margin of safety.”180
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Six Companies’ counsel also presented the affidavit of E.J. Brockman, head of the
Six Companies insurance division. Brockman maintained that the company had a “fully
equipped safety department” He further insisted that of all the injuries reported to him,
there were no cases of carbon monoxide poisoning in the tunnels. Six Companies’
counsel also provided affidavits of tunnel workers, denying any injuries or discomfort
from the presence of gas. It concluded by acknowledging that carbon monoxide was a
dangerous industrial hazard. However, there was “no sufficient concentration of carbon
monoxide” in the tunnels.181
The extensive briefs presented surprised the state’s lawyers. They had assumed
that the hearing would only cover the facts set forth in the affidavits by the respective
parties. Nonetheless, the state’s lawyers presented their arguments, offering numerous
affidavits that contradicted Six Companies’ counsel. Overall, they claimed that Six
Companies was not “blameless” in the situation. The mining laws were well-known, first
enacted in 1929 and revised in 1931. Still, it purchased the trucks. Six Companies
“arbitrarily, if not contemptuously” ignored the law and continued to operate the trucks.
Furthermore, since the temporary restraining order was filed, it continued to operate the
trucks underground. The “great delay” ultimately permitted the company to continue
putting the workers at risk. In effect, the contractor wanted to finish the tunnels as soon
as possible to make safety “a moot question.” Moreover, the statute was not
unreasonable. It was a viable measure to protect workers. The state’s lawyers
acknowledged that converting the vehicles to electric motors carried a heavy financial
burden, costing an estimated $150,000. However, it was imperative to enforce the safety
laws. That was the purpose of the law. The corporation, existing for profits, did not
181
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protect the health and lives of workers to ensure it “monetary welfare.” The state’s
lawyers also revealed Stinson’s findings. Unlike Duschak, determined that the
ventilation was inadequate. The use of gasoline increased the risk of fire and explosions
as well. Six Companies also failed to reported dangerously high levels of carbon
monoxide on “at least two occasions.” The state’s lawyers continued to point of
inconsistencies in Six Companies’ case, stressing that a few breaths of carbon monoxide
was “fatal, or at least, very dangerous to man.” In fact, the American Engineering and
Industrial Standards banned its use in all mining regulations, the reason Nevada enacted
the statute. Clearly, carbon monoxide fostered unsafe working conditions. It was
therefore imperative that the state intervened. Nevada wanted to project to thrive, but it
was at a terrible cost.182
In the end, the judges ruled in favor of Six Companies, stating that under the
terms of the injunction, the state could not enforce its labor laws or inspect conditions.
However, the contractor agreed not to operate the trucks underground to a greater depth
than 250 feet, satisfying provisions in the Nevada statute. Several months later, the
judges ruled in favor of Six Companies again, making the injunction permanent. They
sided with the contractor because they determined that Nevada mining laws were not
applicable to constructing a dam, only mining. The judges also declared parts of the
Mining Inspector Act unconstitutional, ruling the state had no jurisdiction over any aspect
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of the project. In 1933, Stinson attempted to pass a rewritten bill, but it was defeated in
the legislature.183
Six Companies assured its workers that it took every precaution to safeguard their
lives, claiming the gas levels harmless and similar to New York’s Holland Tunnel. Frank
Crowe also publically proclaimed that the company “would rather take a loss of $100,000
than to hurt one man.” But the tunnels were not safe, and hundreds of workers were
dead, sick, and dying from acute carbon monoxide poisoning. Since employer liability
became easier to prove, especially with a disease like acute carbon monoxide poisoning,
several workers began suing Six Companies for damages. At the same time, tighter
government regulations during the New Deal would facilitate successful employer
liability lawsuits. Personal injury lawyers ultimately forced courts to determine liability
for ailments excluded from workers’ compensation. Six Companies was not immune
from this process.184
In 1933, attorney Harry Austin filed six personal injury lawsuits against Six
Companies. The victims sought $77,186 in damages for permanent ailments. The “gas
cases” sparked a media firestorm. Austin alleged Six Companies did not properly protect
workers from inhaling high concentrations of carbon monoxide. Consequently, they
received permanent disabilities or suffered significant health problems. The first case to
trial involved Ed Kraus, a 34 year old truck driver who hauled muck from the tunnels.
Kraus testified that he lost 26 pounds, and suffered from headaches, chills and nausea
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while working in the tunnels. Since that time, he also experienced weakness, blurred
vision and loss of sexual desire. Kraus described the exhaust fumes in the tunnels as so
thick that he could not see the truck’s electric lights. Other workers testified that a blue
cloud of gas drifted out of the tunnels each afternoon, and the men regularly evacuated
the tunnels because of gas sickness. Instead of settling out of court, Six Companies
decided to play hardball. Ed F. Kraus v. Six Companies Inc. was the most exciting trial
Las Vegas had ever seen. Six Companies’ attorneys, the McNamees and San Franciscobased trial lawyer Jerome White, argued that Kraus’ symptoms were caused by the heat,
preexisting conditions, and lifestyle choices. Additionally, they interviewed workers that
testified the air quality were “acceptable” to breathe and at hazardous levels only a few
times.185
Both sides enlisted physicians to testify about the origins of Kraus’ health issues.
As historian James Mohr demonstrates, doctors increasingly served as medico-legal
expert witnesses throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the cases, they
faced no greater conflict of interest. Do they side with their employer or their patients?
Personal injury suits ultimately put doctors in an uncomfortable position. While the law
required objectivity, it was often difficult to give a fair medical testimony without
prejudice. Of course, the claims of neutrality were self-serving as well. It is impossible
to access if employers influenced a doctor’s diagnosis, but the high number of workers
complaining of dishonest company physicians suggest the practice was common.186
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Two points are clear about Six Companies’ physicians. First, Drs. Wales Haas
and Richard Schofield created an environment that was conducive to out-of-court
settlements. These settlements were typically in the best interest of their patients. During
the 1930s, workers rarely won large settlements and most received nothing at all.
Second, as Mark Aldrich shows, most company physicians struggled to define their
professional role in the framework of conflicting obligations to employers and patients.
The logical outcome was to diagnose fraud. This was the case with Six Companies’
physicians. Schofield described the medio-legal aspect of industrial medicine as the
“foreground” of his job. Consequently, he played an intimate role in blocking attempts
made by workers to establish a legal claim. According to Schofield, his job was to prove
that disabilities were not connected with employment. The “best defense” was to
maintain detailed records, documenting a worker’s schedule, first aid visits, medication,
hospital entries, and other important data. Schofield called the reports “a necessary part
of the original industrial medical set-up.” At the end of the project, the data was
“summated” and studied to deduce any “interesting facts, figures, and statistics.” 187
There is little evidence that Haas and Schofield purposely concealed the carbon
monoxide cases. But their primary job was to diagnose fraud first, and treat patients
second. It is possible the doctors misdiagnosed their patients as contacting “pneumonia”
or “tuberculosis” over “carbon monoxide poisoning” in the effort to protect Six
Companies. To be sure, both diseases displayed similar symptoms to carbon monoxide
poisoning. During the Stinson trial, Haas testified that J.C. Bowles, a shovel operator in
the tunnels, contacted tuberculosis, which may have been “long standing.” He denied
that carbon monoxide caused tuberculosis. His ailment resulted from “a germ.”
187
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However, Haas did find that Bowles had “irritated tissues of the lungs,” a symptom of
carbon monoxide poisoning. But the doctor decided that the workers contracted the
disease before employment. When asked why his preemployment exam did not discover
the disease, Haas responded that Bowles may have falsified his medical history. Physical
examinations, he insisted, were sensory. It would “not be likely” that an examining
physician would discover tuberculosis unless a patient specifically directed attention to it.
The examinations were “based upon the statement of the applicant himself” describing
his health condition and past history. Haas suspected that Bowles contracted tuberculosis
prior to the project, lying to gain employment. With 100 percent medical certainty, the
doctor concluded that he did not contact his ailment from working in the tunnels.188
Because of such statements, the workers were convinced Haas purposely
diagnosed their respiratory problems as “pneumonia” or “tuberculosis” to cover the Six
Companies’ tracks. Since the workers suspected both doctors were protecting the
company, a high level of bitterness brewed among them. The Boulder City Hospital
became a hot topic of discussion among the workers because they felt their peers were
“only dying of pneumonia” and “nothing else.” It became a standard joke among the
workers: “Don’t go to the Boulder City Hospital, you’ll die of pneumonia!” The IWW’s
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Industrial Worker even publicly accused Haas of purposely diagnosing carbon monoxide
poisoning cases as “influenza” and listing “pneumonia” as the cause of death.189
Of course, there was no way to prove this. During Kraus v. Six Companies Inc.,
several doctors disagreed over the cause of Ed Kraus’ ailments. Dr. H.M. Behneman, a
prominent San Francisco-based surgeon, testified that abdominal ptosis, a sagging of
internal organs, caused Kraus’ condition because of his “tall and angular” build, not
carbon monoxide. However, Drs. Walter Koebig and J.N. Van Meter argued that his
symptoms were consistent with “extreme carbon monoxide poisoning.” To fight the
opposing testimonies, Six Companies’ counsel employed unethical and illegal
techniques. As Joseph Stevens asserts, the company engaged in “pimping, criminal
conspiracy, intimidation of witnesses, and jury tampering.” Six Companies appointed an
agent, Bud Bodell, to uncover evidence that contradicted the allegations. Luckily for the
company, Kraus was a colorful individual. He not only had Utah police record, but had a
reputation for partying and flirting with women. This hardly portrayed the picture of an
ailing man.
To gather evidence, Bodell hired a petty criminal, Jim Moretti, to befriend Kraus.
Bodell instructed him to “lure” him into “drinking bouts,” “sexual liaisons,” and criminal
activity. Moretti spent three months with Kraus and testified that he was a fit man. In
fact, Kraus was not sexually impaired due to carbon monoxide poisoning; he regularly
engaged in sex “as though a well man” Moreover, he admitted to committing insurance
fraud, and regularly using counterfeit money, engaging in blackmail, and stealing sugar
to make bootleg whiskey. Most importantly, Kraus admitted that carbon monoxide
“Eugene F. McCarthy Tunnel Man Passes” Review-Journal, (December 11, 1931); “Iron Heel is Used to
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poisoning had not permanently impaired him and he could “look pretty sick for $76,000.”
The case was ultimately declared a mistrial. The following year, Austin took another
case to court, Jack Norman v. Six Companies Inc. Like Kraus, Austin alleged Norman
received carbon monoxide poisoning in the tunnels. But compared to Kraus, Norman
was honorable and incorruptible. To win the case, Six Companies bribed at least three
jurors, causing a mistrial. Austin lost both cases, but he continued to file suits. By
August 1935, 48 plaintiffs sought a total amount of $4.6 million in damages pending in
Nevada courts. Due to the growing number of cases and project reaching an end, Six
Companies finally accepted defeat. In January 1936, the cases settled out-of-court, and
an undisclosed amount was distributed to 50 plaintiffs.190
The mid-1930s marked several watershed victories for the occupational health
movement. In 1936, the legal system compensated dam workers for Six Companies’
negligence. At the same time, courts in West Virginia ruled in favor of Rinehart &
Dennis Company workers poisoned by silicosis. The incident, referred to the “Hawk’s
Nest Tunnel Disaster,” is considered the nation’s worst industrial massacre. To save
costs, the company instructed black migrant workers to dry drill a diversion tunnel. The
technique exposed them to high levels of silica dust. Upon examination, company
doctors determined the men suffered from “tunnelitis” or “tuberculosis.” As with carbon
monoxide poisoning, “silicosis” was a well-known industrial disease, so the workers filed
suits against their employer. Of course, Rinehart & Dennis denied negligence. In
January 1933, 157 lawsuits sought $4 million in damages. However, both sides settled
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for $130,000 in June, half of which went to attorney fees. The workers were outraged,
charging that the company struck a corrupt bargain with the attorneys. Consequently, an
additional 202 workers filed suit, although the courts barred 142 case due to a one-year
statute of limitations rule. After taking a test case to the Supreme Court and losing, the
remaining workers settled out-of-court for $70,000. 191
The Hawk’s Nest Tunnel Disaster was significant because unlike the Hoover
Dam’s “gas cases,” it garnered a significant level of national exposure. By the late
1930s, Time and Newsweek published numerous exposés, opening America’s eyes to
dangers in the industrial workplace. To be sure, the Hawk’s Nest Tunnel Disaster death
toll was much higher than losses at Hoover Dam. According to a historical marker on the
site, there were 109 deaths, however a Congressional hearing set the number at 476.
Other sources estimate 700 to 3000 fatalities. As with Hoover Dam, the number is
difficult to pinpoint. Both companies only recorded deaths they determined were
workplace-related. Natural causes were overlooked. Additionally, many workers
returned home to die. However, unlike the Hawk’s Nest Tunnel Disaster, the Hoover
Dam “gas cases” represent an overwhelming victory in employer liability cases in favor
of the workers. The cases set a crucial precedent for future employer liability suits. Even
though the federal government barred Nevada’s mining laws, the courts eventually found
191
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the contractor liable for safety lapses. The civil trials were ultimately an embarrassment
for the federal government. When Austin requested tunnel inspection reports from
September 1931 to October 1932, the Bureau of Reclamation worried about the
implications. If there was “just cause for criticism of the working conditions,” the federal
government “must share the blame” because it fostered the situation. However, it denied
the request. “While not admitting that such was one,” the Bureau of Reclamation decided
“not expose the records in question to the scrutiny of partisan attorneys.” In the end, the
Hoover Dam “gas cases” sent the message to industries and the federal government that it
was cheaper to embrace occupational health.192
Dam Malpractice
Not all civil suits at the Boulder Canyon Project were successful, particularly with
regard to medical malpractice. The malpractice phenomena in the United States, like
other legal issues, were a reflection of the nation’s political, social, cultural, and
profession trends. As historian Kenneth Allen De Ville reveals, medico-legal writings
rarely referred to malpractice in the mid-nineteenth century. Patients typically sued for
breach of contract. Malpractice cases were also rare because the legal profession had not
defined it yet. Most lawyers used William Blackstone’s Commentaries, defining
malpractice as an injury sustained due to “neglect” and “unskilled management” of the
medical profession. 193 Following the court’s willingness to accredit malpractice
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decisions in 1840, the rate intensified until the twentieth century. Technological
advances in the medical profession also prompted newspapers to market malpractice suits
as a solution to medical wrongdoing. By the turn of the century, the tenet of malpractice
shifted from contract disputes to torturous liability actions. After Pike v. Honsinger
(1898), the courts established a “standard of care” guideline for American physicians. 194
As historian Neal Hogan shows, twentieth century decisions on medical liability was
founded on the legal definition of “standard of care.”195 The central definition continues
to remain the same. But other issues have changed, including amendments of tort law,
interpretations of joint liability, and general court procedures. 196
By the 1930s, public awareness of malpractice had dramatically increased.
Numerous physicians and hospitals began purchasing insurance policies to protect them
from malpractice suits. For example, Six Companies insured itself through the
Employers’ Liability Group. Additionally, Richard Schofield purchased a personal
malpractice insurance plan to cover his private practice. Medical journals also began
publishing information on avoiding suits by improved record keeping. 197 Eventually,
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defensive medicine and attempts to block suits brought the role of professional experts to
the forefront. The media occasionally covered malpractice suits during the 1930s. But
major news organizations did not begin reporting on dramatic cases until World War II.
While malpractice became a publically discussed issue during the 1950s, the volume of
claims remained relatively low until the late 1960s. Most Americans simply viewed
medicine as an evolving practice that involved inherent risk. 198
Six Companies’ doctors faced numerous malpractice suits. One case involved
Oscar Allbritton, an African American steel worker. Six Companies hired very few
minorities. In fact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act specifically prohibited employing
“Mongolians.” Moreover, neither the Hoover nor Roosevelt Administrations promoted
the hiring of blacks at Hoover Dam. 199 In 1932, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League alleged that
the dam and the Mississippi River Flood Control Projects either denied employment to
blacks or abused those with jobs. An investigation by a NAACP representative
confirmed the charges, reporting that Six Companies did not hire blacks because it feared
dissent. Moreover, it did not want to pay the cost of building separate housing. Six
Companies refuted the claims, and begrudgingly promised to hire blacks “when if they
had the necessary experience.” The company eventually hired 10 black veterans.
However, throughout the project’s duration, blacks represented less than 1 percent of the
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workforce. Six Companies gave them the most arduous jobs, such as working in the
gravel pits, the hottest and most remote area of the project, or brushing steel. Sims Ely
also prohibited blacks from living in Boulder City. Consequently, they had to travel over
30 miles from the West Las Vegas slums to the dam site via the Interstate Transit Lines
Bus, a subsidiary of the Union Pacific.200
Blacks daily faced the threat of accidents while commuting. On March 13, 1935,
66 year old Oscar Allbritton loaded the bus with his black coworkers to return to Las
Vegas. Outside of Boulder City, the bus driver lost control and the bus overturned.
Allbritton remained conscious, but the impact threw him from his seat. He struck his
head. An ambulance arrived shortly after. Like white workers, blacks paid monthly for
hospital care. But since it was an offsite accident, Six Companies was not required to
furnish medical attention. Regardless, the ambulance transported the injured to the
Boulder City Hospital. There were several possible reasons for his action. First, it was
closest in proximity. Second, the accident may have been so serious that they thought the
injured could not sustain the trip. Third, the private hospitals in Las Vegas rarely treated
minorities.201
As the attending physician, Dr. Richard Schofield examined over 20 injured
workers. Allbritton was dazed and confused. He had a “terrible headache” and did not
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know what happened. After examining him, Schofield found that Allbritton suffered
from shock. However, there were no major abrasions or swellings to his head, face,
scalp, or neck. While Allbritton complained of pain in his left shoulder, Schofield noted
that “no gross deformity” existed. The doctor hospitalized him for further examination
for “probably a slight concussion.” The next morning, Allbritton’s headache was gone.
But he complained of pain throughout his body, particularly his back, left shoulder, both
knees, and feet. Schofield concluded he suffered from numerous contusions, but no
fractures, dislocations, or bone injuries. His concussion signs had also disappeared.
Allbritton was not satisfied with his diagnosis. He felt terrible and begged the doctor to
examine him further. Schofield appeared to be annoyed with his patient. The doctor
wrote in Allbritton’s chart that his apprehension was due to “the effects of nervous
reaction or mild shock.” He also attributed Allbritton’s uneasiness to be “negro
characteristics.” Since Sims Ely had a strict segregation policy in Boulder City,
Schofield discharged Allbritton and advised to report to Dr. Hale Slavin, the county
doctor. At this point, Allbritton was “assured that Dr. Slavin would again hospitalize him
if it seemed necessary.”202
But Allbritton did not want to leave. He felt “excruciating pain and agony”
throughout his body and knew something was wrong. Slavin advised Allbritton to seek
immediate treatment in Los Angeles. On April 22, 1935, he arrived in Los Angeles and
underwent immediate brain surgery “to save his life.” Allbritton never fully recovered.
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The head trauma left him partially blind, deaf, and paralyzed. He was convinced that
Schofield unjustifiably discharged him, which aggravated his injuries. Permanently
disabled and unable to perform physical labor, Allbritton hired a Los Angeles-based
attorney, J.S. Manning, to sue the bus company, and Six Companies and Schofield for
malpractice.
At first, Six Companies did not take Allbritton seriously. Its counsel watched as
Allbritton vs. Union Pacific pended in the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles,
commenting that it was “quite likely” the case would “die of a natural death” and “no suit
be filed.” Under these circumstances, Six Companies could “close out the file… without
payment.” But the case did not disappear. In December 1935, a jury awarded $25,000 in
damages to Allbritton against the Interstate Transit Lines. However, it dismissed the
charges against the Union Pacific and bus driver. Since Allbritton needed $150,000 to
cover his injuries, he moved forward with the malpractice claim against Six Companies.
On March 11, 1937, Manning filed a complaint against Six Companies, the Boulder City
Hospital, and Schofield at the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada. The lawsuit
alleged that the Boulder City Hospital handled Allbritton’s case “negligently, carelessly,
unskillfully, and unprofessionally,” leaving him “totally disabled.” Manning sought
$50,000 in damages.203
Six Companies’ tone changed. It hired Leo McNamee, who issued a demurrer
challenging the case. McNamee argued that Allbritton’s permanent injuries were a result
of the accident, not Six Companies’ negligence. Additionally, Schofield did not cause
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the damages through malpractice. The complaint was “ambiguous” and needed to be
dismissed. Next, McNamee attempted to remove the case on the grounds of diversity of
citizenship. 204 However, since Allbritton and Schofield were California residents, it
could not be moved. He tried to defame Allbritton as well. The Employers’ Liability
Group, who insured Six Companies with malpractice insurance, found a “negro woman
named Mrs. Turner” that knew Allbritton “did not sustain a serious injury” in a bus
accident because he had “a previous injury to his head.” McNamee subsequently
determined that the woman’s claim would not hold up in court.205
By the late 1930s, Allbritton’s legal battle was losing ground. In California, an
appellate court reversed the judgment against Interstate Transit Lines and ordered a new
trial. This stalled the malpractice case. Six Companies’ counsel motioned to terminate
under a Nevada statute, but it was denied. But Allbritton did not give up. In 1942, he
hired a new legal team, which served an amended complaint. In response, Six
Companies’ counsel filed another demurrer. The most interesting feature of this case was
how the company denied liability, revealing the ambiguous role of a company physician
during the 1930s. First, Six Companies argued that there was no formal contract between
Six Companies and Schofield. Consequently, it was unclear whether the doctor was an
agent of the company or an independent contractor. In fact, Schofield had no written
contract for employment of any kind with Six Companies. It employed him under the
204
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agreement that Six Companies “were to furnish all insurances to him and the hospital.”
While Schofield had malpractice insurance of his own, it did not apply to work on the
project. According to the doctor, he thought Six Companies would take care of it. Six
Companies’ counsel argued that Schofield was free to engage in private practice and treat
non-employees. Therefore, there was strong evidence he was an independent contractor
whose malpractice had no liability attached to the company. 206 Second, was Boulder
City Hospital charitable or for-profit? Since company records indicated the hospital was
for-profit, Six Companies’ counsel argued that the hospital was ultra vires, or “beyond
the powers,” due to the large number of deductions made from their workforce.207
Schofield claimed he knew nothing about the hospital’s financial condition; his duties
included bookkeeping and reporting expenses to Six Companies. The company then paid
the bills. Schofield also stated he had no knowledge of deductions paid by employees
toward hospitalization or medical treatment, or whether the hospital operated for a profit.
Third, Six Companies’ counsel argued that since the hospital was for-profit, the
enterprise was not part of the corporation. According to the original charter issued by the
Bureau of Reclamation, they argued it was “possible to distinguish the hospital
corporation cases.” Specifically, the charter organized to secure “all necessary

During the 1930s, numerous cases tried to define the role of the company doctor. Schneiger v. New York
Telephone Co., 292 N.Y. Supp. 399 (January 1937, Supreme Court, Appellate Division) found that the
company physician was not a servant of his employer, but engaged in an “independent calling.” Therefore,
the employer was not liable for malpractice. See Irene H. Bennett v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., a
corporation, H.J. Strathern, et al, Memorandum of Defendant Paramount Pictures, Inc. In Support of
Demurrer, No. 413975, McNamee Collection, Allbritton v. Six Companies, Box 18, Folder 5, Nevada State
Museum and Archives, Las Vegas, Nevada.
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equipment and service for the treatment of patients.” Since medical services were a
“necessary incident,” Six Companies could not be held liable.208
Allbritton never received a settlement. In fact, Six Companies delayed the case
until his death in 1948. Upon hearing the news, McNamee contacted Allbritton’s
attorneys about dropping the case. He then prepared a motion to dismiss, citing a Nevada
Statute stating that trials needed to occur within 5 years after plaintiffs filed an action.209
The Aftermath
Although a memorial plaque at the Hoover Dam sets the number of workers killed
during its construction at 96, the real figure was nearly double that. An analysis of
fatality records kept by the Bureau of Reclamation and Six Companies indicates that the
figure ranged from 114 to 187 individuals. The discrepancy is likely because the reports
overlooked “pneumonia” victims poisoned by carbon monoxide and fatalities of workers
not “officially” on the clock. Allbritton and his coworkers would have been denied
workmen’s compensation because the accident occurred offsite. The reports also omitted
fatalities associated with disease outbreaks, including Eugene Schaver’s demise from
“spinal meningitis,” and the deaths of family members at Ragtown or tourists visiting the
site.210
Despite a popular myth, no workers were buried alive in the dam. According to
the myth, workers slipped and fell into the concrete as it was poured. Unable to stop the
208
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flow of concrete, their coworkers continued pouring. The concrete submerged and
suffocated them. Legend has it this happened numerous times during construction. It is
nearly impossible to identify the source of the myth, but several workers provide
accounts of its origin. According to Bob Parker, the myth began when workers found
remains of a man who had drowned in the river. Before the lower cofferdam was laid,
the man was buried in the concrete. The second version, told by William D.
McCullough, was that the myth emerged after several men fell into the concrete. The
workers instantly died, but were immediately jack hammered out. Lastly, Claude “Fat”
Jackson claimed he told tourists that workers were buried in the poured cement to
frighten them. Jackson privately maintained there were no buried men in the dam.
Despite firm denial by historians, the Bureau of Reclamation, and Six Companies,
popular memory continues to reinforce the myth. Since it is common knowledge that
dam construction was extremely hazardous, it seems possible that workers would be
buried in the dam. In many ways, the myth has become more compelling than historical
fact.211
Hoover Dam has emerged in public memory as a coffin of dead workers. But the
myth symbolizes reality. The construction was a dangerous enterprise that killed
hundreds of workers. But the project not only represents failures in occupational health;
211
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it also symbolized advances in construction safety and occupational health care. First, it
dramatically transformed the federal government’s role in financing and building big
dams. Second, aside from its long unrecognized value as a jobs program, bringing much
needed stimulus to the fledging Las Vegas economy, and status as one of the “man-made
wonders of the world,” Hoover Dam represented a giant step forward in American
occupational health, setting a standard for later New Deal public workers jobs. Initially,
concerns triggered by the unique factors that coalesced at the site in 1930-1931 forced the
Hoover Administration and Six Companies to undertake health and safety reforms
rejected in earlier decades and in less desolate locations. These actions provided vital
momentum and support for advocates seeking to convince Congress, the states, the
judiciary, and a growing number of employers to prioritize health and safety in the
workplace. In the rapidly changing environment of the Depression, Six Companies
gradually endorsed occupational health to enhance its corporate image and save
money.212
In later years, New Deal dam projects in other western states replicated Hoover
Dam’s occupational health program. Six Companies bid on and won the contract to build
Parker Dam, and several other contractors involved participated in building the Golden
Gate Bridge and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. All companies involved applied
what they learned from their experiences in southern Nevada, including organizing and
controlling a large workforce, and provided a medical infrastructure that facilitated
efficient employees. Later, when Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized Bonneville Dam
under the auspices of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and later projects Grand
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Coulee and Fort Peck, there was little time to focus on design work and occupational
health planning. Certainly, Roosevelt’s goal was to provide jobs to unemployed
Americans. As a result, some engineering designs were constructed from precedent and
not innovation. Ultimately, the rush had tragic consequences for Fort Peck Dam, which
partially collapsed in 1938. However, no dam project after Hoover Dam experienced
major crises in occupational health. 213 All contractors building dams in remote locations
offered their employees decent living conditions, food, hospital services, and health
insurance. As a costly cautionary tale, no contractor operated gasoline-powered trucks
underground in its diversion tunnels. While some Fort Peck workers lived in
shantytowns, the situation did not rival Ragtown. As historians David Billington and
Donald Jackson argue, Hoover Dam is a symbol of the twentieth century just as the
Brooklyn Bridge was for the nineteenth. 214 It played an essential role in western growth
by appropriating water and power resources to the region. However, the dam also
extended an innovative occupational health program to all New Deal projects. In the
process, it transformed the face of federal industrial health. Indeed, it extended this
precedent to thousands of industries across the nation, including a pioneering federal
project manufacturing magnesium during World War II: Basic Magnesium Inc.215
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CHAPTER 3
THE PLANT
You have read the story of BMI. Built by determined men. Operated by determined men.
A big harsh job in a harsh land. No place for lace “panties.” Brittle men or prima donnas.
This is a place where people take scorching heat. Lashing sand storms. This is a place
where Japs and Germans will be defeated. Let’s make a “boom” town out of Tokio.
Basic Magnesium Inc. Employee Manual (1943)
After the completion of the dam in 1936, southern Nevada suffered an exodus of
population and decreased federal spending. While Hoover Dam continued to draw
visitors, dam workers and their families vanished as well as federal services. Six
Companies closed its hospital in Boulder City, forcing the local residents who remained
to seek medical care in Las Vegas. After efforts to attract industry with cheap power
failed, the city focused on tourism and its old standby, the railroad. 216 By the late 1930s,
the divorce trade and gambling industry somewhat revived the local economy. But it was
not enough. Without federal spending, the city seemed destined to bust. It appeared to
Dr. Clare Woodbury that Las Vegas “would fold.” But instead, he watched with pride as
the city “continued on.” 217 While abandoning the region a few years earlier, southern
Nevada attracted the attention of Washington D.C. once again. This time, the region
provided the ideal location to help build an arsenal of democracy.
The Desert Arsenal
Mobilization for World War II dramatically changed southern Nevada. It
introduced the defense industry, a move that precipitated the construction of
manufacturing plants, a gunnery school, and during the postwar period, the Nevada Test
216
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Site and Nellis Air Force Base. Consequently, World War II mobilization profoundly
affected the region, boosting its local economy throughout the twentieth century. Before
discussing occupational health at Basic Magnesium Inc., it is important to understand
how southern Nevada came to host the defense industry. Since the history of Basic
Magnesium Inc. has merited little scholarly attention, this chapter will provide a
description of the plant’s origins and establishment in southern Nevada. 218
Wartime mobilization dramatically transformed the United States, especially the
West. As the closest region to the Pacific, the federal government invested over $40
billion in western military and industrial development. California received 10 percent of
all federal funds. As historian Gerald Nash shows, the New Deal ended the West’s
colonial relationship with eastern and international capital, but World War II charted its
future.219 Federal spending shifted the region’s reliance on mining and agriculture to
manufacturing and science. To be sure, the West was an ideal location for the defense
industry. Since Japanese bombers threatened coastal city production, inland cities such
as Las Vegas, Pocatello, Salt Lake, Phoenix, and Albuquerque were ideal locations for
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manufacturing and military bases. The climatic conditions also accommodated yearround training for pilots, gunners, and bombardiers.220
Nevada was the perfect spot. Closely situated to the Pacific, the state had an
abundance of federally-owned land. Ultimately, mobilization significantly improved
Nevada’s economic condition. In 1943, Governor E. P. Carville remarked that the
“extraordinary conditions brought about by the war” fostered prosperity in Nevada.221 In
fact, the entire state thrived. In northern Nevada, the War Department built air bases in
Tonopah and Fallon, and accelerated the use of an ammunition storage facility in
Hawthorne.222 However, southern Nevada mobilization had a most dramatic effect. As
historian Eugene Moehring demonstrates, Las Vegas’ support for Roosevelt, the New
Deal, and promise of cheap water and electricity from Hoover Dam encouraged the War
Department to utilize the region. In June 1940, the military constructed a marine
auxiliary base and electrolytic manganese pilot plant in Boulder City.223 The Civil
Aeronautics Authority also helped Las Vegas purchase and upgrade the Western Air
Express airport in January 1941, located northeast of town, to strengthen the western air
defenses. The city leased it to the Army Air Corps for one dollar per year. In turn, the
army invested $25 million in the property, constructing hangers, storage facilities,
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barracks, fuel tanks, and two runways. The War Department eventually turned the base
into the Las Vegas Air Gunnery School, a training school for pilots and gunners in
airborne combat.224 The school boasted a high graduation rate. As the war raged in
Europe and the Pacific in 1942, the gunnery school graduated 4,000 pilots every 6 weeks.
In preparation for the battles of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Japan, the Army Air Corps
continued to expand the training facility. By spring 1945, the base hosted approximately
13,000 workers.225
Moreover, dam building positioned the West and South as prime locations for war
plants due to their accessibility to cheap power and water. Defense contracts quickly
became big business, especially in southern Nevada. Secretary of War Henry Stimson
candidly explained that if you are going to war in a capitalist country, you have to let
“business make money out of the process or business won’t work.”226 The wartime
relationship between the federal government, the industrial sector, and the armed forces
established what President Dwight Eisenhower called in 1961 the “military-industrial
complex.”227 Manufacturing and technology firms built shipyards, steel and aluminum
mills, chemical plants, and research facilities. The process dramatically transformed the
military. For example, government investment and military purchases advanced the
infant aircraft industry into the largest sector of the war economy. The aircraft industry
cost $45 billion, employed 2 million workers, and produced 125,000 aircrafts during the
war. Henry J. Kaiser, formally of Six Companies Inc., capitalized on western defense
224
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contracts. After the completion of Hoover Dam, Kaiser helped construct the Bonneville
and Grand Coulee Dams, and the San Francisco-Oakland Bridge. But under the
mobilization program, he was busier than ever. In California, Kaiser’s Permanente Co.
won a government contract by underbidding his competition by 18 percent, and helped
build a naval air base in Corpus Christi, Texas. But he was best known for shipbuilding.
With Todd Shipyards, Kaiser entered the business in 1939 and became renowned for
innovative production techniques. His yards in California, Oregon, and Washington built
ships in less than 45 days. Kaiser built one ship in 4 days. Workers laid the keel of the
Robert E. Peary on November 8, 1942 and it “slide into the water 90 percent complete”
on November 12.228
A lesser known venture was Kaiser’s production of magnesium. 229 Pure
magnesium was weak and soft, but its strength increases when combined with aluminum.
It was two-thirds as heavy as aluminum and one-fourth as heavy as steel. Consequently,
magnesium was manufactured into bullets, flares, bomb casings, and bomber parts.
Additionally, its powder was explosive and used in incendiary bombs.230 During the war,
the military utilized 5 percent of the nation’s magnesium in military pyrotechnics and
savaging, and 95 percent in nonflammable alloys, mostly aviation. There were two
methods to manufacture the material. I.G. Farbenindustrie of Germany developed the
Air Force History Support Office; “Business: Kaiser’s Circus,” Time Magazine, (November 23, 1942);
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electrolytic process, extracting the metal from magnesite ores. Kaiser also acquired the
rights to the carbothermic process, developed by Austrian scientist Fritz Hansgirg.231 The
latter method mixed oxide with carbon, quickly heating and cooling it.232
Throughout the 1930s, Dow Chemical, Inc. and Alcoa Aluminum held a
monopoly over American magnesium production. Dow was the nation’s only magnesium
producer, shipping its output to Alcoa to fabricate into metal fittings. But the war ended
this arrangement. In 1941, a federal grand jury indicted Dow-Alcoa, American
Magnesium Corp., Magnesium Development Corp., and other companies for conspiring
with Nazi-affiliated I.G. Farbenindustrie. The Justice Department claimed it had
“startling evidence of German influence” discouraging the production and raising the
price of magnesium in the United States. This created a shortage of magnesium. The
firms pled no contest and paid a $140,000 fine. They were also required to make their
patents available royalty-free, opening the opportunity for other companies to enter the
business. At the same time, the War Production Board authorized an enormous increase
in magnesium production in 1942, calling for an output of 700,000,000 pounds annually,
75 percent more than previously planned.233
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Small firms also benefited from the wartime conditions, such as Basic
Refractories, Inc. (BRI) of Cleveland, Ohio.234 Howard Eells inherited BRI from his
father in 1919, selling firebrick to steel companies throughout the 1930s. But the
industrialist had bigger aspirations. Eells’ firm held a patent for producing aluminum
from refractory bricks. In order to capitalize on it, he needed raw materials. In 1933,
Eells sent geologists to investigate magnesite claims in California and Nevada.235 By
1936, they located rich deposits of magnesite and brucite in the eastern slopes of the
Paradise Mountains in Nye County, Nevada. The geologists also discovered adjacent
claims in Gabbs with extensive deposits of commercial grade ore. Eells purchased the
claims, but his objective had changed. By 1940, he became interested in magnesium. In
January 1941, Eells learned that a British magnesium firm wanted to built a plant in
Canada. In the 1930s, Major John P. Ball, president of Magnesium Elecktron, Ltd.,
purchased the rights for the electrolytic process from I.G. Farbenindustrie, enlisting
German technicians to build a plant in Manchester. But after the blitz on London, Ball
needed raw materials and protection from Nazi bombers. He attempted to negotiate with
the Canadian government to build a plant in Quebec, but the deal collapsed. Eells
contacted Ball and proposed a solution. If Ball provided the know-how, Eells could
supply the raw materials. 236
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Impressed with Eells’ holdings, Ball agreed. The men incorporated Basic
Magnesium Inc. (BMI) in Nevada, with Eells sitting as president and Ball as vice
president. Next, they chose a location for the plant. The logical choice was to transport
the raw materials from Eells’ mining claims to California. Nevada did not have the
industrial capacity to house a war plant. But Eells had a better idea. Southern Nevada
was the perfect location for a plant due to its federally-owned land and close proximity to
Hoover Dam. Eells assumed the electricity savings would offset the transportation cost.
It was the first time an industrialist expressed interest in the region. Since the dam’s
completion, local residents aspired to promote their region as a haven for industry.
However, there was one major problem. In order to bring power and water to Las Vegas,
a company had to spend an estimated $7 million to build a water line and power
transmission system from Lake Mead and the dam. After Eells chose to build his plant in
the region, the only problem was securing federal funding.237
Eells had several influential supporters. George Thatcher, western counsel for
BRI, began discussing the subject with Senator Key Pittman in May 1940, six months
before the Senator died. After Pittman’s death, Thatcher contacted Senator Pat McCarran
and Congressmen James Scrugham. By the time Eells traveled to Washington D.C. to
secure funding, Nevada’s congressional seat enthusiastically supported the project. In
particular, Senator McCarran was a crucial ally, personally convincing President
Roosevelt to fund the project. He also enlisted the help of former Nevada senator Charles
and Alcoa, held the American patent. American Magnesium also held a patent used for fabrication at BMI.
See Dobbs, “Working at BMI,” 4; John Lowman to Howard P. Ells, September 24, 1940, Letter, Box 1,
Vol. II, Chronology of Basic Magnesium Inc. Supporting Data, August 27, 1940 to June 11, 1941, BMI
Collection, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Special Collections.
237
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B. Henderson. As the chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC),
Henderson oversaw the authorization of federal loans and investments in programs that
encouraged the production of essential war materials. The relationship paid off
handsomely. On April 15, 1941, BMI presented its plan to the Office of Production
Management. After several meetings with the War Department and Industrial Planning
Section of the Army Air Corps, Eells met with a subsidiary of the RFC, the Defense Plant
Corporation (DPC), in June. By July, Eells signed a $63 million contract for the
construction of a 33.6 million pounds of magnesium per annum plant. When the contract
finalized in August, the War Department expanded production to 112 million pounds per
annum! The numbers were a huge boost to the war effort. In 1940, the United States
only produced 6,000 tons. In comparison, Germany’s output was 12,000 tons. The DPC
contract stated the federal government owned all land, structures and equipment, and
magnesium, and rights to approve all sales and stockpiling. Additionally, the U.S.
Treasury compensated BMI for management services and paid employee salaries. Eells
managed operations and received a salary of $1 per ton of magnesium produced. 238
With federal approval, Ball attempted to transport blueprints and chemical
formulas to the United States from England. But they almost did not make it. A German
torpedo ended the first attempt, sinking the ship. While the technicians escaped, they lost
the plans. Ball creatively planned the second attempt. He transferred the plans to
microfilm, sending them to Washington D.C. via plane. At the same time, his technicians
boarded another ship to trick Germany spies. This time, the plans and technicians arrived
safely. But the transportation issues did not end. The plans were flown from Washington
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D.C. to Las Vegas, the courier left them on the plane. They were found in a Seattle
airport and delivered to Las Vegas. With the plans and financing intact, Eells’ dream had
come to fruition. Given the code name of “Plancor 201” for security purposes, the plant
was born.239
Wartown in the Desert
The war transformed southern Nevada. Like the dam before it, Las Vegas
boomed from federal spending. While practicing at the Las Vegas Hospital, Dr. Clare
Woodbury noticed a spike in tourism and Black Market gamblers. “World War II was
essentially a boom for Las Vegas,” he remembered. People with black market money
“did not want to report their revenue,” so they gambled and reported that their winnings
came from the casinos. Moreover, the divorce trade thrived, mostly due to publicity
garnered from the much publicized Clark Gable-Rita Langham divorce in 1939. But the
gunnery school and Basic plant provided the biggest boosts to the local economy.240
Indeed, many American cities boomed from defense contracts. In Detroit,
Michigan, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, producing 90 percent of the nation’s
automobiles, began supplying the war effort. In 1940, Willow Run, a creek west of
Detroit, was a quiet area surrounded by woodlands and farmhouses. By 1942, Ford had
built an airfield and aircraft assembly plant in the area, manufacturing four-motored
Consolidated bombers and employing over 90,000 workers. The Census Bureau
estimated from 1940 to 1942, the population of Detroit jumped 336,000 people, or 21
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percent. In Mobile, Alabama, the federal government awarded a $26 million contract to
convert their municipal airport into Brookley Field, a major Army Air Force supply depot
and bomber modification center. Mobile emerged as a major wartown, housing an Alcoa
plant as well as numerous shipyard companies. The Brookley Field operation alone
employed over 17,000 men and women.241
Like Detroit, Mobile and other martial cities, the population of southern Nevada
grew as a result of defense spending. Las Vegas’ population rose from 8,500 to nearly
50,000 residents. In comparison to Hoover Dam, the Basic plant was a far bigger
operation. At its peak, the dam employed 5,128 workers. The plant had 13,000 workers
on the payroll in July 1942. Everything was bigger at BMI, with a weekly payroll
exceeding Hoover Dam’s monthly one. To mobilize its workforce, military services
drafted workers to construct the plant or produce magnesium. Since most dam workers
had left the region, the plant recruited from neighboring states. According to Ragnald
Fyhen, Secretary-Treasurer of the Central Labor Council of Clark County, “whole groups
of men” were brought in by the “train-loads” from war recruiting centers, especially from
Los Angeles and San Diego.” The Employment Division of the Industrial Relations
Division handled all recruitment and employment. One notable BMI employee was
Jonreed Lauritzen, a western novelist. While working at the plant in 1943, he published
Arrows into the Sun. Lauritzen also wrote a short story, “Hellbent on Victory,” about his
BMI experience. 242 When asked about working in the chemical lab, Lauritzen
“Battle of Detroit,” Time Magazine, (March 23, 1942); “U.S. At War: War and Cities,” Time Magazine,
(December 14, 1942). See also the documentary, The War, American Lives II Film Project, Florentine
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responded: “We of the West know freedom. Our obligation is therefore the greater to
help preserve it. They won’t let me fight—but they will let me make magnesium. I
consider that a privilege.”243
As most World War II industries, the BMI workforce comprised of men too old
for military service, women, and minorities. Women in the workplace was not an
entirely new concept. Women had always worked, especially among lower class whites
and minorities. But prior to the war, two factors hindered women from seeking
employment. First, cultural divisions of labor situated men in the workplace and white
middle class women at home. Second, industries rarely hired women because they had
an ample supply of men. During the depression, male labor shortages were unlikely and
hiring women took jobs away from unemployed men. Pearl Harbor changed everything.
Employers could not save a man from his draft board, no matter his industrial skills.
While the 1930s motto was “train another,” “train a woman” became the wartime
norm.244
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At first, the federal government had difficulty recruiting women, so it launched
the “Rosie the Riveter” propaganda campaign. Rosie was the perfect working woman.
She was attractive, reliable, competent, and patriotic. Women responded
overwhelmingly to the Rosie campaign, especially among lower class whites and
minorities. By 1945, the number of working women rose from 12 to 18 million. While
most worked in the service sector, over 3 million women toiled in war plants. Certainly,
patriotism motivated the women, but it was also the pay. In 1942, most female college
graduates earned $25 dollars a week. War workers started at $25 to $40 per week, and
applicants needed no prior experience. After a training program of 2-6 weeks, a woman
could begin work.245
Southern Nevada’s version of Rosie the Riveter had many names, including
“Magnesium Maggie” and “Chlorine Kate.” In February 1943, BMI hired 16 women “as
an experiment putting women workers in the production department.” Most were
housewives or former office workers living in the Basic townsite. According to the
Review-Journal, the women were the first employed in a magnesium production job in
the United States. BMI quickly learned the benefits of hiring female workers. Their
safety records exceeded most of their male associates; women exhibited greater finger
dexterity, focused better, and excelled in inspection work. Moreover, they were less
likely to strike and responded well to speedup campaigns. But there were some
drawbacks. Women often needed assistance lifting heavy equipment, were prone to
Missouri Press, 1999), and Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War
II, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984); Leila J. Rupp, Mobilizing Women for War:
German and American Propaganda, 1939-1945. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); and
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fatigue, and had shorter industrial lives than men. They also were susceptible to small
accidents because of lack of experience with the complex machinery. At first, BMI
eagerly hired white women.246
Female workers assumed an array of positions, from driving forklifts to wrapping
magnesium ingots, manufacturing asbestos gloves, and repairing gas masks. The Big Job
and Basic Bombardier, the plant’s newsletters, regularly highlighted Basic’s working
women. The newsletter described the “Hydrogen Women” who appeared “as though
they’d stepped out of a Superman plot, with visors, masks, and gloves and weird-looking
instruments. As a matter of fact, they’re three of our splendid woman workers… taking
cell voltages and cleaning out the glass tubes.” Thelma Lindquist’s coworkers called her
“Chlorine Kate.” Lindquist operated a cell making chlorine gas in a room that ranged
from 130 degrees in the summer to freezing temperatures in the winter. She often
crawled on top of the cells for warmth, which was hazardous and forbidden by safety
regulations. In general, female workers tailored previous experiences to their work. One
women working alongside molten metal commented that it was “nothing more than
working over a hot cook stove.” 247
The men had mixed reactions to women to the workplace. According to Time
Magazine, their position was a “mixture of nose-out-of-joint and gallantry,” either
leaving the women alone or being too helpful. Surely, the concept was difficult to get
used to. While a redhead female posed for a photographer, one workman commented: “I
“First Women Are Put on Production Line at BMI Plant,” Review-Journal, (February 13,1943); “Army
and Navy – Manpower: Women & Machines.”
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ran that machine [for] two years and nobody ever took my picture.”248 But there was
little discrimination. At the Basic plant, women received equal pay for equal work,
approximately 90 cents per hour. Federal requirements ordered equal pay for female
workers, and it appears BMI did not take advantage of them.249 On a national scale,
women in the workplace had a significant impact. Some companies wondered why they
never employed women. Others separated female employees from the men. When asked
the reason, an executive in Detroit responded: “You know how men are.” Some men
enjoyed working alongside women. In a womanless aviation plant in Kansas City, the
men complained that “the promised blondes had not arrived.” Additionally, most women
did not experience inappropriate behavior from their coworkers. At the Basic plant,
sexual harassment was rare. Most women claimed it never happened because they lived
and worked in the Basic townsite, and the majority were married or met future spouses on
the job or at a local bar.250
Besides women, BMI employed thousands of minority workers, mostly African
Americans.251 In response to pressure from civil rights activists, Franklin Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941, prohibiting racial discrimination in the
defense industry. The Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) was the first
federal commission to support equal opportunity, barring discrimination at the federal
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workplace. Throughout the war, FEPC rules ordered that there could be “no
discrimination in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or
national origin.” By 1943, Roosevelt strengthened the FEPC with Executive Order 9346,
requiring all government contracts to have non-discrimination clauses. In 1940, only 664
blacks lived in southern Nevada. Of Las Vegas’ 8,422 residents, 165 were black. Dr.
Clare Woodbury remembered treating “very few blacks” during the 1930s. But by 194142, BMI began recruiting black men, predominantly from the South, due to labor
shortages. In 1943, over 3,000 blacks had moved to the region, making up 60 percent of
all production personnel on the plant.252
While the FEPC prohibited discrimination to some degree in the North, the
committee did not actively challenge segregation in the South and parts of the West. By
the summer of 1943, shifts in demography and workplace desegregation had serious
consequences. Rioting among whites, blacks, and Mexican Americans erupted across the
nation. In particular, desegregation in the workplace provoked riots in the South. In May
1943, a riot erupted at the Alabama Dry Dock after FEPC officials forced the company to
promote 12 black workers to skilled positions. The riot forced the FEPC to permit Jim
Crow arrangements in job positions and segregate workplace activities. A few weeks
later, false rape allegations triggered a similar riot at the Pennsylvania Shipyards in
Beaumont, Texas.253 BMI did not experience such dramatic opposition to minorities in
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the workplace, but several black workers protested workplace segregation. On October
23, 1943, 200 assembled a walkout in protest of the separate washrooms and toilet
facilities. A day later, John Burke, an FEPC examiner, arrived in Las Vegas to
investigate the allegations. It is unclear what happened to the strikers, although the
Review-Journal reported that several were offered employment at the Hawthorne Naval
Depot.
While BMI claimed it discouraged racial discrimination, white workers had
higher earning potential than blacks. According to local union representative E.E. Ward,
blacks were “being discriminated against with the support of management” even though
they performed “identical work as white men receive lesser payment.” Louis Stricklan, a
jeep driver, confirmed Ward’s accusation. He revealed that black workers received 50
cents less an hour and had little opportunity to advance their position. Stricklan also
claimed BMI believed blacks workers’ wages were “too high” and it “didn’t want none of
the colored fellows to get a chance” for advancement.” The Review-Journal also reported
that blacks an “income range from $1,500 to $2,000,” while whites earned “$1,500 to
$3,000.” 254
Besides separate lavatories and unequal pay, BMI requested complete segregation
of the plant. But the FEPC denied the request, noting that full segregation caused unrest
and alluded to the riot in Alabama. The workers generally interacted well. Most blacks
had issues with management, not their coworkers. However, the FEPC did not challenge
the construction of separate housing units. Under the direction of the Federal Housing
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Authority (FHA), BMI completed Carver Park in 1943, providing 324 apartments for
families and dormitories for singles, a grammar school, recreational facilities, and a small
business district. Another option was to live in the Westside, Las Vegas’ black district,
located across the railroad tracks from Fremont Street. But until the completion of
Carver Park in 1943, most blacks and their families lived in army tents near the plant.
Arriving in 1942, Viola Johnson lived in a tent with 7 family members. Her family
rotated shifts during the day and night, and constant rainstorms and heat spells enhanced
the cramped conditions. Johnson’s recollection of the experience was that “it was awful
living there.” 255
The housing situation was not only uncomfortable for black workers. Everyone
experienced inadequate living conditions. As thousands of war workers flooded into
southern Nevada for a paycheck, the situation was eerily similar to a decade earlier. Like
the dam, accommodations were an afterthought. In fact, the entire nation experienced
housing shortages. Some used local jails and churches to house workers. In Detroit “the
symbol and seat of America’s industrial genius,” workers lived in tents, shacks, and
trailers. Time Magazine called the situation “tragic, dirty confusion.” Moreover, LIFE
described Detroit’s morale as “perhaps the worst in the U.S.” The poor planning in
Detroit eventually led to material shortages, short tempers, sit-downs, strikes, and a drop
in war production.256
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When confronted with housing shortages in the 1930s, New Dealers created
several relief programs, protecting private lenders against loss and subsidizing lowincome public housing. By 1940, the federal government needed housing to build an
arsenal, so they allocated millions to defense housing. The programs gave financial
support to cities to construct their own housing, and housing developments were built
under federal jurisdiction. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, legislation provided an
additional $300 million for housing.257 Eventually, the competing programs led to
numerous setbacks and delays. To remedy the situation, the federal government
consolidated all activities into the National Housing Agency (NHA). Additionally,
Roosevelt amended the Housing Act of 1934 to create Title VI, authorizing the mass
construction of FHA-financed homes in defense industry areas. By June 1941, the FHA
approved the financing of three housing developments under Title VI in Las Vegas.258
The Biltmore, Huntridge, and Mayfair neighborhoods provided over 1000 homes for noncommissioned officers, and army gunnery school and white BMI employees. From 1940
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to 1947, the federal government financed nearly one million units of war, emergency, and
defense housing nationwide.259
While the Biltmore, Huntridge, and Mayfair neighborhoods created some
housing, BMI needed to provide accommodations as well. At first, Eells opposed the
idea and did not want to build a company town. Indeed, there was little profit in the
endeavor. Eells’ original plans only provided for a plant and he wanted workers to
commute from Boulder City’s dam housing. But after military demands increased
production, BMI needed to accommodate an additional 10,000 workers and their
families. Eells faced relentless criticism for not providing suitable housing, but the
situation was beyond his control. The federal government not only increased the size of
the project, but also delayed selecting a townsite and supplying funding. After the War
Department increased production, Eells contacted the Emergency Housing Coordination
(EHC) and the Federal Works Agency (FWA) to secure housing funding. The FWA
responded that there was a “tremendous national demand for similar civic needs.” It
suggested that the War Department file an application emphasizing “the importance of
the Nevada project and the vital necessity for housing.” Eells arranged for the War
Department to submit a request and recruited Justin Hartzog, a Defense Housing
Coordination planner, to collect information for his application. 260
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In July 1941, Hartzog traveled to southern Nevada with several federal
representatives to determine a location for the housing development and the plant. The
surveyors identified 2800 acres of unclaimed federally-owned land for the plant site.
Located southeast of Las Vegas at Black Mountain, the site provided access to Hoover
Dam and Lake Mead’s power and water. In case of an attack, it also would be located a
safe distance from the dam.261 Besides the plant site, the surveyors also chose a housing
location. They considered both Las Vegas and Boulder City, but determined both were
inadequate. Boulder City was “operated as part of Boulder Dam plant and not intended
to be a population center for industrial enterprises.” Moreover, the town lacked sufficient
electricity, water, and sewage, and the schools were already unsatisfactory. Las Vegas
was also deemed unacceptable. To accommodate the growth, it needed more water, and
new schools and an updated sewage system. Additionally, Las Vegas land value was
“very high due to current rapid growth” and far away from the plant, which would cost
workers “time and money from [a] transportation standpoint.” The surveyors also cited
the stigma of Las Vegas, determining that it was undesirable to industrial population “due
to wide-open conditions– “booze, gambling, and brothels.” The Basic townsite needed to
be a regulated community, minimizing the “influences prevalent in Nevada.” The
surveyors found only one redeeming quality: its medical infrastructure. The hospitals
were “probably enough to handle our needs even if we build a corporate town,” with 182
beds between the county and private hospitals. 262 The surveyors also briefly considered
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Paradise Valley as a possible townsite, located between the plant and Las Vegas. But
they determined it “did not have an existing city as a nucleus” and would be expensive to
build an infrastructure. Also, the cost of drilling trenches for a lengthy water line from
Lake Mead to supply residents and cool the hot magnesium ingots when they came out of
BMI’s ovens would have been too costly.263
Ultimately, the surveyors decided the housing should be located adjacent to the
plant. The close proximity afforded the project access to fundamental civic facilitates.
Moreover, without a long commute, workers would show up on-time for their shifts.
With a townsite selected, BMI needed more federal support. This was a difficult task.
Since the original contract did not include housing, Eells did not budget for funding.
Consequently, the Defense Plant Commission (DPC) handled the application.
Mismanagement on part of the DPC contributed to the townsite delay. First, it postponed
officially selecting the townsite until September 20. Second, the DPC did not file the
application until October 12, requesting $6 million. The FWA initially expressed anxiety
over the request because of “very limited funds,” but approved the funding. After a
month of deliberating, it offered $3 million if the DPC covered the balance.264
The DPC authorized $240,000 for housing, and McNeil Construction Co. erected
army tents for its workers near the plant site.265 The news infuriated Las Vegas leaders.
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Their town had earlier missed out on housing dam workers, and now the federal
government overlooked them once again. Many businessmen feared that the townsite
would lure dam-bound tourism away from Las Vegas. They were also concerned about
the new community interfering with local politics and wanted to improve Las Vegas’
infrastructure. By December, Las Vegas accelerated its anti-Basic townsite campaign.
The Las Vegas Taxpayers’ Association called for a mass meeting, enlisting the help of
Senator Berkeley Bunker, who had filled Senator Key Pittman’s seat in 1940 until an
elected successor qualified for the position.266 He was the first southern Nevada resident
to hold a congressional seat. Described as a “handsome,” “dapper,” “serious Mormon exBishop,” Bunker was usually “seen not heard on the floor of the Senate.” But during this
tenure, he made headlines on one subject: BMI. Unlike Senator McCarran, who called
the plant a “permanent addition to southern Nevada’s prosperity,” Bunker charged the
project with war profiteering. On December 11, he sent a letter to the DPC indicating
that the townsite was “motivated by visions of personal financial profit.” After an
investigation, the DPC struck a compromise. BMI would build “temporary” housing,
which could be removed after the war. In exchange, the federal government granted Las
Vegas 1,000 additional building permits, facilitating the construction of the Biltmore,
Huntridge, and Mayfair developments.267
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By December 23, the DPC authorized the construction of 1,000 demountable
homes, dormitories, army tents, and a trailer camp. Additionally, the agency refused to
allocate funding if the townsite did not meet Public Health Service (PHS) standards,
requiring streets, stores, sewers, recreational facilities, power, water, and gas supplies.
Confronting these regulations, the federal government forced Eells to erect an entire
town. On February 17, 1942, construction finally began. BMI commissioned Paul R.
Williams, a famed African American architect, to design the development, named
Victory Village. Williams’ plan provided for 1,000 homes, several schools, a grocery
and meat market, a department store, beauty and barber shops, a recreation center, a mess
hall, a drug store, and other amenities. In May, the McNeil crew finished and released 59
homes. But it was not enough. The workforce grew faster than homes could be built.268
Moreover, thousands of the workers were black. Since Victory Village adhered to
strict segregation, they had nowhere to live. The situation forced the construction of
Carver Park in 1943. Located east of the plant, Carver Park had 324 housing units, a
school, recreation hall, and athletic field. While the plans for Victory Village and Carver
Park seemed promising, both developments could not handle all the workers. By July
1942, BMI maintained 11,009 construction workers and 1,490 plant laborers.
Remarkably, the turnover rate was 5 percent per week, mostly among unskilled laborers.
These numbers surprised L.G. McNeil, president of McNeil Construction Co.
“Considering the living conditions here in the past month,” he assumed the rate “would
be higher.” Eventually, the housing situation attracted the attention of union leaders and
political leaders. Congressmen Scrugham spoke to labor leaders about the “titanic
268
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struggle” facing the nation, acquiring raw materials and recruiting labor. He stressed that
BMI needed a bigger workforce. However, to attract workers, he contended the “living
conditions” needed to “be improved and changed.” 269
But the poor conditions continued throughout the fall. In October, only 1,000
workers lived in homes. Most lived in the tent city, housing 4,800 workers, the
Anderson’s Camp barracks, or squatted in the desert. The Saturday Evening Post
described the chaotic situation: “Anything larger than a parasol is rated a house. If it has
lights, water and sewer it is a mansion, and anything beyond is pure paradise.” The
workers encountered “picturesquely squalid discomfort,” living in “trailers and tents,
abandoned mine shafts, or sleeping in cars scattered over twenty square miles of desert.”
The tent city accommodated 4 workers per tent, providing cots, chairs and a writing table.
Of course, the lodging lacked power, running water, and toilets. Most workers had
difficulty sleeping during the hot summer nights. Some wrapped themselves in wet
sheets and slept outside in the dirt. Others regularly visited Fremont Street’s clubs or the
taverns that dotted Boulder Highway. Most workers tried to spend as little time in the
tents as possible, often working double shifts or playing card games in the mess hall. 270
Besides the tent city, workers doubled up accommodations with families in Las
Vegas and Boulder City, participating in “share your home” programs with households
with extra rooms. Others shared beds from coworkers on separate shifts. BMI also
entered an agreement with the Boulder Dam Hotel and Hualapai Lodge for the rental of
hotel rooms. Basic employees, government officials, military personnel overwhelmed the
269
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Boulder Dam Hotel. To provide beds, the hotel turned their dining room into a
dormitory. War workers also slept on the lobby couches and staircase landings. The
conditions lasted until April 1943 when BMI finally rented out 1,300 homes and 500
furnished apartments in Victory Village. However, most workers continued to reside in
Las Vegas and other places. After the departure of most construction workers in early
1944, the majority of Basic employees lived in the townsite. The same year, its post
office opened, officially naming the townsite “Henderson.”271
But housing controversy did not end there. During the process, Las Vegas
realized it could not accommodate BMI workers, and the project benefited it
economically. However, Bunker continue to probe the plant. All he needed was a spark.
Conveniently, his opportunity appeared in the form of a fire. On the evening of March 6,
1942, guards noticed smoke in the southwest of the plant’s administration building.
Word of the fire spread quickly. Over 3000 workers helped evacuate the building and
attempted to extinguish the flames with a limited water supply. Several drove bulldozers
into the blazing ruins, “pushing the fire away” from plant’s blueprints. According to the
Review-Journal, one of the operators was “completely surrounded by fire on all sides as
he pushed blazing piles of debris away from the important McNeil vault.”272 High desert
winds continued to fan the blaze. The building burned to the ground. Miraculously, the
workers saved the blueprints and neighboring buildings, and there were no reported
injuries. The next morning, BMI built temporary field offices and continued
271
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construction. Rumors of sabotage spread immediately. McNeil commented to the
Review-Journal that the blaze was “the result of sabotage,” attempting to halt work on the
important war project. A local investigation also revealed that it originated in the
engineering department. Each afternoon, BMI disconnected the building’s gas and power
sources. But investigators discovered the gas valves were open. This confirmed their
suspicions. An arsonist had entered the room and ignited the gas. 273
Bunker had all the evidence he needed. He believed that BMI set its
administration building on fire. On March 10, Bunker issued a statement to the ReviewJournal, charging the BMI’s corporate records were “conveniently burned” in the fire.
Eells issued a statement that welcomed an investigation. Even though the Fire
Companies Adjustment Bureau found “no indication that the fire was of incendiary
origin,” the controversy had come to the attention of Washington.274 By the end of the
month, the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program visited
Las Vegas to examine Bunker’s allegations. In early 1941, Senator Harry S. Truman had
heard rumors of mismanagement in America’s defense industry. An investigation
revealed the allegations were true. Departing from the methods of the Congressional
Joint Committee on the Conduct of War during the Civil War and the Nye Committee
during World War I, Truman created a regulatory committee. He believed unrelenting
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scrutiny of the military and after-the-fact investigations did little good. “The thing to do
is to dig up this stuff now and correct it,” Truman noted. The Roosevelt administration
was skeptical of a committee investigating activities concerning national defense. But it
deemed Truman to be “friendly hands.” By March 1941, the Senate created the Special
Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, dubbed the Truman
Committee, by unanimous consent. Until 1948, the committee revealed exploitation and
mismanagement, abuses in cost-plus contracting, and faulty material production. Most
historians agree it was a success, reportedly saving taxpayers over $15 billion. 275
In March 1943, the Truman Committee began its investigation. After several
days of testimonies, it concluded that BMI was “one of the most fragrant attempts at war
profiteering” observed by the committee. BMI received $280,000 in ore royalties,
$560,000 for operating the plant annually, and $300,000 for construction and engineering
services. The Truman Committee called these “tremendous fees,” considering “miserable
progress” under current management. It criticized Eells, noting that he had “little or no
construction experience.” The committee stressed that magnesium was a critical war
material and the nation needed the metal to advance its aircraft industry. It recommended
a crackdown on mismanagement. Several days later, Bucker attacked BMI on the senate
floor. He charged Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones with committing “sinister fraud”
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and entering a “corrupt” contract with Eells. He alleged “unusual political ramifications”
surrounded the refinery contract with the DPC. Jones denounced the allegations, calling
Bunker “unworthy” of his senate seat. He formally denied the charges, reporting that “no
irregularities” were discovered.276
Throughout the summer, Bunker continued to scrutinize Eells, regularly
addressing the senate floor about BMI’s conditions. But the campaign did not save his
political career. Bunker lost the Democratic nomination to Congressmen Scrugham, a
stanch supporter of BMI. Coincidently, Eells’ attachment to the plant ended around the
same time. His contract contained a clause that the DPC could discontinue the agreement
“at any time after the expiration of 3 years.” At this time, it would pay Eells $1 million
for the plant. Additionally, the contract stated the DPC could fire Eells if he violated the
contract or the plant was not “substantially in conformity with the plans, designs,
specification, and schedules.” Most likely, the federal government ousted Eells with the
latter clause. Among his numerous indiscretions, the plant lacked a coordinated
engineering efforts, and general errors existed in its construction design and layout. Eells
was also charged with “extravagances” and overestimating “the quality and quantity” of
his ore reserves. The failures prompted his removal from the project. Eells ultimately
got half the payout the federal government promised him. On October 27, 1942,
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Anaconda Copper Company bought the management rights for $75,000, and the DPC
purchased his mining claims for only $450,000.277
BMI and Occupational Health
When BMI broke ground in September 1941, industries were considerably safer
than a decade earlier at Hoover Dam. Throughout the 1930s, improvements in
technology and public policy bettered working conditions. The New Deal also
encouraged safety in the private sector.278 Consequently, most large firms
institutionalized occupational health programs, employing safety engineers to improve
efficiency and save lives. The workers also benefited from the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, the standardization of the 8-hour workday, ending child labor in most factories,
and from the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935. At the same time, most
industries experienced a decline in labor turnover. But mobilization for World War II
stalled the movement. While the employment opportunities reduced the unemployment
rate, it also increased labor turnover and thereby injury rates. After Pearl Harbor,
intensified mobilization continued to strain conditions. The military drafted most of the
experienced workers, including safety engineers. As a result, industries recruited workers
with no prior experience in heavy industry. Given little instruction on safety measures,
the workers were a danger to themselves and coworkers. Conditions worsened after
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companies extended the workweek and instituted speedups to increase production as
well.279
The workers were exhausted, but regularly volunteered for double shifts or
overtime to support the war effort. Industries producing iron and steel, ships, bombers,
automobiles, concrete, slaughtering and meat packing, fertilizer and leather reported high
disease and injury rates. Likewise, the production of ammunition, chemicals, electric
goods, plastics, and rubber exposed workers to pollutants, dusts, and acids. While the
federal government and companies were familiar with the effects of toxins, including
benzene, toluene, asbestos, and silica, they often showed little concern in protecting
workers. However, the urgent need for war material eventually forced the issue. Since
accidents and injury-related absenteeism slowed production, the safety movement soon
became synonymous with the war effort.280
Part of the hazardous work at the plant was its construction. It was a huge job; at
one time, BMI employed 10 percent of Nevada’s population. The company
subcontracted with McNeil Construction Co. to build the plant and townsite, and a dozen
subcontractors to construct power transmission lines from Hoover Dam, a 14 mile water
pipeline, and other architectural and engineering services. The MacDonald Engineering
Company also erected an oxide plant and housing development at Eells’ mine holdings in
Gabbs, Nevada.281 Due to its success at Hoover Dam, BMI hired the Anderson Brothers
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Company to feed the workers. Its facilities opened in 1941, operating continuously
throughout the project. At peak construction, the mess hall served 30,000 to 40,000
meals daily. The workers demanded an enormous quantity of food. They consumed 70
gallons of coffee and 90 dozen doughnuts every morning, 75 gallons of beef stew daily,
and 3 tons of frankfurters a week. Anderson Brothers also provided beverage services at
the plant, stocking canteen and coffee shops to ensure workers remained hydrated and
alert. The company estimated that each worker drank over 2 gallons of water per shift.282
McNeil maintained the largest contingent of workers. In September 1941, the
company began leveling and grading the plant site. By 1942, it erected several cells,
installed electrical, plumbing, and heating, and constructed roads, fencing, foundations,
machinery support, drains, and sewers. McNeil subcontracted with the Columbia Steel
Company to fabricate 23 chlorination, electrolysis, chlorine, and preparation buildings.
40 percent of the plant was underground, with electrical transmission lines embedded in
subterranean tunnels. The electrical equipment alone cost $12 million and the workers
poured over 200,000 yards of concrete. McNeil described the plant as a “veritable jigsaw
puzzle” with “endless miles” of pipes, compressors, pumps, tanks, and heat exchangers.
His workers “toiled through wind, sand, and heat to assemble” it. The job was often
“complicated” that it resembled “a great pattern of lace.” His workers were generally
efficient, setting new building records daily. The Fritz Ziebarth Co., which built the
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power line from Hoover Dam, finished it 25 days ahead of schedule. Engineers Limited
also completed the water system from Las Mead on time.283
At the same time, construction surged ahead at the mines in Gabbs. The
MacDonald crew built an oxide plant and housing development, and loading area to
transport the raw materials south. The Gabbs operation employed 900 workers. By June
1942, the oxide plant became operational. The Big Job described it as “a triumph of
modern engineering,” processing the raw magnesite into magnesium through “a maze of
conveyors and pipe lines in an uninterrupted flow.” The first shipment left the following
week. At first, BMI transported the material from Gabbs to Salt Lake to Las Vegas on
railroad freight cars. But the 1,100 mile trip was expensive. The cost eventually
convinced the federal government to build a highway that connected Gabbs and Las
Vegas. BMI hired Wells Inc., a trucking company, to drive 668 miles round trips every
28 hours. It was the biggest trucking operation in the nation, and the longest haul
undertaken on a continuous basis. 284
Construction did not officially end until October 1943, but BMI started producing
chlorine in August 1943. Chlorine was an essential chemical in modern warfare. It
provided a base in chemical warfare, purified water, and helped make magnesium. The
first batch of liquid chlorine left the plant of August 9. At the end of the month, workers
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began operating one section of the plant. Within 6 weeks, they loaded the first shipment
of magnesium to southern California to make aircraft and bomb parts. A year later, BMI
reached full production. It was the largest metal producer in the world. When the plant
closed in November 1944, it had operated continuously for 807 days. The production
numbers were astounding. In 1938, the total U.S. consumption of magnesium was 2,400
tons. In 1941, the output was 12,400 tons. During BMI’s tenure, it produced over 83,000
tons of marketable, refined, or alloyed magnesium!285
The workers confronted a variety of hazards. Human error was the leading cause
of accidents, resulting from carelessness, fatigue, poor communication, limited work
experience, and inadequate risk perception. The construction crews experienced
traditional working conditions for their line of work. Some workers fell to their deaths.
In July 1943, a McNeil employee suffered fatal head and chest injuries after falling 50
feet.286 Workers operated heavy machinery and other dangerous equipment. Driving on
uneven ground, trucks and cranes frequently tipped over, crushing or trapping workers
underneath. There were numerous automobile accidents, striking workers while they
walked to work. In fact, traffic accidents in American industries were a widespread
problem during World War II. In 1943, Time Magazine actually reported that the
battlefronts were safer than working in America’s war plants. Traffic accidents had
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killed 22,500 war workers since Pearl Harbor, while 16,913 soldiers died in combat.
Besides traffic, fires were a regular occurrence. In March 1943, the BMI administration
building fire reduced the structure to a “mass of blazing embers and twisted metal” in an
hour. Remarkably, no workers sustained major injuries. Several months later, a fire
erupted in the electrolysis building. Subsequent fires in the peat pits and sheet metal shop
burnt structures to the ground, costing a total estimated loss of $85,000. The causes
ranged from arson to “a curious quirk of nature.” 287
Mining and the production line was also hazardous. Miners entered the Gabbs
deposit by drilling and blasting, which afforded the greatest degree of selective mining.
After extraction, the plant crushed, floated, and dried the raw material. Gabbs workers
were subjected to numerous dangers, mostly concerned with risk associated with mining.
They inhaled dust, and confronted fires, crush-related accidents, operating heavy
machinery in the ore pit, and human error accidents. At first, the crushing unit did not
make provisions to eliminate dust. After the Nevada Inspector of Mines cited the
company, BMI corrected the problem. However, most accidents were incidental to the
industry and not due to safety lapses In fact, worker carelessness contributed to most
injuries. While in the mining pit, a large boulder struck a worker. Later, the state
determined the accident was due to “the carelessness on the part of the miners.” Anxious
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to finish work at noon, they had “overlooked the precautions.” The worker died from a
cerebral hemorrhage triggered by a fracture to his skull.288
The Basic plant was also dangerous work. At first, labor turnover was high due to
the summer heat, inhalation of suffocating chlorine gas, and housing situation. Under
Executive Order 9301, the plant’s maximum work hours were 48 hours a week, 8 hour
shifts. But manpower shortages and various emergency situations forced most BMI
employees to work 7 days a week and in 10 hour shifts. The company paid double time
for Sundays, providing an employee worked the 6 preceding days. All shifts rotated to
ensure 24-hour production. The manufacturing process was complicated and most
employees had limited industrial experience. After Gabbs workers converted the raw
magnesite into magnesium oxide, Basic workers mixed it with peat moss, coal dust, salt,
potassium chloride, and calcium chloride. Next, they cemented the compound into
bricks, melting it in kilns and placing it in an electric furnace. Finally, the workers
blasted the compound with chlorine, transforming the magnesium oxide into magnesium
chloride bars. The product was then shipped off to war factories.289
The manufacturing process created very poor health conditions. One byproduct
was the intense heat. Temperatures in the plant soared during the blazing desert summer.
Inadequate ventilation and cooling equipment contributed to the problem. As the
workers toiled in the heat, they handled dangerous chemicals. While chlorine gas was an
essential part of the process, it was highly toxic. The use of chlorine marked the advent
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of chemical warfare during World War I. The “choking gas” killed over 800 soldiers on
a battlefield in Belgium. Victims essentially suffocate in their own fluids. Chlorine was
not longer used in combat, but was a component in chemical and biological weapons, and
producing magnesium. Chlorine or sulphur gassings were regular occurrences. Exposed
workers experienced coughing, chills, and fever, and allowed disability leaves for up to 3
weeks. The workers were understandably concerned about its harmful effects. In its
employee manual, BMI stressed that medical authorities agreed that “chlorine gas
positively [did] not result in tuberculosis” or lung trouble. With the exception of rare
cases, the cure was a “few minutes of fresh air after exposure.”290
But BMI recognized the threat. To limit employer liability, its health care policy
specified that it covered all injuries “including those arising from the effects of the gas…
without cost to the employee.” However, the pressure of incompetent workers
constituted the greatest danger in the BMI workplace. High labor turnover resulted in the
hiring of numerous unqualified workers. This increased the number of gassings,
especially in the electrical department. Indeed, the workers protected themselves with
safety gear, wearing masks, gloves, protective eyewear, and wooden shoes. But
accidents were still frequent. The Inspector of Mines reported numerous injuries, ranging
from inhalation of dust to life-threatening burns from hot metals to explosions spattering
workers with molten magnesium. In 1943, Clark County reported 356 accidents, the
second most in the state. White Pine County, which produced 59 percent of Nevada’s
five metals – gold, silver, copper, lead, and zinc – edged out Clark as the state’s most
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dangerous county to work. However, by 1944 the figures were nearly identical, both
experiencing 724 accidents in one year. 291
To make matters worse, the workers endured primitive living conditions. The
housing shortage produced much discomfort. Additionally, the Anderson Brothers Co.
quickly developed the reputation for bad sanitation and food preparation. On one
occasion, ptomaine poisoning and food poisoning struck 123 workers after eating in the
mess hall. Numerous workers were also sickened after eating Anderson’s molded pies.
A Board of Health investigation revealed the pies were spoiled and insanitary conditions
in the mess hall. Besides contaminated food, recreation was problematic. The workers
had nothing to do. Gas rationing virtually prohibited them from leaving the townsite. To
entertain themselves, they drank and gambled at the clubs on Boulder Highway and
Fremont Street. Consequently, their quality of work suffered. BMI immediately
recognized the problem. The workers often reported to their shifts drunk or failed to
show up at all. To promote wholesome leisure activities, the company established social
activities, including dances, and arts and craft instruction, and chess games. BMI also
sponsored church groups, fraternal organizations, and athletic teams. The recreational
programs helped somewhat, but workers continued to overindulge in local vices, leading
to high absenteeism. In fact, BMI had the highest absentee rate of any defense plant in
the United States during the war. In the week of January 18, 1943, 3041 employees were
absent out of 4000, averaging approximately 400 per day. The Big Job and Basic

291

White Pinot County was the leading mining producer in the state, with 59 percent of the total value of
Nevada’s five metals (gold, silver, copper, lead, and zinc), and was first in output of copper and gold. By
sheer volume, it edged Clark County out as the most dangerous county in the state. However, by 1944, the
numbers were identical. For a list of the various injuries experienced at the BMI plant, see Reports of Fatal
and Nonfatal Accident in “Report of the Inspector of Mines,” 7-9, 35-74, 116-153. See also Basic
Magnesium, Inc., Forman Manual, “Company Policies – Hospital;” and Dobbs, “Working at BMI,” 22-23.

174

Bombardier newsletters regularly condemned absenteeism, calling the practice “Old Man
Absenteeism” and the “production enemy and ally of the Japanazi.” It warned that absent
“war workers on the production line” killed American soldiers on the warfront.292
In April 1943, BMI decided to do something about it. Much like Sims Ely had
done in Boulder City during the 1930s, the company attempted to police its workers to
encourage good behavior. Partnering with the American Federation of Labor, it
established a “Production Patrol Police” to prevent drunkenness, conserve man hours,
and ensure proper treatment of workers. Besides ending absenteeism, the company
sought to limit crime. During drinking binges, many workers were “robbed and abused”
by various assailants. The Production Patrol Police were observers, not law enforcement,
helping intoxicated workers to their homes. Additionally, BMI built a temporary jail at
the plant for the workers to “sober up” and “work on schedule.” If an employees’
absenteeism continued, the company reserved the right to discharge anyone with over 7
days of unexcused absences. Ultimately, the Production Patrol Police and layoff threats
did not end absenteeism. Throughout the project, it averaged 10 percent of the workforce
per day. By August 1943, General Manager Francis O. Case announced the closure of all
taverns between the townsite to curb the problem. Of course, the bar owners contested
the move, promising to maintain a midnight closing time.293
The poor working and living conditions resulted in a high turnover rate. During
its construction, the Las Vegas office of the U.S. Employment Service recruited 1,000
United States Senate, “Hearings,” Part 20, 8355-8356; “BMI Absentees,” The Big Job, No. 32, Basic
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workers per month to compensate for turnover. Turnover declined after housing
increased, but workers continued to quit at a rapid pace. Many suffered dust or gas
infections, and left because of health reasons. E.E. Ward, a local union representative,
testified to the Truman Committee that “hundreds of cases of workers, both white and
black, left the plant feeling that their lives are endangered.” They did not want to take
“any further risk.” Indeed, all industries experienced high labor turnover during World
War II. In normal times, workers seek employment. But during World War II,
employment was plentiful and companies competed for workers. Since labor turnover
delayed production, employers had difficulty meeting production goals. Officials
attributed labor turnover to several reasons. First, employees frequently transferred jobs
for better pay. Competition between companies produced an inequality of wages.
Second, workers quit because of housing and transportation arrangements, or unhygienic
and dangerous working conditions. World War I labor turnover was particularly
problematic. Some industries with a 200-300 percent annual turnover rate in peacetime
experienced a 100 percent per week rate during the war.294
High labor turnover plagued World War II mobilization throughout the nation. In
Seattle, an aircraft mechanics union lost 2,518 members in one month, mostly to the
Army and higher-paying shipyard jobs. In an alloys plant with 50 employees, 19 left in
one week. The War Manpower Board worked out a solution in the West and South,
issuing a “freezing arrangement” with employers and unions. It stated that no worker
could seek jobs elsewhere without obtaining a “certificate of separation.” To solidify the
agreement, the War Labor Board raised mining wages. A mine operator commented that
294
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it was the “perfect case of locking the barn door after the horse is stolen.” One-fifth of
miners were already gone. In southern Nevada, the order prevented BMI workers,
employees of the manganese plant in Boulder City, and miners in Goodsprings from
terminating employment. But employers could terminate workers in cases of “gross
misconduct” or an inability to “perform higher-skilled work.” Additionally, workers
could quit if they had “compelling reasons” or their wages were “less favorable” than
“prevailing in the community.” Consequently, BMI workers were denied discharge
employment or allowed to quit at the rate of 240 to 250 per day.295
But the order failed and the plant continued to experience a shortage of workers.
Each department lacked enough workers to perform their jobs. One employee estimated
that his department was short “at least 15 men.” Figures in the Basic Bombardier
demonstrate the severity of the problem. Throughout the project’s duration, there were
21,022 terminations and 22,514 hires at the plant.296 The turnover rate was highest in
1943 to 1944, averaging 20 to 30 percent per month. To fix the problem, BMI recruited
women and blacks. It also arranged a bargain with the legal system. Judges in Lincoln
Heights, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles gave minor offenders the choice of jail time or
employment at BMI. Most chose the latter and were transported to southern Nevada.
Alcoholics were given the same punishment. In the preemployment medical
examinations, company doctors discovered that a high percentage of alcoholics worked at
the plant. Consequently, petty criminals and alcoholics arrived by the bus load, working
long enough to draw their first pay and quitting. M. L. Reese, a former McNeil employee
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and BMI guard, recounted a situation while working at a sheriff in the Pittman area. He
arrested a man who had recently spent 18 months in jail for “drunkenness and drunkdriving.” After an all night drinking bender, Reese found the man naked, taking a bath in
a galvanized tub in broad daylight. He arrested him. Three days later, the man went to
work for BMI in the mechanical maintenance department. Reese denounced the practice,
commenting that BMI was hard work and workers needed to be alert, not addicts.
Besides alcoholics and petty criminals, headhunters in Phoenix, Reno, Tucson, Barstow,
San Diego, and Los Angles offered recruits $10 for getting on a bus headed for Las
Vegas. The recruits often worked an hour and disappeared, while others lasted a week or
two. 297
The hiring practices did not foster the most competent workforce, which
contributed to the high accident rate. But BMI management may have been partially to
blame. One worker complained there was “no management” at the plant and that
subordinate supervisors were “afraid to assume any responsibility.” No one was
monitoring safety and working conditions. The plant also had poor working conditions,
which contributed “very definitely” to the labor turnover. Yet, despite the situation, the
worker asserted that most employees were proud to work at BMI. To help in the war,
they offered to work double shifts and overtime. However, the underlying problems at
BMI were the result of “incompetent management.”298
The working conditions at BMI could have been worse if not for a strong labor
presence. To be sure, World War II strengthened the power of labor unions, especially in
southern Nevada. At BMI, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of
297
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Industrial Organizations (CIO) represented the workers. But they were often at odds.
Throughout the 1940s, the AFL and CIO fought to control the American labor market,
and the struggle played out at BMI. The AFL maintained had a stronghold of southern
Nevada, securing a contract with BMI to install AFL-affiliated unions to oversee the
operation. However, the AFL was a conservative union and usually did not represent
minorities. It also maintained a close relationship with corporate management. At BMI,
the AFL barred black workers from membership, providing an opening for the CIO to
assumed control. In December 1942, the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter
Workers (IUMMSW), a CIO affiliate, launched their campaign, printing newspaper ads
directed towards employees to rethink their union representation.299
The federal government soon intervened. According to the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, employers were obligated to recognize a union chosen by the
majority of its workers. But when BMI drafted its AFL contract, it had not hired workers
yet. The National Labor Relations Board ordered an election to “determine whether
production and maintenance employees shall be represented by the CIO, AFL, or
neither.” The CIO won with a clear majority. The AFL expressed its disapproval,
declaring the contract was still valid. It filed an objection with the National Labor
Relations Board, and began protesting the switch. By July 1943, the National Labor
Relations Board established that the AFL had “no merit” and officially granted
certification to the CIO. At first, the National War Labor Board did not accept
jurisdiction in the case. But eventually, the Truman Committee intervened. It invited the
CIO to testify about the AFL and working conditions at BMI. The committee determined
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that “the lack of decent labor-management relations, the effect on production, the effect
on the cost of production and the effect on morale” produced the numerous problems at
the plant. It called for a “speedy resolution.” In the end, the struggle between labor
unions brought attention to discrimination and unsatisfactory working conditions at the
plant. It prompted the federal government to intervene, enforcing tighter regulation and
improved working conditions.300
Basic Health
Like Hoover Dam, the occupational health program was lacking at first, but
showed improvement as time progressed. BMI management posted “Safety Pays” signs
and required workers to attend a training classes. Utilizing methods established by the
War Protection Board, the program was designed to get “unskilled men into speedy
production” and based upon four instruction steps: preparation, presentations, job tryout,
and follow-up.301 90 percent of the workers were trained by foremen, assistant foremen,
and experienced workers. Directed by safety engineers, the Safety Department oversaw
the program, stressing that “prevention is better than cure.” It mandated that all
employees to wear safety hats, dust respirators, gas masks, goggles or plastic face shields,
and rubber gloves. The Safety Department also provided decontamination showers, and
first aid stations and oxygen treatment for gassing cases.302
The plant had numerous divisions, including the Preparation, Electrolysis Cell
Room, Chlorination, Refinery, and Recovery Departments, and the Neutralization and
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Chlorine Plant. The Safety Department adapted each division’s program according to the
specific work. In the Refinery Department, it required that fire blankets were readily
available if the “clothing of an employee catches fire.” The Safety Department also
required workers to wear face shields, respirators, asbestos gloves, and asbestos aprons.
In the Chlorine Plant, it advised employees to hold their breath and “walk unhurriedly
away from the area into the wind” if they were gassed. If their breath could not be held,
workers were to “breathe shallow and short breaths to avoid coughing.” Of course, the
Safety Department stressed that chlorine gas was “not cumulative” and “exposure effects
wear off without permanent after effects.” In all divisions, it encouraged “good
housekeeping,” prohibited smoking, drinking liquor, and all “horseplay,” and requested
that workers report unsafe conditions. Additionally, the Safety Department punished
negligent behavior. If a worker was drunk, fell asleep on the job, dismissed safety
requirements, or acted insubordinate, the actions were the grounds for dismissal.303
If workers sustained an injury, then the Nevada Industrial Commission (NIC)
provided “full compensation benefits.” After an accident, the BMI Legal Department’s
Claim Division assisted workers with making claims for medical benefits and
compensation. Disabled employees received 60 percent of their average earnings, up to
$72.00 per month. But the NIC did not cover cases “caused by an unreasonable refusal
or neglect to submit to competent medical aid.” The compensation program was
marginally successful. Like carbon monoxide exposure at the dam, chlorine gassings and
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dust inhalation were not covered under the plan. According to union representative E. E.
Ward, “if you get dust infection of the lungs or gas infection, the only way you get
anything out of it is to die. If you are injured in your lungs by this dust and gas infection
there is no compensation for it – if you die the estate may benefit by a few dollars.” To
its credit, BMI attempted to meet the contingencies not covered. It adopted a “blanket
insurance program,” providing accident and death benefits, and surgical and hospital
care.304
Like the Salt Lake Road and Six Companies before it, BMI built an employeefunded hospital. Under Eells’ management, the hospital was conceived as a temporary
structure that provided first aid to construction workers and plant employees. The most
serious cases were sent to Las Vegas or Los Angeles. But BMI determined that the
hospitals in Las Vegas could not accommodate the expanded workforce and family
members. The lack of medical care fostered a “drastic” situation in 1942, according to
Eells. Knowing the desert heat contributed to fatalities at Hoover Dam, Eells told the
Truman Committee that BMI was in desperate need of “proper care” with the “hot
weather approaching.” “I tell you this is a very dangerous and critical situation,” he pled.
Still, McNeil did not begin construction until the summer.305
In two months, construction workers built the hospital near the plant. It was
designed in cooperation with Dr. F. E. Clough, the chief surgeon of BMI. According to
The Big Job, Clough was “busy as a tail gunner for months,” checking the details of
construction and expediting the technical apparatus. The doctor had prior experience
working in occupational health. He served as the chief surgeon of the Homestake Mining
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Company in South Dakota, and was recognized in the fields of industrial medicine, and
bone and joint surgery. Clough affirmed the importance of occupational health on the
project:
The big and important thing about the new hospital is that it represents something
relatively new in American industry. Embodied in its physical structure and the
apparatus and equipment which it houses, the hospital is a monument to the
insistence of modern industry that health and safety of employees is of vital
importance.
According to Clough, the hospital was “relatively new in the industry” and sought to
provide medical care “with the utmost expedition” and “wholehearted personal service.”
Built according to PHS code, it had a sprinkling system for fire safety, an air-cooling and
heating system, x-rays, delivery and operating rooms, and an outpatient section. The
hospital provided 24-hour ambulance service. All ambulance attendants were trained in
first aid. Clough asserted that it was very well-equipped, with the “latest equipment” in
medical science. BMI had spared no expense, he claimed, guaranteeing the workers had
“the best.” Besides Clough, BMI hired Drs. Chauncey Baird, A. F. O’Conner, and Ned
D. Miller, and 25 nurses. The hospital ultimately provided care to workers, and treated
families when “space was available.” After a dedication ceremony, which Clough
described as a mixture of “patriotism, medical ethics, and the concern for modern
industry for the welfare of its employees,” the hospital opened in October 1942.306
The swift construction produced issues at the hospital. At the same time,
Anaconda Copper Company acquired BMI, disrupting the workers’ health insurance
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coverage. Anaconda did not offer a pay-deduction insurance plan. This caused mass
confusion, because the workers did not understand the terms of their coverage. Clough
was confused as well. By December, he received clarification from the company and
issued a statement to The Big Job. Employees that sustained injuries on-the-job and
“service-connected cases,” including chlorine gassings, were covered without charge.
However, occupational diseases not covered under state laws were handled individually.
For injuries and illnesses sustained off-duty, workers and their families paid out-ofpocket. The reduced rates ranged from $5 to $6 a day. Operating and delivery room fees
cost $15. The rates were “reasonable” and conformed “to accepted standards.” By
summer 1943, organizational and billing issues prompted Anaconda to adopt a blanket
insurance plan. Thereafter, the workers made hospital payments through pay-roll
deduction authorization if the NIC did not provide coverage. In cases of short-term
disability, employees could not return to work until they were cleared by the medical
division.307
Working at the hospital was chaotic. The 50-bed facility did not have the
capacity to treat thousands of construction and plant workers. They waited for hours or
days to see a doctor. Overwhelmed with worker cases, the doctors rarely treated family
members. Most workers were dissatisfied with the quality of care. It is likely the
situation contributed to the high labor turnover. Moreover, the hospital was understaffed,
a prevailing condition during the war. Most doctors had left private practice to enlist,
leading to medical shortages across the nation. After Pearl Harbor, Washington D.C.
required that all male physicians under 45 years old register for the draft. Those over 45
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had to register to serve in civilian roles like at BMI. According to the New York Times,
the military managed a ratio of 6.5 physicians per 1,000 soldiers. However, the rest of
the nation dropped significantly, roughly 1 to 1,500. One response to the nationwide
physician and nursing shortage was accelerating medical and nursing programs from 4 to
3 years of training. Retired doctors and nurses also filled the civilian population need.
Despite these efforts, the military ultimately enlisted one-third of all licensed physicians,
with two-thirds under 45 years.308
Rural regions, with limited pre-war health care, were particularly hard hit. As
southern Nevada swelled to accommodate war workers, the ratio of local physicians to
patients became highly disproportionate. In 1942, the Las Vegas Hospital and Clinic
recruited doctors such as Gerald Sylvain, a state epidemiologist, to help resolve their
physician shortage. Upon his arrival, Sylvain found that most hospitals were inadequate,
except the Las Vegas Hospital. Just as during the preceding decades, little surgery was
preformed in town, with the most serious cases sent to Los Angeles. The influx of
gunnery school and BMI workers made Sylvain’s job busy, a stark contrast from his
practice in Goldfield. “We were absolutely overworked in Las Vegas,” he recalled. “We
were short of doctors and we did everything.” Sylvain worked around the clock, seeing
patients all day and making house calls at night. While he rotated shifts, the work was
overwhelming. In 1944, Sylvain was recruited for military service. He called it a “twoyear vacation” compared his time in Las Vegas.309
Until the completion of the BMI hospital, all accidents and injuries at the plant
were transported to Las Vegas, not Boulder City. While the Boulder City Hospital
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prospered during the Boulder Canyon Project, Six Companies Inc. closed the facility in
1935. Boulder City residents had to travel to Las Vegas for medical care, a long trip that
sometimes proved fatal. In 1938, the National Park Service acquired the hospital
building and turned it into a museum, abandoning it in 1941. By December 1943, the
Public Health Service (PHS) reopened the hospital to treat wounded soldiers, but not
locals. 310
In Las Vegas, the Las Vegas Hospital and Clinic, and Clark County Indigent
Hospital cared for war workers. Built in 1931, the county hospital mostly accommodated
impoverished patients. By 1940, however, the facility opened surgical facilities and
became the Clark County General Hospital. Several few years later, officials appointed
Dr. Jack Cherry the house physician and administrator. But as the only nonprofit, public
hospital in Las Vegas, it was grossly inadequate. Consequently, the Federal Works
Administration assumed ownership of the hospital in 1943 and invested $447,000 in its
modernization. At completion, the Clark County Hospital had 146-beds. Despite the
improvements, war workers continued to overwhelm the hospital, often lining the
hallways. The physician shortage forced nurses to play a bigger role in treating patients.
Mary Kennedy Rymer, a registered nurse, recalled that “there was nothing that was too
big for us.” The nurses “tried it all,” taking x-rays, delivering babies, and assisting in
surgery. Every morning, the hospital opened at 3:00 am to treat emergency cases. Most
of the patients were construction workers at BMI. Rymer described them as “rough and
tough,” frequently getting drunk, and crashing their cars or getting into bar fights. Unless
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cases were “very tragic or very major,” she never called the doctor because “he had to get
some sleep too.”311
After the BMI hospital opened in October 1942, it alleviated the volume of cases
in Las Vegas. However, the hospital faced its own issues. The staff was overworked and
exhausted, working multiple shifts for days at a time. BMI also pressured them to get
injured employees back to work as soon as possible, because lost time at work threatened
production. The practice often clashed with medical ethics. When BMI requested that
Dr. Arthur Miller clear an injured employee for work, but he refused. Miller responded
that the worker needed more recovery time. The company ordered Miller to sign the
certificate regardless. He refused and was subsequently discharged. This was one reason
why the hospital was understaffed. Like to the plant, BMI’s hospital experienced a high
turnover rate. The company routinely discharged staff members that did not comply with
policy. But most doctors, fed up with the stressful working conditions, quit on their own
accord. Even Cough had enough by 1944. He resigned and was replaced by Dr. David
E. Hemington. The hospital was so understaffed that Dr. Roy Martin came out of
retirement to work for BMI, administering physical examinations and delivering babies.
Martin worked there until his death in 1943.312
Despite poor living, working, and hospital conditions, southern Nevada
maintained a good health record during the war. The Clark County population had a low
311

Interview with Mary Kennedy Rymer, May 4, 1977, Conducted by Mary Fitzgerald, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas Special Collections; “History of Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital,” Southern
Nevada Memorial Hospital News and Views, Vol. 3, No. 5, (December, 1968), 3; Sandra Klimek, “A
History of Hospitals: Clark County, Nevada,” (Unpublished Paper, 1985), 9; and “The Hospitals of Clark
County: Development of Medicine in a Rapidly Growing Nevada Community,” Greasewood Tablettes,
Vol. VII, No. 4, Winter 1996-7, (Reno, NV: Department of Pathology, Great Basin History of Medicine
Division, University of Nevada School of Medicine, 1997), 1-2.
312
United States Senate, “Hearings,” Part 20, 8351; “New Head Now at Basic Hospital,” in ReviewJournal, Basic Magnesium Inc. Collection, Box 2, Folder 6, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Special
Collections; Interview with Mazie Martin Jones.

187

mortality rate. According to the State Board of Health, the most pressing issue in the
state were accident fatalities, not diseases. According to the agency, the high number of
accidents in Nevada’s industries indicated the state needed “a wide-spread safety
campaign conducted in such a manner as to reach all the people of the State and make
them accident conscious.” Besides accidents, degenerative conditions like heart disease
and cancer increased statewide. However, the increase was expected since the general
population was “gradually aging.”
There were no large scale epidemics because the state provided diphtheria,
smallpox, and typhoid immunizations to control communicable diseases and regularly
inspected labor camps and communities. But Nevada experienced one notable outbreak.
The State Board of Health noticed a significant rise in venereal diseases, which arose
“out of expanding military and industrial activities in the State.” More people per capita
died in Nevada from venereal diseases than any other state besides Wyoming. In 1943,
syphilis infected 777 Nevadans and 351 contracted gonorrhea. Moreover, in the first ten
months of 1944, 561 cases of syphilis and 460 cases of gonorrhea were reported. The
outbreak was particularly serious in Clark County, affecting numerous Army personnel
and BMI workers. In April 1944 alone, the Clark County Health Department reported
176 cases of venereal diseases.313
Venereal disease outbreaks were problematic nationally, hampering the war
effort. Draftees that showed positive reactions to syphilis tests averaged a rate of 45.2
per 1,000 men. U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Thomas Parran, Jr. called syphilis “the next
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great plague to go.” During World War I, 338,746 soldiers required treatment and over
40,000 registrants had syphilis. Syphilis was painless and difficult to recognize, so the
disease was difficult to diagnose and treat.314 By the 1940s, the medical profession
understood the causes of syphilis and gonorrhea, and several treatments were available.
But until the mass production of penicillin in 1944, which remained in short supply
throughout the war, there was no speedy cure. To fight the outbreak, the Clark County
Health Department established a VD Clinic, as well as controls of tuberculosis, food
inspection and sanitation, school health, and other diseases. The VD Clinic applied
advanced techniques to detect the diseases. Slides of gonorrhea were examined with a
microscope and blood tests diagnosed syphilis. In cooperation with the military, the VD
clinic also diagnosed gonorrhea by the culture method.315
Local residents combated venereal diseases by focusing on prevention. The most
visible campaign sought to outlaw commercialized prostitution. In the early 1940s, there
was little regulation of the Block Sixteen. Tourists and high school boys alike frequented
the establishment. Dr. F. W. York, a city health officer, acknowledged prostitution was
“one of the main attractions to tourists,” but it elevated the threat of venereal diseases.
By the early 1940s, the county health department pushed for tighter regulation, enacting
policies requiring all prostitutes to receive physical examinations. If the women did not
get a clean bill of health, they were forbidden to work. The program did little good, and
syphilis and gonorrhea continued to spread. The social stigma and health hazards of
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prostitution eventually prompted a movement to permanently close the block. In
November 1940, local attorney J. R. Lewis publically declared that “running, operating,
and maintaining houses of assignation and prostitution” was “injurious to health.” By
mid-1941, the justice court cited four brothels for violating a statute outlawing
prostitution within four yards of a church.
By the time BMI construction began and the army gunnery school opened, federal
authorities stepped in. A PHS surgeon, Dr. F. T. Ford, commented that “if we go to war,
the red light district would be banned.” While the federal government was not interested
in “the morals of any community,” it needed to stop the spread of infectious diseases. By
the end of 1942, local authorities prohibited prostitution in Clark County. It also fined
individuals who willingly transmitted venereal diseases. For example, a promiscuous
local woman allegedly spread diseases to numerous Army personnel and war workers.
When given the choice of a $500 fine or jail time, she chose the latter. Other plans
included education programs in high schools and the disbursement of condoms. The
legislature even discussed requiring couples to take premarital blood tests, a requirement
in many states. The programs were largely unsuccessful, mostly due to the social sigma
of discussing sex and the use of contraceptives, and opposition to the impediment of
Nevada’s hassle-free marriage industry.316
The War Baby
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Since Washington D.C. needed defense plants like BMI to be productive, it
eventually instituted a greater emphasis on occupational health. Workers also realized
their importance to the war effort and began using federal contracts as bargaining tools to
improve working conditions. At the same time, a national safety movement mobilized.
As Mark Aldrich shows, private safety associations worked alongside the National Safety
Council to help staff and support occupational health at several federal agencies. The
Council also convinced the National Committee for the Conservation of Manpower in
War Industries to enlist defense-related companies to the cause, and the Maritime
Commission to promote health and safety at its shipyards. According to Aldrich, a
combination of these factors produced a “striking conclusion.” Injury rates rose due to
wartime production increases, but fatality rates increased slightly. Still, the wartime
workplace was very dangerous. From 1941 to 1945, 13,600 workers were killed and
171,100 permanently injured in American’s war plants. But without the mobilization of
organized safety work, the number may have doubled.317
The national statistics reflect occupational health at BMI. The accident rate was
remarkably high. During the first year of war production, Clark County reported 356
accidents, with the majority at BMI. By the second year, high labor turnover and other
factors propelled the number to 723. But at the same time, the project experienced a
decrease in permanently-disabling injuries. From July 1942 to July 1943, 75 workers
were received permanently-disabling injuries. The following year, BMI reported that
only 5 employees received such injuries. 318 Additionally, in comparison to the Boulder
Canyon Project, few workers died. There are no statistics are available, but the number
Aldrich, Safety First, 271-272.
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was fewer than 20, with the majority occurring during construction. Lastly, unlike heat
and carbon monoxide poisoning at the dam, BMI experienced no major disasters.
One explanation for the low fatality rate was limited production time. It only
operated for 26 months. In 1941, Eells envisioned southern Nevada rapidly emerging as
“the Detroit” of the light metals industries. By 1943, BMI was the largest magnesium
producer in the world in 1943, manufacturing 25 percent of American output. But
despite its success, discussion regarding its permanency began in early 1943. Anaconda
assured the Review-Journal that it was the company’s “ambition to build permanently.”
Senator McCarran and Congressmen Scrugham joined the cause, working alongside RFC
Chairman Henderson to research future uses of the plant. But in early 1944, McCarran
learned of a plan to cut BMI production by 40 percent. The WPB argued that there was
an “oversupply of magnesium” and the nation needed to conserve energy.
Of course, McCarran disagreed with the idea. He launched a campaign to save
the plant, charging the federal government built BMI as a “wartime baby” with no
postwar use. This was “more than coincidence,” he alleged. Similar situations occurred
across western and southern states. “The time has come to declare economic
independence from monopolistic industrial combinations attempting to stifle or control
new development and industry in these states.” McCarran also charged that the WPB did
not cut Dow Chemical’s production or eliminate aluminum plants in southern California
despite over-surpluses. The fight to save BMI continued throughout the year. Despite
McCarran’s efforts, the WPB ordered a nationwide reduction of magnesium in July. By
September, it announced the curtailment of production, calling for the closing of BMI
and International Minerals in Austin, Texas. After the order, layoffs began. In July
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1944, BMI had 2,600 employees, By October, the number was reduced by half. On
November 17, 1944, magnesium production officially ended.319
It appeared that the BMI plant was indeed a war baby. After the suspension of
production, the federal government had no use for it. The RFC leased several
warehouses to small industries, and contracted part of the facility to Stauffer Chemical
Company in May 1945. Stauffer operated the caustic and chlorine plant, importing raw
materials from California. At the same time, the RFC leased sections to the Western
Electrochemical Company, a producer of missile propellants and electrolytic manganese.
Both companies employed over 1000 workers. Nevertheless, by October 1946, the RFC
relinquished custody of BMI, arranging a sale of the assets. Determined to ensure the
future of southern Nevada industry, state political leaders, especially Senator McCarran,
launched a campaign to save the plant. Senator McCarran made a deal with the Truman
Administration for the state to buy half of the plant site. In turn, the state sold it
producers of titanium, alkali, and other chemicals. The new companies, and the
expanded army gunnery school, the Nellis Air Force Base, attracted numerous veterans
seeking employment. The Basic townsite evolved as well. In 1953, Henderson was
incorporated as a city. By November 1954, Henderson was one of the fastest growing
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cities in the United States, boasting a population increase of over 100 percent in 18
months.320
Besides the plant, the federal government also liquidated the hospital. But unlike
the Boulder City Hospital, it did not completely abandon the facility. When the project
ended, the hospital continued to serve the general public. Local doctors could also treat
patients at the facility. But the hospital was understaffed and residents received limited
care. The hospital’s future seemed uncertain. But Reverend Peter Maran, a priest at St.
Peter the Apostle Church in Henderson, took up the cause. In 1946, he contacted the
Adrian Dominican Sisters of Michigan to manage the hospital. The Sisters were wellknown for managing hospitals. Maran successfully convinced them to take over the BMI
hospital. After receiving endorsements from Clark County Medical Society and several
local doctors, the Sisters contacted the federal government.321
The Sisters incorporated in the State of Nevada in 1947, and offered to lease the
land, buildings, hospital equipment, and supplies. The RFC accepted the proposal. The
Sisters signed a 25-year lease for $1.00 per year. The only stipulation was they could not
transfer ownership, and the operation provided 24-hour medical and surgical treatment
for BMI employees and families, private contractors, and lessees of the plant. The Sisters
renamed it St. Rose de Lima Hospital, staffing the hospital with nurses “advanced in the
science of nursing.” But doctors were harder to recruit. When the project ended, most
had left town. The Sisters had difficulty staffing the hospital for nearly a decade. But the
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hospital continued on. By the 1960s and beyond, St. Rose de Lima played a crucial role
in maintaining the health of the expanding city of Henderson.322
Even though BMI ended production in November 1944, the fruits of the workers’
labor continued to bombard Europe and the Pacific. From August 1942 to November
1944, the plant produced 166,322,685 pounds of magnesium. According to The Big Job,
“every drop of molten metal [was] on the first leg of its journey of destruction of Tokio
and Berlin.”323 And it did. After leaving the plant, its alloy constructed bombs,
supplying magnesium incendiaries and casings, and bombers. Next, Allied bombers
rained Europe and the Pacific with the explosive incendiaries, seeking to dislocate the
German and Japanese military, industrial, and economic system and the morale of the
enemy. But the most dramatic bombs were used last. On July 26, 1945, the USS
Indianapolis delivered a classified shipment to the Marianas. The warship was ultimately
torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine, but it delivered its important cargo: a
uranium-based atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project tested its plutonium counterpart on
July 16 in New Mexico. On August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay dropped the bomb over
Hiroshima. The explosion changed the world, and southern Nevada, forever, ushering in
a new era of defense in the desert.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE TEST SITE
It is of my opinion that we have gone past all reasonable effort to live with the current
[radiation exposure] criteria… These conditions will continue to prevail as long as the
unreasonable and unrealistic attitude considering low-level exposure of a non-producing
variety to be more serious and more horrible than accidents and including death from
convention operation and vehicle travel… It is my studied, professional opinion that the
only sensible thing to do is to increase the maximum allowable exposure.
Dr. Clinton S. Maupin, Radiological Safety Advisor (1961)
Arriving in Nagasaki in September 1945, Shields Warren, a Harvard pathologist
and expert in medical radiation, was shocked by the carnage. The forty-seven year-old
was a brilliant biomedical scientist with a calm and collective demeanor, and a mild
speech impediment that seemingly vanished when he discussed his work. His most
notable accomplishment to date was discovering that cancerous cells moved through the
lymphatic system. The finding prompted the cancer treatment of removing lymph nodes
near cancerous tissue. However, Warren’s trip to Japan changed the course of his career.
The doctor traveled through “the pastoral Japan of Madame Butterfly” to reach Nagasaki,
a sharp contrast from the “start wreckage” left by the 22 kiloton plutonium bomb. “It
was almost like stepping from the eighteenth century say, into the twentieth century,” he
later recalled, “the countryside on one side, and on the other, modern power.”324
While research existed on the dangers of radiation, very little was known about
the effect of large doses on the human body. Consequently, the American military had
established three medical teams to study the medical effects of the bombs, working
alongside a Japanese team led by Dr. Tsuzuki Maseo. Warren headed the Navy team,
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while Drs. Ashley “Scotty” Oughterson and Stafford Warren directed the Army and
Manhattan District teams.325 As in Hiroshima, the bomb devastated Nagasaki, but the
destruction was less because of a local mountain range shielded part of the city from the
bomb’s heat, shock waves, and fallout. Upon arriving, Warren examined the survivors
sheltered in schools, barracks, and hospitals, and collected clinical, laboratory, and also
reviewed autopsy reports taken by Japanese doctors immediately following the
bombing.326 It was apparent to the doctor that the destructive power of nuclear weapons
would create “unprecedented problems in the field of medicine.” Warren found the
survivors’ injuries to be “diverse and confusing;” most resulted from ionizing radiationblast effects, gamma rays, and neutrons rather than the explosion itself. In fact, ionizing
radiation took hours, days, or weeks to appear. The importance of these injuries,
according to Warren, were “masked” by the thousands killed by flash burns, fires, and
wreckage. While his colleague Stafford Warren told Congress that radiation caused 5 to
7 percent of the deaths, Shields Warren concluded otherwise. Radiation produced most
of the Japanese injuries and deaths. Its lingering effects would be the legacy of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.327
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After completing his investigation, Warren reported to the American Association
for Cancer Research on the latent effects of radiation exposure, revealing that over
14,000 hibakusha suffered from bomb-related hemorrhages, leukocyte destructions, bone
marrow damages, anemia, and fertility problems. He advised that it was “necessary to
follow the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for many years.”328 His associates
“Scotty” Oughterson and Stafford Warren agreed; American scientists could use the
Japanese cities as a laboratory to study the medical and biological effects of radiation.
The doctors recommended that Washington create a “permanent American Control
Commission” beyond the control of the military, which led to the establishment of the
Atomic Bomb Causality Commission (ABCC).329 By the spring of 1947, Warren
returned to Japan to reexamine the survivors and their descendents, and found that most
had recovered. “People were more alert,” he wrote in his diary, “many smiling, look fat,
and well-fed. Striking change.” The Japanese census of 1950 recorded that a total of
283,000 survivors existed; however, most received “only minimal” radiation exposures
“10 rads or less.”330
Over the next thirty years, Warren continued his research. His role in establishing
the ABCC prompted the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to appoint him as its first
director of Division of Biology and Medicine (DBM). From 1947 to 1951, Warren
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directed all aspects of radiation safety of the AEC and contractor workers, and emerged
as one of the commission’s most influential biomedical scientists. His most notable
accomplishments was persuading the AEC to fund cancer and atomic energy research.
Eventually, the commission supported numerous fellowships and grants in life sciences,
and the construction of the Argonne Cancer Research Hospital at the University of
Chicago and other medical facilities at the Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies and
the Brookhaven National Laboratory. Under the wing of federal support, research in
radiation health and atomic energy flourished.331
But Warren was also something of a tragic figure in American medical history.
His policies as the director of the DBM would affect the health of Americans for
generations. Historian David Rothman called the period between 1945 and 1965 “the
Gilded Age of research, the triumph of laissez-faire in the laboratory.”332 The influx of
federal funding, and advances in medicine and science prompted a shift in American
medicine. Instead of saving a few lives, many doctors became biomedical scientists,
hoping to discover medical secrets to save humanity from cancer and other diseases. In
the name of scientific progress, human experimentation occurred in nearly every medical
field. Certainly, Warren was “very much opposed to human experimentation” when it
was not “for the good of the individual concerned” or “any other way of solving the
problem.” The doctor challenged the use of military personnel in Exercise Desert Rock
from 1951 to 1957 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), although he was more concerned with
blast injuries and negative press than fallout risks. Moreover, he shut down the TBI
experiments, which sought to expose 200 volunteers to whole-body radiation to learn the
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threshold a soldier could sustain in combat. But Warren also continually suppressed
information to prevent lawsuits and protect the AEC’s public image. While the doctor
was horrified that Manhattan Project scientists injected humans with plutonium to study
the effects, he actively prevented the news from going public.333
Additionally, Warren had a checkered history of protecting humans from
radioactive fallout. In an interview with former Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall, who
represented downwinders from Nevada and Arizona in a class action lawsuit, the doctor
admitted he knew “from 1947 on” that hazardous fission products contaminated the
atmosphere during a nuclear explosion. He also suspected “food chain dangers” in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a theory seemingly confirmed after scientists linked
contaminated fish to the 1946 atmospheric tests in the Pacific. Not surprisingly, Warren
initially opposed continental nuclear testing, arguing that it posed a great threat to the
American public. But the AEC gradually wore him down, reassuring that the NTS would
only detonate “relatively few” low-yield bombs.334
Unfortunately, by 1952 fallout from high-yield bombs began sprinkling the
ranches and small towns of Nevada and Utah. One week after the 12-kiloton Easy test in
1952, Warren recommended that “we cannot risk any continental aboveground shots
333
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larger [than Easy].335 His appeal fell on deaf ears. However, by the mid-1950s, Warren
apparently changed his mind. The doctor had left his DBM position, but continued
working as an AEC consultant. As public concern mounted over nuclear testing and
fallout, Warren decided to align with prominent scientists like Ernest Lawrence and
Edward Teller, publically advocating that the United States needed further nuclear tests
to maintain superiority over the Soviet Union. 336 In 1956, he even wrote to Lewis
Strauss, chairman of the AEC, that “distinct or worldwide radioactive fallout is not a
controlling factor in bomb testing. To permit us to fall behind Russians in disastrous; to
wait for them to catch up to us is stupid.”337
Warren supported the idea of a “permissible dose,” which maintained that low
doses of ionizing radiation posed little health risks. It was not until radiation rose above a
certain level that damages to human health occurred. The nuclear testing debate
eventually faded after the Test Moratorium of 1958 and the 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty, which banned atmospheric testing. But the effects of low-level radiation
remained controversial. Was there a “safe” dosage for workers in the nuclear industry
335
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and the general public? Beginning in 1956, numerous studies began linking radiation in
pregnant women to childhood cancer, and the ingestion of radioactive fallout contributing
to immune diseases. By the late 1960s, public debate surfaced regarding nuclear reactors
and the threat of radioiodine. In 1971, Canadian physician Abram Petkau discovered that
cell membranes suffered more damage with long-term, low-level radiation exposure than
high-level exposures. Scientists in atomic research also began speaking out about the
dangers of low-level radiation, arguing that low-level emissions from nuclear reactors
posed a greater threat to human health than plant accidents. By 1978, President Jimmy
Carter, himself a nuclear physicist, ordered the Department of Energy (DOE) to make
their operational records public, leading to further government, journalistic, and scholarly
investigations, including historian Barton Hacker’s comprehensive study on radiation
safety and nuclear testing, Elements of Controversy Eventually, a two-year congressional
hearing determined the unthinkable: “The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear
testing program is that our only victims of United States arms since World War II have
been our own people.”338
A byproduct of the controversy was personal injury litigation. Downwinder
ranchers began suing the government in 1955, claiming that fallout from the NTS’s Harry
shot in 1953 killed 4500 of their sheep. The ranchers lost their case, but government
investigators reopened it in 1980, reversing the decision two years later. Other fallout
cases followed. The public debate also prompted employees of the NTS and military
personnel to charge negligence. Ex-soldiers with leukemia claimed that their exposure to
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radiation during the 1957 Smokey Shot caused their diseases. Additionally, the widows
of Harley Roberts and William Nunamaker, civilian employees at the NTS, alleged that a
botched underground shot, code-named Baneberry, killed their husbands. The Baneberry
case in particular shocked the public.
After the ban on atmospheric testing, most Americans assumed that underground
testing was relatively safe. But of the 475 underground tests conducted, there were 62
official lapses in safety. Of these, 53 were classified as “leaks” and “seeps,” or a gradual
escape of radiation, and 9 as “venting,” defined as “a massive release of radiation.” 339
Baneberry was the worst of them all. On December 18, 1971, a 10-kiloton nuclear device
was detonated 910 feet underground in Area 8. Three minutes later, a dramatic venting
occurred, releasing radioactive gas 8,000 feet in the air over the next 24 hours. Harley
Roberts, a Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) guard, died April 17, 1974 from leukemia.
William Nunamaker, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co. (REECo) employee, also
died on December 19, 1974 from leukemia. Baneberry was not only the worst industrial
accident experienced at the NTS; it was the first time the hazard of low-level radiation
was argued in a court of law. And the widows gained an unlikely ally: Shields Warren.
Drawing upon 30 years of research on radiation, the doctor concluded that small amounts
of radiation could have caused their husbands’ leukemia.
Ranger in the Desert
By the end of World War II, the federal government terminated manufacturing at
Basic Magnesium Inc. and deactivated the Air Force’s bombing and gunnery range. But
Cold War tensions prompted it to reopen the base in 1948. At the same time,
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groundbreaking developments in science had dramatically altered the defense industry.340
During the war, the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) spent over $2.2 billion on
production facilities, communities, and research laboratories in Oakridge, Tennessee,
Hanford, Washington, and Los Alamos, New Mexico to build an atomic bomb. MED
functioned like a large corporation, relying on public/private partnerships. Oakridge and
Hanford produced uranium and plutonium, the materials needed to build an atomic bomb.
Private contactors built both the facilities and reactors in consultation with physicists at
the University of California, Berkeley (Oak Ridge) and the University of Chicago
(Hanford). Directed by physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer and in association with the
University of California, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) created the bomb
design and conducted diagnostic experiments.341 The site also hosted a proving ground,
the Alamogordo Bombing Range. It exploded the first plutonium-based atomic weapon,
codenamed Trinity.342
As tensions rose between the United States and Soviet Union regarding the
postwar world, Congress enacted legislation to establish the United States Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), a civilian agency that directed peacetime developments of atomic
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science and technology from 1946 to 1975. 343 On August 1, 1946, President Truman
also signed the Atomic Energy Act, which transferred most of the MED’s plants,
laboratories, and offices in Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos to the AEC. Seveneights of the 44,000 workers were employees of private contractors, a model that
continued under the commission. But efforts to deter the Cold War were less successful.
The United States, believing the Soviet Union threatened the future of Western Europe,
refused to surrender its atomic secrets without adequate controls. The decision partially
contributed to the onset of the Cold War.344 By 1947, the iron curtain divided East from
West.345
As the Cold War escalated, Los Alamos eagerly waited to resume testing. Since
Trinity and Crossroads, theoretical developments had revealed new techniques to create
more efficient and improved bombs. But the scientists needed more data to choose
between the designs. Consequently, they appealed to the AEC to sponsor large-scale
tests to evaluate the new bombs. Los Alamos narrowed the location to Enewetak, an atoll
in the Pacific Ocean. The location became known as the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG).
But the logistical problems of testing in the Pacific, including unpredictable weather,
pollution of the Pacific Ocean, the expense of transporting men and materials from the far
West prompted the Pentagon to push for a continental proving ground. In 1948, the
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Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) sponsored Project Nutmeg to search
for a new site. The survey evaluated “phenomena concerning atomic clouds,” fallout
patterns, and meteorology. The report concluded that it was “quite clear that there is no
site within the United States nor within the North American continent that would ensure
the absence of fallout on populated areas.” However, the western desert “would be more
sound” than the eastern coastal area. But the report did not recommend a specific
location. In the end, the AEC decided that a continental test site was “not desirable” due
to domestic and international relations concerns. The commission decided to resume
plans in the event of a national emergency.346
Following the detonation of the Soviet Union’s first nuclear weapon in 1949 and
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the AEC renewed its search for a continental
site.347 The location criterion required that there be no threat to any population,
economy, or industry within a 125-mile radius. Public opinion, logistics, and security
were also considerations. Thanks partly the influence of Senator Pat McCarran, the AEC
ultimately decided that the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range held the most
promise. Located northwest of Las Vegas, the site consisted of dry lakebeds, Frenchman
Flat and Yucca Flat. It had “significant advantages,” situated near a government-owned
airfield at Indian Springs and had natural barriers for improved security. But Las Vegas
fell within the 125-mile radius criterion; the site was located only 65 miles from Fremont
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Street. This raised safety concerns. Consequently, a team of physicists conducted further
studies, and determined that a “tower-burst bomb having a yield of 25 kilotons could be
detonated without exceeding the allowed emergency tolerance dose.” However, while
meteorologists could predict the wind patterns and limit offsite exposure, there was still a
risk. The physicists concluded that people would undoubtedly receive “perhaps a little
more radiation than medical authorities say is absolutely safe.”348
The AEC accepted the recommendation and the United States Air Force permitted
use of the site “on a temporary basis only” in December 1950. Truman also approved the
choice. At the same time, planning for Operation Greenhouse at the Pacific Proving
Ground surged ahead. Despite the Korean conflict and logistical issues, Los Alamos and
the AEC sought to explode the first thermonuclear bomb. But the scientists needed more
tests to determine the design criteria. With Greenhouse beginning in summer 1951, the
AEC organized the first continental test series in southern Nevada, Operation Ranger.
The AEC established safety criteria that minimized participants to radiation exposure,
restricting the permissible dose to 3.0 roentgens for a 13-week period.349 A Radiological
Safety Section also issued the AEC, Los Alamos, and DOD personnel film badges and
protective equipment, and set up radiation monitoring and decontamination equipment.350
Ranger’s first shot detonated at 5:45 a.m. on January 27, codenamed Ranger Able. The
explosion was small, yielding only 1 kiloton. The following day, Ranger Baker produced
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a more spectacular explosion, yielding 8 kilotons. The Los Angeles Times reported that it
was a “brilliant sunburst-like blast.” While both tests produced varying levels of
radiation onsite, employees monitoring radiation safety only found trace readings offsite.
But like Trinity, they did not discover until later that Ranger blasted radioactive debris
into high-altitude winds, contaminating the snowfall in the Midwestern and Northeastern
United States. In fact, fallout contaminated most of the United States throughout the
decade years of atmospheric testing, not just the southwest. Ranger ultimately produced
no serious accidents to personnel or significant radiation exposure, and ushered in 40
years of nuclear testing in southern Nevada. But it also introduced radiological hazards to
the region, giving new meaning to the dangers associated with working in the desert.351
Anatomy of a Test Site
After Ranger, the AEC turned the Nevada Test Site (NTS) into a permanent
proving ground.352 From 1951 to 1992, the test site hosted 928 tests and 1,021
detonations.353 The AEC maintained private partnerships, contracting with construction,
architectural, and engineering firms, and laboratories. The anatomy of the NTS is often a
confusing topic. It is unclear who actually ran the facility. In fact, the AEC did not
conduct the tests. It owned all assets and had “absolute authority of all questions of
security” and “labor expenses.” The AEC also set guidelines on safety, employee
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relations, and working conditions. Despite some limitations, it ensured the test site
reflected “the best experience of American industry,” aiming to achieve “stable,
democratic labor-management relations.”354
The real operators were the laboratories, contractors, and the military. Los
Alamos, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories
designed the bombs and ran the tests.355 Los Alamos and Livermore were the principal
organizations at the NTS, while Sandia operated the Tonopah Test Range.356 At the
NTS, Los Alamos and Livermore were friendly rivals; competition frequently arose out
of the need to score government contracts. When the military needed a nuclear weapon,
it approached both laboratories, who created and submitted a design. The military then
awarded the contract to its favorite.357
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As the winning laboratory built the test sequence, it enlisted contruction and
engineering firms to conduct the tests.358 Therefore, the largest contingent of NTS
workers were private contractors. The companies furnished labor, equipment, and
materials, industrial hygiene and safety, radiation safety, sanitation, and fire protection,
and medical care. They managed maintenance and operation, communication and
mapping, engineering, and security as well. Reynolds Electrical and Engineering
Company (REECo), was the prime contractor, sharing the responsibly with Edgerton,
Germeshausen, and Grier, Inc. (EG&G), Holmes and Narver (H&N), and Federal
Services, Inc. (FSI). REECo carried out construction, maintenance, support operations,
and health and safety, while EG&G handled timing, firing, measurements, and other
scientific functions.359 H&N provided engineer services and FSI outfitted security guard
services at the NTS and affiliated facilities in Las Vegas. Security was later assumed by
Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI).
While several contractors ran the NTS, this chapter will focus on REECo due its
involvement in occupational health, radiological safety, and medical program. Founded
in 1932 by Lou J. Reynolds, REECo participated in Trinity as a subcontractor. By 1952,
the company became the test site’s prime support contractor. REECo gained the
reputation as a “no problem” or “can do” contractor, “getting the job done” expeditiously
for the laboratories, and military. It handled the majority of testing support.360 It was a
big job. The NTS spanned 1,375-square miles, and REECo provided power,
358
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communication, and water. It built and maintained facilities, roads, fences, and utilities,
and operated the motor pool and maintenance repair shops, and craft support. The
company also set up and fired the nuclear tests, and handled post-shot data collection and
drilling. Lastly, it established elaborate comprehensive industrial hygiene and safety,
sanitation, medical, and by 1955, radiation safety programs to protect workers and the
public.361
REECo provided most of the workers at the test site. Total employment varied on
the test series. For example, in June 1961, the NTS employed 2,300 workers, 1,320 of
which worked for REECo. By November 8, 1961, the workforce swelled to 5,800 to
accommodate Operation Nougat. At the height of nuclear testing in 1966, REECo
employed 6,500 workers. To pool workers, most NTS contractors recruited local talent.
A 1959 survey of Holmes and Narver employees revealed that most workers had lived in
Nevada for at least two years prior to employment. Nonetheless, a common complaint
was that the contractors imported workers from out-of-state. Some enacted qualifications
for employment, including age limitations, but the practice was eventually terminated.
For example, Wackenhut based employment decisions on a physician’s opinion that the
applicant could perform their duties rather than on their age.362
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REECo employees held various positions. Its occupational health and safety
program employed doctors, medics, nurses, health physicists, and safety engineers. Ken
Case, known as the “Atomic Cowboy,” began working at the test site in 1954 and became
one of REECo’s first radiation safety monitors in 1955. By 1957, he worked under
Captain Scott L. Reynolds of the U.S. Army Veterinary Corps, a veterinary advisor for
radiobiological aspects of test activities. Case drove cattle over ground zero to study the
effects of radiation on wildlife. After watching the test on horseback, he was often the
first one to enter ground zero.
We would get over ground zero, the epicenter of the blast at ground level, and
bang, [the monitors were] off-scale. When we went back over, about 30 feet off
the ground, and the sand would be melted like glass. Those ground zeros in the
spring bleed a big circle in the snow… Rabbits would run across there and they
would be on fire. It was something.
Besides the health personnel, the majority of workers were laborers, including carpenters,
masons, electricians, ironworkers, painters, and plumbers, as well as surveyors and
architect-engineers. After the induction of underground testing in 1957, REECo hired
miners and drillers. Numerous workers held culinary, housekeeping, and general office
staff positions. Los Alamos and Livermore hired scientists and laboratory technicians to
conduct the tests as well. Lastly, the Nye County Sherriff patrolled the grounds, writing
speeding tickets and responding to car accidents and protestors. Security guards also
managed the badge office, processing military and civilian clearances.363
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Perhaps the most visible job were soldiers engaging in Exercise Desert Rock.364
Instituted in 1951, the NTS exposed troops to “realistic” atomic warfare training. The
military sought to learn how use nuclear weapons tactically in combat. Additionally, it
studied its effects on military equipment and materials, and the troops, testing
psychological and physical reactions. For example, during Desert Rock I soldiers
watched a detonation 7 miles from ground zero. One soldier described it “like someone
had sneaked up on me and breathed heavily on my skin.” The men inspected the damage
and were herded into decontamination showers. Next, the Human Resources Research
Organization (HumRRO) recorded their psychological responses. The soldiers filled out
questionnaires, inquiring about nuclear warfare, the Cold War, and radioactivity. The
questions asked: “Just how frightened would you say you were when the last test A-bomb
went off?” Did you have physical reactions, such as “violent pounding of the heart” or
“urinating in pants?” Most men answered no. One soldier remarked that he “wasn’t even
that nervous.” The comments reveal the biggest problem with Exercise Desert Rock: a
lack of reality. Despite the enormous health risk, the exercises continued throughout the
1950s.365
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The site provided several housing options. Camp Mercury began as a military
camp during Operation Ranger, a name derived from its location in the Mercury Valley.
The camp provided platform units with canvas roofs, and workers slept in bunks. Robert
“Doc” Campbell, a Navy hospital corpsman, recalled that it was not “the Waldorf
Astoria, but being military, they never did promise a rose garden.” During the evenings,
the workers met for beer and food at the old Slop Shoot or drove to Las Vegas. When the
testing program became permanent, the AEC invested $6.7 million in Mercury,
constructing temporary housing, office space, a cafeteria, recreation facilities, laboratory
facilities, and administrative offices. With the addition of Nuclear Rocket Development
System (NRDS) and the Plowshare Program in the 1960s, the AEC allocated $15 million
to build permanent housing and dormitories, and administration buildings.366 Some
workers resided there during the week, and returned to Las Vegas on the weekend.
Although, many commuted everyday, leaving on buses from various points in the Las
Vegas valley. As Mercury expanded, it provided all the needs of a small town, including
a chapel, bowling alley, swimming pool, and “upscale” steakhouse. But unlike the
federally-financed towns Boulder City and Henderson, the AEC restricted public
access.367
Likewise, Camp Desert Rock housed troops participating in Exercise Desert
Rock. George Younkin, a soldier, described it as a typical field camp “just like the ones
overseas.” There was “a lot of tents and a lot of desert.” At first, there were few
366
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luxuries. The soldiers slept on cots in squad tents and ate out of mess gear. The
bathrooms were open trenches and there was no running water. The troops showered in
canvas tents with suspended water pipes. The Review-Journal described the showers as
“Camp Desert Rock’s most popular spot,” presumably because of the dusty, desert
conditions. After the completion of Exercise Desert Rock III, the military built
substantial upgrades, installing water storage and sewage systems, and electrical services.
It also improved sanitation, constructing concrete bathrooms with flush toilets, showers,
and sinks, and erected a small hospital and mess hall with a seating capacity of 500.368
Given the isolation of Camp Desert Rock, the military made recreation a priority. It
established various clubs, and arranged to bring entertainment to the camp. The Jimmy
Durante Show performed during Operation Upshot-Knothole and Patti Page serenaded
the troops before Operation Teapot’s “Doom Town” APPLE-2 shot in 1955. The
military also set up shows in Las Vegas. But most soldiers disliked the post. They
worried about radiation exposure and complained of the harsh desert conditions. One
soldier called the sleeping bags “lousy.” At night “we froze our assess off,” he recalled.
The wind was particularly annoying. To seek protection, the soldiers salvaged wooden
boxes from trash areas to board their tents. To generate heat, they used potbellied stoves.
In 1955, a violent wind storm flattened several barracks. The troops participating in the
1957 Plumbbob series confronted particularly difficult conditions. A flash flood
inundated a portion of the camp, and summertime temperatures reached nearly 120
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degrees. Consequently, numerous soldiers were felled by heat exhaustion and food
poisoning after the refrigeration storage facilities failed.369
The Permissible Dose
Early living conditions were not desirable, but the situation improved with time.
Occupational hazards, however, were always present. The AEC cited three
classifications of accidents. The first included accidents in “no way related to atomic
energy,” such as falls, electrocutions, and motor vehicle and construction accidents. The
second involved accidents arising from “materials or the processes closely related to the
program,” or fires/explosions caused by noxious non-radiation inducing materials. For
example, in a shed housing a Kiwi-B IA reactor, an accidental hydrogen explosion
occurred. Although the accident injured several men, it did not release radiation.
Therefore, the explosion was not officially considered a nuclear incident.370
There were numerous instances that fell between the second and third classifications.
The third were accidents where radiation was the prime factor. Most were caused by
human error or faulty equipment. Additionally, entering hazardous test areas produced
injuries; workers often entered exclusion areas during a test. Others incurred injuries
because of safety oversight. In 1956, four workers, dressed in protective clothing,
entered a test area to recover samples. A monitor should have been positioned there in
advance to check for radiation levels, but was not. As a result, the employees received
external exposures of 4 rads, 14, rads, 19 rads, and 28 rads, respectively. At the time, the
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recommended permissible level was 3.9 rads in 13 weeks. Other opportunities involved
radionuclides contaminating construction or laboratory areas, laboratory technicians
handling radioactive material with torn gloves, or explosions occurring while conducting
experiments.371
Radiation accidents had biological and physical effects, as well as psychological
fallout. Injuries varied in severity and scope, depending on conditions related to the
exposure. Doctors diagnosed two categories of radiation accidents. Most industrial,
nuclear reactor, and medical accidents resulted from external exposure. But
contamination also occurred internally by ingesting, inhaling, or directly absorbing
radionuclides. The clinical name for external exposure is acute radiation syndrome
(ARS), an illness caused by whole-body irradiation during a short period of time. 372
ARS cases include the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and firefighters responding to
the Chernobyl disaster. Historically, high-level, external radiation accidents in the
workplace are uncommon. According to international registries, only 300 patients so far
have contacted ARS have worldwide, excluding the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
and Chernobyl.373 Fatalities are also rare; approximately 20 percent of all patients with
ARS had fatal outcomes. 374
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ARS was very infrequent at the NTS. In order to get an ARS diagnosis, patients
had to have received a radiation dose over 70 rads. But mild symptoms can occur at as
low a level as 30 rads. The AEC determined radiation doses according to curie, roentgen,
rad, and rem units. The curie and roentgen evaluated radiation activity and exposure,
while rad and rem determined the absorbed dose and dose equivalent that will cause
biological damage to the human body. One rad equaled one rem.375 While the lethal
dose for humans was uncertain, Dr. Shields Warren theorized in 1950 that it equaled 450
roentgens. The number was an estimate and never tested experimentally, but scientists
often referred to it as “Dr. Warren’s magic number.” Besides a dose of 70 rads or higher,
ARS patients must have received an external dose that penetrated the entire body,
affecting the organs. For example, most NTS radiation injuries involved exposure to the
hands. Such localized exposure rarely caused ARS. Lastly, the dose was delivered in a
short time period and at the same magnitude, usually in a matter of minutes.376
Throughout atmospheric testing, major radiation accidents resulted in a small
percentage of injuries. From 1945 to 1964, 99.8 percent of all AEC and contractor
employees received less than 5 rem annually. The majority of exposures over 5 rem
resulted from accidents. The AEC determined that out of 7,693 injuries occurring, only
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36 were from radiation. Of the 36 workers involved in radiation accidents, 3 died, 11
were “without evidence of radiation effects,” and 22 showed clinical manifestations
attributable to radiation. Of the latter group, 2 received permanent disability due to
radiation and 2 required amputation. The workers did receive a fair amount of radiation
exposure, but their tolerances varied significantly. According to Dr. Leonard Kreisler,
medical director of REECo from 1973 to 1990, the amount of radiation was not
indicative of potential damages to the human body. The reasons were multiple. First,
there was a wide margin of safety. Second, individuals differed in dose tolerance, on top
of the wide margin of safety. Third, the type of ionizing radiation [Alpha, Beta, Gamma,
X-Ray, Neutron] was a factor. Fourth, the distance and shielding may have contributed
to the level of exposure. Kreisler provided an example:
A radiation monitor was giving a class on how to handle a radioactive source…
He came out and there is this lead-shielded box, a pig, and inside is radioactive
material. The way you would normally take it out is you attach a cable to it,
which is shielded, and this would pull out the radioactive material… This guy
opens up the container and pulls the thing out with his bare hand. With his bare
hand! They reconstructed the time that he was exposed, the type of radiation,
whether it was alpha which will not penetrate the skin, whether it was beta which
really gets penetration, whether it is nasty stuff like gamma. They calculated the
dose and he had significant exposure to his hands from a physics point of view.
We watched this guy for a month. We did blood tests. I looked at his daily for
two weeks. He didn’t even sunburn. He didn’t even get redness! Nothing! He
got no adverse medical findings. It just goes to show that there is a wide margin
of safety, number one [and that] individuals differ.377
Therefore, the key issue was not exposure itself. The question was whether or not
the workers received damage from the exposure. High doses of external radiation
produced easily recognizable symptoms. But low-level effects were questionable.

United States Atomic Energy Commission, Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience,
1943-1964, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 10-12, NV0015614, Atomic
Testing Museum, Las Vegas, Nevada; Interview with Leonard Kreisler, M.D., April 20, 2005, Conducted
by Suzanne Becker, 19-20, Nevada Test Site Oral History Project, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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During the 1950s, scientists started using the term “low-level radiation” to refer to doses
of whole-body radiation ranging from 25 to 100 rads. At those levels, there were no
observable effects. From the viewpoint of science, it is unclear if low-level effects pose
significant health consequences. Certainly, all workers received low doses on a regular
basis, sometimes so small that it defied detection. As a result, physicians treated
exposures statistically rather than clinically. A worker blasted with high-levels usually
exhibited ARS signs immediately. However, a smaller dose may cause leukemia several
years later. As the time between exposure and injury increased, the causal link became
blurred. Physicians therefore determined if injuries were caused by radiation based on
probability. To be safe, in January 1961, the AEC required that all contractors limit
worker exposure to 5 rem per year.378
While all levels of radiation posed an imminent threat to the workers, company
doctors were more concerned with traditional industrial hazards. Dr. Clinton S. Maupin,
Radiological Safety Advisor to REECo, felt the maximum permissible radiation exposure
level was “exceedingly low.” In fact, he thought the standards were impeding
occupational health at the site. Maupin called it “unreasonable and unrealistic” to
consider low-level exposures more serious industrial accidents. Indeed, such hazards
acquired the most injuries and fatalities throughout the AEC program. From 1943 to
1964, the commission experienced 15,790 injuries, 7,364 of which happened during
construction activities. The most common injuries involved dust inhalation, burns, cuts
and lacerations, hernias, infections, strains from improper lifting, and fractures.
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Additionally, out of 251 fatalities, the majority occurred in construction and production.
Most deaths results from falls, electrocutions, and car accidents. The AEC attributed
“lack of proper precautions, too much familiarity with the job, and failure to follow safety
precautions” as identifiable causes. Motor vehicle causalities were particularly common.
In fact, many workers identified “unsafe driving” as one of the biggest hazards at the
NTS. Cars flipped, killing victims with burn and crush wounds, asphyxiation, or
explosions. Onsite car accidents were widespread, but the most dramatic ones occurred
on a two-lane road connecting the NTS and Las Vegas. Nicknamed the Widowmaker,
thousands of workers traveled the road daily in the morning and at night. At first, the
road was poorly constructed, with dips that prevented visibility. The workers were
fatigued, in a hurry, or had stopped to drink at saloons in Cactus Springs or Indian
Springs. They frequently crashed into oncoming traffic or sand embankments. In the
early 1960s, the road was widened into a four-lane divided highway, but the accidents
continued. By 1964, the Widowmaker had claimed 45 lives.379
To safeguard the lives of workers, the NTS outlined an extensive occupational
health program. While much of the existing scholarship focuses on negligence in regards
to health and safety precautions, the program was actually quite comprehensive.380 The
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AEC established a partnership with the Public Health Service (PHS) to manage offsite
radiological safety activities. 381 Additionally, it developed safety protocol to protect
employees and the environment. The standards covered physical aspects of health, safety
and fire protection, working practices, and radiation exposure. The AEC divided its
program into four categories: general safety, and fire, nuclear, and health protection.
General safety protected industrial work, such as construction, handling explosives,
mining and tunneling, operating motor vehicles, aircrafts, and firearms, and transporting
radioactive materials. Likewise, fire protection mandated fire and building codes, and
conducted inspections of appliances, equipment, and materials, and nuclear safety
involved AEC-owned reactor procedures. Finally, health protection has garnered the
most scholarly attention, including occupational medicine, industrial hygiene,
environmental sanitation, and radiological safety.382
The AEC required contractors to establish an occupational health program based
on their nature of work and the Division of Biology and Medicine (DMB) set a guide of
safety standards. The occupational health program included:
Emergency medical treatment, ambulance service, and preventive medical
services.
Preplacement, periodic, and termination medical examinations.
Employee return to work and work restriction evaluations.
Survey-type psychological evaluations.
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Health and hygiene education.
Occupational hygiene, health physics, and sanitation control in all employee
occupied areas.
Maintenance of medical, sanitation, and occupational hygiene records.
Medical procedures and advice on radiation incidents. 383
Doctors were prominent members of the occupational health team. Trained in
occupational medicine, industrial hygiene, or health physics, they inspected the NTS for
health hazards, and recommended preventative and corrective safety measures.
Additionally, the doctors conducted physical examinations. The AEC required three
types of examinations: preplacement, periodic, and separation. Like the Union Pacific,
Six Companies Inc., and Basic Magnesium Inc., the commission required preemployment
examinations to record preexisting conditions, occupational history, and personal and
family medical history. The AEC insisted they were “preplacement” examinations, a
means to “aid in suitable placement” in a job position. The periodic examinations were
similar, but doctors also decided if an employee’s health was “compatible” with the work
and if “any ill health” could be attributed to employment. In the event of a termination,
doctors conducted separation examinations, especially if employees received significant
radiation exposure or injuries. The doctors recorded skin lesions, cataracts, blood
dyscrasia, and internal radioisotopes and other toxic materials. Indeed, the preplacement,
periodic, and separation examinations aided in maintaining the health of the workers.
However, they were also useful to the AEC and contractors in employer liability suits.
Consequently, the commission mandated that each contractor maintain “accurate and
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complete” medical records, noting it was “highly desirable” that they record “data of
exposures of hazardous physical (including radiation) and chemical agents” regularly.384
In the event of an injury, the AEC required the contractors to furnish medical
care. However, the version at the NTS differed from its predecessors due to significant
changes in American medicine and health insurance. Prior to 1950, employers provided
health care through company doctors and onsite hospitals in exchange for monthly salary
deductions. The plans were hardly comprehensive, only covering occupational-related
injuries and diseases. However, at the same time, the concept of third-party health
insurance companies gained momentum. Companies like Blue Cross and Blue Shield
significantly increased market share during World War II.385 The partial reason for the
companies’ successes were wartime wage restrictions. The War Labor Board had
declared that fringe benefits, such as health insurance, did not count as wages.
Consequently, employers increased employees benefits and turned to third-party
insurance companies. By 1960, approximately 70 percent of full-time employees
received third-party health insurance benefits. Additionally, as insurance companies
competed to provide the most comprehensive benefits, workers began viewing health
insurance as a right and not a privilege. For the first time in American history, any
employed person could acquire quality medical care, regardless of personal wealth.
Coupled with increased federal spending in medical research, the introduction of thirdparty insurance companies led to an expansion of the American hospital system,
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encouraging advances in medical technology, surgical procedures, and the quality of
medical personnel training.386
At the NTS, occupational medicine resembled a merging of the old and new
system. REECo controlled all aspects of onsite medicine, providing emergency diagnosis
and treatment care, physical examinations, and immunizations. For all other services, it
offered health insurance with third-party carriers such as Blue Cross. The workers also
enjoyed a federal-state partnership, providing worker’s compensation for disability or
death from radioactive material or industrial injuries.387 The health plan worked as
follows: If a worker got a cold, he went to a Las Vegas doctor covered in his third-party
benefits.388 The AEC dictated that the diagnosis and treatment in non-occupational
disorders were “not the responsibilities of an occupational health program.” But there
were some exceptions. REECo doctors treated minor disorders or prevented the loss of
life or limb. Caring for workers on a “preventative basis,” they sought to correct ailments
that aggravated normal work hazards. All workplace injuries were treated in onsite
medic stations, and the health, medicine, and safety building in Mercury, which housed a
state-of-the-art hospital subsidized by the federal government. Critically injured workers
were transported to Las Vegas or Los Angeles hospitals for further treatment. While
onsite medical services changed throughout the years, the program was continuously
directed by a “qualified physician (M.D.)” with training in occupational medicine. The
Jonathan Engel, Doctors and Reformers: Discussion and Debate over Health Policy. (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 316-317.
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medical director dictated its development, interpretation, and implementation, managed
medical units at the NTS, Groom Lake, the Tonopah Test Range, and Las Vegas, and
hired doctors, nurses, and paramedics.389 The staff was usually large, although it ranged
considerably based on funding and need. To be considered for employment, training in
occupational health was desirable, but not mandatory.390
During atmospheric testing, the medical staff provided 24-hour, 7 day a-week
physician coverage during each series, which spanned 2 to 5 months. When testing
expanded to year-round, underground series in the 1960s, it became harder for REECo to
convince doctors to stay nights and weekends. Consequently, it limited coverage to
weekdays. The workers did not appreciate the change. After prodding REECo for
expanded medical care, it hired more “well-trained first aid men” to treat patients during
the nights and weekends. The medics were ultimately the most visible members of the
medical staff. Positioned in remote stations to active worksites, they provided immediate
medical assistance to injured workers. The medics also received “around the clock”
physician advice “via telephone or radio communication” in case of critical emergencies.
The medical staff provided health education and counseling to the workers, educating
about personal hygiene and health maintenance. The AEC considered health education to
go “hand in hand with safety education,” teaching about cleanliness, weight control,
nutrition, and metal health. “Experience has shown,” added the commission, “that health
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education is most effective when the employer demonstrates his sincere and continuing
interest in the health of his employees…”391
Even though industrial injuries caused the most injuries and fatalities, radiological
safety remained the test site’s primary focus. Indeed, continental testing posed unique
problems for the AEC, potentially exposing employees and the public to deadly levels of
ionizing radiation. Radiation is an energy released from unstable atoms, and is classified
as both natural and man-made. External radiation is emitted naturally in the environment
from radium, thorium, and other materials. Radioisotopes also exist in water, food, and
the air. But the levels are very low, producing little somatic effects. During the 1890s,
the discovery of man-made radiation sources, namely the x-ray and radium, began
exposing humans to high, dangerous levels. 392 By the 1920s, scientists discovered that
radiation caused genetic mutations and radiologists experienced alarmingly high death
rates, linking overexposure and mortality. Dr. Marie Curie, a pioneer in the field of
radioactivity, had died from aplastic anemia, an illness caused by radiation exposure. By
the 1930s, scientists linked radon gas to high cancer rates among Central European
miners. When Dr. Shields Warren and his colleagues headed to Nagasaki, there was
“hundreds of articles” written on the effects of radiation. However, most provided
“qualitative rather than quantitative data.” 393
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During the 1920s, the field of radiology grew, as did the hazards. X-ray
apparatuses began producing more penetrating types of ionizing radiation. Consequently,
safety experts began setting exposure level guidelines. After 1928, the concept of a
“permissible dose” emerged. According to Warren, there was a “high degree of
probability” that a radiation worker would suffer “no harm” if the exposure did not
exceed the permissible dose. During the Manhattan Project, thousands of workers were
suddenly vulnerable to unprecedented doses of radiation. Historian Barton Hacker, in
The Dragon’s Tail, demonstrates that the Manhattan Project anticipated the elevated
hazards. In order to protect workers and the public from “undue exposure,” it instituted a
comprehensive radiological safety program. But safety was never a priority; the
scientists needed to help win the war and field-testing overshadowed it. At Los Alamos,
the risk of exposing the southwest to fission particles seemed inconsequential. Testing in
the Pacific produced similar results. Adhering to Manhattan Project standards, the Baker
test blanketed the Bikini lagoon with radioactivity. It soon became clear that radiological
safety needed to become a higher priority.394
The development of radiation safety in America’s nuclear program has been
covered extensively by Barton Hacker in Elements of Controversy.395 Two terms denoted
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the field of radiation protection. The first, “health physics,” emerged during the
Manhattan Project, literally designating the physics section of the Health Division. After
the war, it symbolized how the medical profession protected people and the environment
from potential radiological hazards. The second, “rad-safe,” was the standard term that
described radiological safety organizations. At the NTS, rad-safe handled the radiation
protection program. It established safety standards, radiation detection, equipment
monitoring, and decontamination plans in the event of radioactive fallout. It also issued
safety equipment to workers, such as film badges to measure exposure levels.
Rad-safe evolved significantly throughout the 1950s. At Operation Ranger, the program
was assembled in two months, based on Operation Greenhouse’s rad-safe at the Pacific
Proving Grounds. Rad-safe management shifted considerably afterwards. During
subsequent series, Los Alamos or the military handled its operations. Both faced
numerous challenges. It was difficult to obtain firm safety policy due to urgent
construction needs; construction workers were instructed to build testing support in close
proximity to tests just conducted. While the levels were unsafe, workers needed to fulfill
testing requirements. By 1957, REECo assumed control, establishing a full-time health
and safety organization to accommodate Operation Plumbbob. To be sure, it was an
ambitious endeavor. Plumbbob consisted of 24 nuclear detonations and 6 safety
experiments and involved approximately 18,000 DOD personnel partaking in scientific
and diagnostic experiments, observation exercises, and tactical maneuvers.396
For a complete history of rad-safe operations from Ranger to Teapot, see Hacker, Elements of
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While some DOD personnel assisted in scientific experiments, most participated
in tactical exercises organized by Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII. At shot Hood, the
Marine Corps partook in a helicopter airlift and tactical air support. At shot Smokey, the
Army conducted an airlift assault, and at shot Galileo, it tested the psychological reaction
to witnessing a nuclear explosion. Rad-safe limited exposure to 5 roentgens for each 6
month period. Of this exposure, no more than 2 roentgens could be immediate radiation.
The limit was higher than most NTS workers, which allowed 3 roentgens for a 13-week
period, and 5 roentgens for one calendar year. The 50th Chemical Platoon supported
Desert Rock’s rad-safe section, providing materials, equipment, and rad-safe personnel.
Before the shots, the soldiers attended orientations on safety procedures, and were issued
film badges and protective equipment. During the shots, rad-safe performed surveys,
limiting access to contaminated areas and provided decontamination support, removing
hot material from personnel and equipment.397
At first, the tests went according to plan. On June 24, Priscilla involved large
numbers of DOD personnel and an extensive military effects program. By July 5, Hood
produced the largest atmospheric test explosion at the NTS, yielding 74 kilotons.
Weather delays postponed Smoky until August 31. It performed differently than
anticipated, producing a significant amount of fallout on ground zero. Shortly after, radsafe entered the test area to determine radiation levels. Afterwards, the soldiers
preformed their exercises. The final test, Galileo, occurred a month later. While Smoky
did not expose troops to significant radiation levels, its contaminated the Galileo area
with radioactive fallout. Many soldiers, including Paul Cooper, were supposed to
participate in Smoky, not Galileo. But scheduling issues and radiation concerns
397
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postponed their participation. The DOD ultimately approved the exercises for Galileo.
After watching the explosion, the soldiers entered the trench area and performed the
infiltration course test. By the end of Plumbbob, only 50 out of 14,880 soldiers received
greater than 5 rem exposure. The rad-safe program appeared to be a success. Nothing
suggested the controversy that would unfold two decades later.398
Going Underground
Operation Plumbbob marked the end of the Desert Rock Exercises and the demise
of atmospheric testing. During the mid-1950s, public concern over fallout began when
radioactive dust sprinkled ranches downwind of the NTS and the Japanese fishing boat
Daigo Fukuryū Maru in the Pacific. Eventually, an international campaign materialized
calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. By 1959, the United States, Great
Britain, and Soviet Union unilaterally halted nuclear testing and began negotiating a
comprehensive test ban treaty. But President Dwight Eisenhower cancelled it at the end
of the year, declaring that while Americans would refrain from regular testing, “we
consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons testing.” Still, the NTS remained
inactive until the de jure moratorium ended in 1961. After four years of failed
negotiations, the parties reached an agreement. Abandoning talks on a comprehensive
test ban treaty, they settled on a limited test ban, outlawing atmospheric, underwater, and
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outer space tests. In 1963, the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain signed the
Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow.399
The treaty ended atmospheric testing at the NTS, but ushered in a new era of
underground testing. While most scholarship on the test site concerns atmospheric
testing hazards and downwind radioactive fallout, underground testing was also
profoundly dangerous, especially for workers. It fundamentally changed the nature of
work, presenting new hazards associated with drilling and mining the test sites. The AEC
began discussing the concept of underground detonations in 1946. Initially, it selected
the island of Amchitka in the Pacific for the tests, but ultimately deemed the site
unsuitable. After the inauguration of testing at the NTS, the topic resurfaced. Dr. Shields
Warren, then-director of the DBM, openly objected to underground testing, citing that it
was not possible “to disregard a potential long-term inhalation hazard.” The doctor
cautioned that underground detonations could create “continually recurring problems of
dust contaminated with material of long half-life being blown around by the winds.”
Moreover, “the arid character of the region” would “increase this hazard.” Despite his
reservations, the AEC authorized the testing of shallowly-buried, underground devices,
hoping to use atomic energy for excavation and demolition purposes. In November 1951,
the first underground test during Operation Buster-Jangle. By 1955, army engineers
tested atomic demolition monition (ADM) underground. The Chicago Daily Tribune
described the test as “the dirtiest of the series,” producing radioactive dirt that sprinkled
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the test site. With the help of both laboratories, Operation Plumbbob hosted the first
underground tests designed to be fully contained. Los Alamos conducted two tests,
Pascal-A and Pascal-B, in unstemmed holes in Yucca Flat. Meanwhile, Livermore
conducted a third test, Rainier, in the Rainier Mesa. Rainier was the first fully-contained
explosion at the NTS, or no fission particles vented into the atmosphere.400
The test served as a prototype for all future tests. However, underground testing
before the Limited Test Ban Treaty was rarely contained. In 1958, the NTS conducted 9
safety and 4 weapons underground tests during Operation Hardtack II. Out of the 13
tests, only 1 was fully-contained. When year-round underground testing began in 1961,
the numbers remained grim, with half of its 113 tests fully contained. After the
introduction of tighter safety controls, 1964 statistics showed slight improvements, with
55 percent containment out of the 29 tests. While venting was a safety concern, it was
also legally problematic. According to the Test Ban Treaty, underground testing was
legal if no radioactive debris was “present outside the territorial limits” of the country it
was conducted. The AEC subsequently revised regulations, mandating deeper buried
tests. At first, the changes did not fare well. A deep burial did not assure containment.
During Operation Niblick, the deeply-buried Pike shot created a fissure in the ground,
venting a black cloud of radioactive dust that drifted towards the California-Arizona
border. Besides the obvious health concerns, if the radioactivity had reached Mexico, the
United States would have violated its treaty. In the end, the crisis was diverted.
However, the Pike shot forced the AEC to impose tighter regulations, mandating that
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firings occur during optimal weather conditions, limiting the spread of radioactive
venting.401
Pike demonstrated that deeply-buried tunnels or shafts did not guarantee fullycontained underground tests. To provide proper treaty compliance and adequate safety
for workers and the public, the NTS improved underground testing safety by the late
1960s. REECo, merged with EG&G since 1967, organized all drilling, mining, and
tunneling. After Los Alamos or Livermore acquired funding, it decided between two
methods to conduct the test. Vertical shafts were the most common, representing 90
percent of all tests. Assisting in the development of new weapon systems, the shafts
housed smaller-yields in Yucca Flat and large-yields, requiring deeper holes, in the
Pahute Mesa. Additionally, horizontal tunnels tested radiation and ground shock effects
of military weaponry systems in a tunnel complex in the Rainier Mesa.402
Both underground test methods followed the same general steps. It took months
to over a year to mine the test bed, field the experiments, execute the event, and reenter to
collect the experiments. REECo workers often complained that Los Alamos and
Livermore instructed them to create “impossible” design scenarios. But, according to
mining superintendent John F. Campbell, they always delivered. The workers surveyed,
staked, and core-drilled the site, conducting a geophysical, biological, and cultural
inspections. After the preliminary steps, they mined or drilled the main experiment drift,

401

W.G. Flangas and L.E. Shaffer, “An Application of Nuclear Explosives to Block Caving Mining,” June
2, 1960, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Contract No. W-7405-eng-38, UCRL5949, Atomic Testing
Museum, Las Vegas, Nevada; Bob Campbell, Ben Diven, John McDonald, Bill Ogle, and Tom Scolman,
“Field testing: The Physical Proof of Design Principles,” Los Alamos Science, (Winter/Spring, 1983), 177;
Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 206-207, 231-235; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, signed August 5, 1963, Article I, Paragraph I.
402
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Underground Testing at the
Nevada Test Site,” Nevada Site Office, Office of Public Affairs, July 2005, DOE/NV-1068, Atomic
Testing Museum, Las Vegas, Nevada.

234

instrument alcoves, and containment plugs. In the tunnels, each event required 4 to 5
thousand feet of tunnel driving. Diesel locomotives pulled mine cars, hauling concrete
underground and muck outside. The workers handled engineering and construction as
well. They installed structural steel and concrete to create extensive grounding systems,
and installed utility power, instrumentation cables, diagnostic and radiation monitoring
systems, and shock mounting. On the experiment day, engineers transported an
unassembled nuclear device in a pig. Pigs were used as a lead-containment vessel for
transporting the devices. When the device reached its destination, rad-safe and industrial
hygiene technicians checked for leaks and other safety requirements. Upon approval, the
laboratory took the device out of the pig and conducted a diagnostic assembly.
Afterwards, it reported its findings to the Containment Panel. If the panel accepted the
designs and preliminary tests, the device was ready for detonation. Security operations
insured that all nonevent workers were evacuated prior to the test. When the device was
armed, rad-safe activated its monitors and aircrafts to track potential venting activity.
The test controller then detonated the device remotely from the control room after a
weatherman determined the wind direction and fallout patterns would not threaten offsite
populations. Following the detonation, a reentry team, comprised of miners, laboratory
technicians, and rad-safe personnel, check for appropriate ventilation and opening doors
to enter the experiment area. Once safety was established, the workers continued
according to the event requirements. They recovered experiment instrumentation,
reentered the drifts to permit visual examination of ground zero, and occasionally mined
back to the detonation site.403
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REECo drew an eclectic workforce to support underground testing. After the test
location was chosen, it submitted work lists to local labor unions. After word spread
among the transient mining and construction community, REECo hired miners, drillers,
and other support workers. The miners were a rough group that tramped all over the
world. “They had a circuit,” John Campbell recalled, traveling from water projects and
mines in Bakersfield, California and Ely, Nevada, to the Coeur d’Alene District and
Butte, Montana. At first snowfall, they headed to Arizona, New Mexico, and other warm
weather locations. Campbell commented that most workers were single and did not have
a “real social life” because they had the mentality: “I don’t know if I’m going to live
tomorrow.” Many miners had been in the business for a long time. In fact, several were
tunnel workers at Hoover Dam. After gaining employment, the work was intense and
time-consuming. While the majority lived in a 600-bed camp established in Area 12,
some commuted on the Widowmaker everyday. Early conditions in the Area 12 camp
were rudimentary. One worker described an “atmosphere of discontent” among the men
in 1962. While they were aware of the “vital and important work for the safety of the
country,” the living conditions made it “difficult to be patriotic.” The worker complained
that 4 adult men shared sleeping trailers, which had inadequate sanitary facilities. The
nearest entertainment area was in Las Vegas, leading to “perilous driving” that was
especially “dangerous if the men have spent even two our three hours in a bar.” There
were also only two phones in the entire area, and they were often out of order. Food
strikes were also threatened because of “outrageous prices (5 cents for a pat of butter)”
and quantity issues. The problem was eventually resolved as the underground testing
program intensified. With the perceived threat of fallout diminishing throughout the
Scolman, “Field testing: The Physical Proof of Design Principles,” 164-179.
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1960s, Area 12 eventually began providing more permanent living quarters with better
amenities.404
Constructing underground tests presented new occupational hazards to workers at
the NTS. But most miners considered the risk a natural part of their job and felt the
danger was worth it because they were safeguarding America’s security from Communist
forces. Other than leaving work dirty everyday, they never worried about the heightened
risk of their job. Campbell noted that if workers started “dying at once en masse” that
would have “created panic.” However, with only sporadic reports of cancer or
cardiovascular disease cases, they carried out their work normally. Moreover, most
enjoyed the thrill of manufacturing an underground test. A self-proscribed “adrenalin
junkie,” the tunnels gave Campbell his “fix,” especially when handling big equipment
and dynamite. Still, the conditions were dangerous. During the summer, very hot
temperatures sometimes reached over 120 degrees. Since the tunnels and shafts were
located 2,000 feet under the water table, the workers were threatened with water inflows.
With very limited space, the workers could not apply standard safety procedures.
Consequently, they invented new techniques, including communication equipment, and
devices for filtering and cooling breathing air, to better accommodate the unique
conditions of underground testing.405
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But accidents were common. William Beam, a safety superintendent, saw “lots of
bumps and back strains.” The indoor drilling and mining equipment created noise
pollution. Ear protection, according to Beam, was the hardest to enforce, as many miners
refused to wear earplugs. This contributed to cases of temporary or permanent hearing
loss. Beam described the most dangerous job as drilling. They experienced the most
fatalities and accidents, maneuvering large equipment underground. Miners were in
close second. Once, a man lacerated his liver on a drill rig. Rigs often overturned and
workers fell from derrick platforms or down the shaft as well.406
Environmental exposures were also prevalent. However, Campbell considered
the conditions improved from the uranium, copper, and metal industry. The shafts and
tunnels exposed workers to diesel and blasting smoke, chemicals (epoxies, silicone,
exotic chemical hardeners), dust, asbestos, and radiation. Workers wore safety clothing,
but regularly breathed contaminated air. Concrete dust accumulated on their noses as
they poured concrete and mined. Marv Swena, a miner, remembered that “it was so goddanged dusty in there, you had to pick your nose with a nail.” Working alongside
radiation also posed a significant risk. External radiation exposure was certainly a threat,
but radionuclides were highly concentrated underground. During pre and post-shot
drilling, workers regularly breathed tritium and radioiodine. In 1965, radioiodine escaped
from an abandonment valve. While engaging in post-shot drilling, 2 received an
estimated thyroid exposure of 31 and 27 rads, and 4 others reported smaller varying
doses. Despite these conditions, Dr. Leonard Kreisler thought the tunnels were relatively
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safe. During his tenure as medical director of REECo, he conducted a health track data
of the miners. In comparison to the state of Nevada, he found no difference in the
incidence of diseases, especially cancer and cardiovascular disease. In fact, Kreisler felt
the “tunnels were cleaner than most of the casinos downtown.” Still, Campbell and the
other miners believed “the cumulative dosage” affected them. While the conditions may
have not directly killed anyone, it may have contributed to future ailments.407
As a new industry, accidents were fairly common during the underground testing
era. Kreisler attributed most of accidents to “some workers [not listening] very well.” In
1964, the frequency rate of disabling injuries was 9.65 per million man hours worked.
But the new safety procedures, enacted throughout the 1960s, eventually produced a safer
workplace. By 1968, REECo had reduced the rate to 1.63, a drop from 3.15 in 1967.
William Beam regarded 1967 to 1993 as “the best years of the test site” because
“everybody worked hard” and “followed safety guidelines.” Kreisler agreed. The doctor
declared the NTS “the safest place in the world,” with an accident rate “probably lowest
in the industry.” Like atmospheric testing, REECo outlined a comprehensive
occupational health program for underground testing, composed of radiation monitoring,
industrial hygiene, and air and water sampling. It staffed industrial safety and safety
training departments to handle everyday mining, drilling, and construction safety. The
departments advised, inspected, recommended, and investigated, and offered safety
training classes. In the Area 12 camp cafeteria, Beam taught mine rescue and first aid
training, and blaster certification for handling explosives. All courses had to be renewed
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periodically. While the safety departments were not involved in the actual test, mining
inspectors interfaced with rad-safe and industrial hygiene on the tunnel reentries.408
The medical department worked alongside all the safety departments. Dr. Savino W.
Cavender, a REECo consultant and interim medical director from 1967-1973, noted that
his personnel worked “very closely” with the industrial hygienists and radiological
science department. “Throughout my years as a doctor,” Cavender recalled, he learned
“if we can prevent injury or disease, it [was] a lot easier and more profitable to prevent
than to have to treat.” Since he worked as a miner in undergraduate school, Cavender
knew what the job entailed. The environment was “quite dusty” and workers were
“exposed to a number of potential agents.” He also recognized that some men had
worked as miners for decades, and therefore had been exposed to chemical solvents,
hydrocarbons, and combustion residues for long periods of time. Cavender was a
reckless doctor. In the event of an accident, he often left his film badge in the lunchroom
because he “didn’t want to be taken off the job” if radiation levels exceeded the allowable
dose. This was a common practice among all workers, not only the medical personnel.
By the 1970s, REECo cracked down on the system, and all badges were collected ontime and processed. As with most employers, the company also discouraged time-lost
accidents. Consequently, the medical staff strove to return patients back to work quickly.
Of course, according to Leonard Kreisler, if a patient was “laying in the hospital with his
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liver lacerated,” the doctors did not clear him for work. But if a worker “came in with a
broken arm,” he regularly “put a cast on it [and] sent him back to work.” Kreisler
subscribed to the philosophy of an employee’s right to work. If he could “engage in
meaningful work,” the doctor cleared him. He explained that workers’ compensation was
compensation was a fraction of their salaries, and it was unfair to keep a man from doing
his job.409
To diagnose and treat patients, the doctors had to get creative. Nuclear testing
was a relatively new line of work, and associated diseases did not have a clear treatment
plan. Testing underground only complicated matters. For instance, mining supervisor
William Flangas recounted a situation in 1959. While toiling underground, he and nine
miners got into a “tritium situation.” Tritium is an active isotope of hydrogen. It is a
low-energy beta emitter and not dangerous externally. But tritium is a hazard if inhaled,
ingested, or absorbed in the skin. While it occurs naturally in the environment,
atmospheric and testing disbursed qualities throughout the NTS. By the late 1950s,
tritium had contaminated the test site’s underlying soil and groundwater. Underground
testing aggregated the problem. When thermonuclear devices detonate in confined
spaces like tunnels and shafts, gaseous and water-based tritium pass the permissible dose.
The isotope never posed a significant threat to the public. It does not last long in the
body, and flushes out within 10 days. However, regularly breathing large quantities
underground posed serious health problems. Flangas’ “tritium situation” occurred after
atmospheric conditions bled tritium into the tunnel, exposing miners to “a big dosage of
it.” Since the exposure was a short-term and high dose, the effects could be limited if
Roberts et al. vs. United States of America, Civil LV 76-259 RDF, Reporter’s Transcript of Court Trial,
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they purged the isotope from their bodies. When rad-safe discovered the exposure,
medical personnel began to treat them.
However, they ran into a problem. Tritium was a new material and treatment still
undefined. Los Alamos and the other laboratories had conducted studies on animals and
humans during the 1950s to understand “the routes or uptake and retention in the body.”
But it was still unclear how to swiftly remove the material. Consequently, the
laboratories began searching for a cure. In the meantime, the miners tried to flush it out
by drinking large amounts of water, tea, coffee, and cola. But nothing worked. Two
days later, the health physicists decided to recommend beer as a treatment. The theory
was based upon alcohol increasing the rate of urine, which washed tritium out of the
body. Human beings could also drink more beer than any other liquid because of the
malt action. After learning the treatment plan, Flangas returned to his coworkers and
instructed them to drink beer. They figured he had “lost it.” The men camped out in
Area 12 and drank large amounts of beer for several days. Rad-safe acquired urinalysis
samples every few hours, recording their tritium levels. The treatment worked. With the
exception of one miner, they reached a tolerable dose within several days. However, one
man refused to drink alcohol based on religious beliefs. Several months later, he still had
traces in his system. In the early 1960s, beer continued to be the treatment of choice for
tritium exposure and monitors regularly screened tritium levels in urinalysis. To limit
gamma exposure, rad-safe reassigned miners to “clean” tunnels, free of gamma radiation.
While it limited gamma exposure, the workers inhaled tritium from previous tests after
accidently breaking ground in adjoining tunnels. In response, rad-safe created a monitor
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that recorded air concentrations of the isotope. The new technique proved very useful
and subsequently limited tritium exposures from then on.410
By the early 1970s, it appeared that underground testing had achieved the goals of
the Limited Test Ban Treaty. While minor issues existed, public concern over
radioactive fallout hazards had ceased. From a public relations standpoint, the NTS
safely conducted nuclear tests. In reality, most tests vented, but posed limited health
risks to workers and the public. However, a byproduct of the safer conditions was an
erosion of occupational health. Safety procedures had became routine. No major
accidents had occurred since atmospheric testing. While rad-safe regularly dealt with
crisis-type situations during the 1950s, its predecessors never experienced a major
disaster. The NTS had seemingly perfected underground testing, and it appeared that
observing basic safety requirements guaranteed a successful test.
Under these circumstances, the NTS began Operation Emery in 1970. As with
other test series, rad-safe limited workers to 3 rem per quarter, with a maximum of 5 rem
a year. The Livermore Laboratory planned a number of tests, including Baneberry.
Geologist Richard D. McArthur selected the southwest corner of Area 8 for Baneberry’s
shaft hole, U8d. He predicted the location was 2,200 feet northwest of the nearest fault
line, discovered during the Discus Thrower event in 1966.411 REECo began drilling in
October 1970, under the engineering supervision of Fenix and Scisson Inc. By
November 14, it finished the 86-inch diameter hole, which stretched 980-feet
410
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underground, and began an extensive cementing program. But the job did not run
smoothly. REECo had to use large quantities of water to remove displaced dirt and rock,
and clean drilling equipment. The company did not know it yet, but it had drilled U8d on
top of a fault line. The excess water ultimately eroded the hole, causing breaks in the
cement walls and depositing 100 feet of saturated clay. Due to the water use and other
issues, the construction cost of U8d ballooned to $586,564, five times its original
budget.412
Despite the various issues, REECo finished the shaft and Livermore scheduled the
test for Friday, December 18. The NTS was bustling with activity during the week of the
test, conducting three separate tests. During the proceeding tests, safety procedures
mandated the evacuation of Area 12. But Baneberry proceeded differently. Since the
previous tests ran smoothly, rad-safe decided not to evacuate approximately 900
employees in the camp, situated 5 miles from the detonation point. During the early
morning of December 18, most were reporting for work in the tunnels or awaiting
permission to enter the Area 2 construction yard or other locations. At the same time,
Wackenhut security guards and rad-safe monitors manned stations seven miles from the
test. When Livermore assembled the device, its most experienced scientists were not
there, supervising it remotely from Livermore and Las Vegas. Like previous tests, radsafe positioned monitors and television cameras, and scheduled a helicopter to take aerial
photographs and aircrafts for cloud sampling. They also positioned remote camera
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stations at the trailer park 60 feet ground zero. The Baneberry test detonated at 7:30 am.
During the explosion, Harley Roberts, a Wackenhut security guard, had arrived for his
shift, relieving the night guard, Jack Cupples. Both men felt the vibrations of Baneberry,
and watched a black cloud of dust swirl from the desert. At the same time, John
Campbell was carpooling to work. Driving through the test site, he looked up “just in
time” to see Baneberry, describing it as “the desert floor just kind of bubbled up and then
pshooo.” Only five miles from ground zero, he “could see things flying through the air
and it just kept going.”413
Three minutes later, the chaos began. The excess water had created a clay
formation in the shaft. After its detonation, the device blasted through the clay and
triggered a fault line, later named the Baneberry fault. The detonation dramatically
shifted the earth, spewing molten rock and ash through a fissure measuring 315 feet.
Radioactive gas burst 8,000 feet in the air and continued venting over the next 24 hours.
Based on weather forecasts, rad-safe had determined that radioactive fallout would occur
in the south and southeast to Area 3, and the north and northeast to Area 51. But after the
detonation, the wind unexpectedly shifted, carrying low-level radiation from the base of
the cloud towards Area 12. By 8:05 am, rad-safe determined that Area 12 fell within the
fallout zone, and the Test Manager issued evacuation orders.414
As Roberts and Cupples watched the radioactive cloud, they received orders to
evacuate Area 12. When they arrived, it was encased in a dark grey fog. Cupples walked
into the first row of trailers, saw himself in the mirror, and did a double take. “My entire
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face was white,” he recalled. “It was in my hair and my lips were all clogged up.” With
minimal rad-safe training, the guards entered without protective suits or masks. Working
at the NTS for 15 years, Cupples first instinct was: “My God… I’m breathing this stuff.”
He grabbed a towel and told his coworkers to “put something over their faces.” The
evacuation took about an hour. But instead of going to a decontamination station,
Roberts received orders to go to the Area 20 guard station. Stopping in Area 17, a radsafe monitor commented: “You’re hot as hell. Get out of here.” Despite the warning,
Roberts followed his orders, continuing to Area 20. While driving a radioactive truck
and wearing contaminated clothing, he received an exposures of 2 rads/hour. Roberts
continued working for 9 hours. By 5:00 pm, a rad-safe monitor insisted on relieving him,
reporting he had received 200 milli-roentgen/hour, 30 inches from his chest. He ordered
Roberts to decontaminate.
Meanwhile, Cupples and the evacuees reported to a rad-safe building, CP-2,
located at the Control Point. Idle since atmospheric testing, the decontamination
showers’ hot water heater was broken. Therefore, the workers had to take cold showers
for over 30 minutes to scrub off the radioactivity. Afterwards, they were transported to
the Public Health Service’s Radiological Health Building in Las Vegas for whole-body
radiation and thyroid counts. Following his shift, Roberts went to CP-2 and took a cold
decontamination shower. Rad-safe gave him a pair of gloves to cover his hands, which
read 25 milli-roentgen. Out of all the workers, Roberts received the highest dose of
whole-body radiation. Dr. Shields Warren later calculated the number was at least 15
rads. He never got whole-body or thyroid counts at the Radiological Health Building. In
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fact, the AEC did not treat him until he checked into Oak Ridge Hospital on August 16,
1973, following the onset of preleukemia.415
To limit public concern, the AEC issued a statement that workers were “in no
danger of radiation sickness.” Indeed, there were no cases of ARS, but plenty received
low-level radiation exposure. Out of 900 personnel in Area 12 and those assisting in the
evacuation, rad-safe detected 86 contaminations. Rad-safe technician Robert Friedrichs
participated in the monitoring and decontamination process. Knowing it was a “once in a
lifetime event,” he asserted that rad-safe got “accurate information on the level of their
exposures.” It monitored 475 vehicles, and found that 413 were contaminated and
ultimately impounded 33. Since Baneberry was close to the holidays, rad-safe also
confiscated Christmas presents that had been stored the cars. It ultimately determined
that 106 workers had radioactive clothing and 86 required showers. After monitoring, 68
needed additional decontamination and direct measurement of thyroid radioactivity in
Mercury. Of those, 18 were transported to the Radiological Health Building for wholebody counts. To study offsite fallout, the Southwestern Radiological Laboratory handled
rad-safe under the auspices of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). An
evaluation of external gamma radiation revealed higher than normal radiostrontium,
plutonium, and tritium levels in snow samples, air filters, and milk. However, the highest
estimated doses were within the radiation protection standards. According to the AEC
Chairman Glen Seaborg, no “health hazards resulted from the radioactivity” at Baneberry
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and the data did not “justify special field studies or the need for instituting protective
actions.”416
After evaluating the film badges, thyroid and whole-body counts, and urine
samples, rad-safe determined that no worker received external or internal doses
exceeding the 3 rem/quarter and 5 rem/year limit. Moreover, it concluded that thyroid
counts did not surpass 10 rem/quarter and 30/rem per year. According to Hacker,
“prompt action seemed to have met the crisis.” But Dr. Shields Warren evaluated the
monitoring and radiation procedures differently. “I’m sorry to say, I would have to call it
bad,” testified the doctor in 1975, “judging by [Harley Robert’s] detailed counts.” The
rad-safe monitors confronted various problems carrying out the evacuation. While
evaluating the rad-safe notes, Warren noticed their apparatus, measuring devices, and
uniforms were not “where they were supposed to be.” Additionally, “evacuation was not
ordered adequately soon” and the monitors did “not agree with each other [about]
readings.” A veteran in the radiology field, Warren knew the difficulties of crisis
management. But had he been in charge, the doctor “would have raised hell with
whoever was responsible for this.”417
The Fallout Over Testing

Roberts et al. vs. United States of America, Box 1, Folder 1, 95-97; Interview with John Campbell, July
23, 2004, 35; Manning, “Baneberry Decision Could Blast Legal Precedent;” Interview with Robert
Friedrichs, February 25, 2005, Conducted by Mary Palevsky, 6-8, Nevada Test Site Oral History Project,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Summary Discussion of Test Series Applicable to Nevada Test Site and
the Pacific, Topic A-5, 1-2; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 248-249; Western Laboratory Research
Laboratory, Environmental Protection Agency, “Final Report of Off-Site Surveillance for the Baneberry
Event,” SWRHL-107r, Atomic Testing Museum, Las Vegas, Nevada.
417
Summary Discussion of Test Series Applicable to Nevada Test Site and the Pacific, Topic A-5, 2;
Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 249; Independent Guard Association of Nevada, Local 1 as a class,
Dorothy Roberts et. al, versus Reynolds Electric and Engineering Company, Deposition of Dr. Shields
Warren, 42-43.
416

248

After Baneberry, Robert Friedrichs described NTS operations as “hectic.” All
testing ceased and the Area 12 camp closed. Baneberry had exposed safety lapses that
developed during the underground testing program. While fallout had ceased, the NTS
eased its occupational health protocol, allowing repair shops, field warehouses, and camp
sites like Area 12 to be positioned close to the tests. While atmospheric testing
conditions prohibited support facilities in forward areas, underground testing promised
improved safety. Placing workers closer to the sites saved the AEC money as well. But
Baneberry forced a reevaluation of policy. When testing resumed in June 1971, the Test
Manager mandated that all personnel evacuate areas north of the Control Point during
events. The AEC also founded the Containment Evaluation Panel, which reviewed plans
prior to approving the event. According to Friedrichs, the panel provided a “far more
sophisticated level of review” than its predecessors. After determining the device yield,
it chose a location that ensured the best overburden for containment. Overburden was the
quantity of soil above ground zero, usually between 700 and 1,000 feet. 418 The
Containment Evaluation Panel created a synopsis of worst case scenarios and determined
if the device could be reasonably contained. Baneberry ultimately forced the adoption of
a new motto at the NTS: “Economy of operations is subject to overriding consideration of
safety.” Friedrichs felt the changes assured that it would “never had a real serious leak
again.” But Baneberry was “a shocking way to find out that things were not as
straightforward as people thought.” The new occupational health standards transformed
the NTS workplace and consistently contained underground tests thereafter. From 1961
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to 1970, 122 tests had vented radioactivity. Throughout the 1970s, only 3 tests were not
fully-contained.419
As occupational health improved at the NTS, its public image took a major hit.
Baneberry sparked renewed interest in past rad-safe protocol, attracting intense criticism
by the late 1970s. Hacker termed three general waves of testing concern in the United
States.420 The first centered around fallout during the 1950s and faded after the Limited
Test Ban Treaty in 1963. While “safe” underground testing quelled the public debate,
scientists continued to research the threats of low-level radiation. During the 1960s,
nuclear power expanded, prompting a new debate focusing on low-level radiation and
radioiodine threats. But mainstream science continued to agree that low-level effects
posed limited health risks. The 1972 BEIR and UNSCEAR reports endorsed this view.421
Meanwhile, the AEC split into two agencies in 1975. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) focused on safety and regulation, and the Energy Research and

Interview with Robert Friedrichs, 6-8; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 250-251.
For literature on the public debate, see Hacker, Elements of Controversy, which discusses the scientific,
technical, and organizational bases of nuclear testing controversy. Divine, Blowing in the Wind focuses on
the public debate of testing; and Richard G. Hawlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 19531961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
reveals what happened during the Eisenhower administration. See also Richard G. Hewlett, “Nuclear
Weapon Testing and Studies Related to Health Effects: A Historical Survey, in Interagency Radiation
Research Committee, Considerations of Three Proposals to Conduct Research on Possible Health Effects
of Radiation from Nuclear Weapons Testing in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah; and, Nuclear Weapon Testing
and Studies Related to Health Effects, National Institutes of Health Publication no. 81-507 (Washington:
October 1980), 24-101; and Walker, “The Controversy over Radiation Safety: A Historical Overview.”
421
See the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council Advisory Committee on the
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation [BEIR], The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation (Washington, 1972); and United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation [UNSCEAR], Ionizing Radiation Levels and Effects (Geneva: United Nations, 1972). Not
everyone agreed with the findings, most notably Harold A. Knapp, Jr., Iodine-131 in Fresh Milk and
Human Thyroids Following a Single Deposition of Nuclear Test Fallout, Report TID-19266 (Washington:
Atomic Energy Commission, 1963); Arthur R. Tamplin and John W. Gofman, “Population Control”
through Nuclear Pollution (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1970; Ernest J. Sternglass, Secret Fallout: Low Level
Radiation from Hiroshima to Three-Mile Island, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). Hacker also provides a
thorough discussion in Elements of Controversy. See “From Test Moratorium to Test Ban,” especially
“Radiation Matters,” and “Testing Underground,” and “The Issue of Low-Level Radiation,” 211-226, 236254.
419
420

250

Development Administration (ERDA) addressed development and promotion. Three
years later, ERDA became the Department of Energy (DOE).422
The third wave of controversy began in the late 1970s, as the scientific
community did not collectively agree that low-level radiation posed little threat.
Beginning in 1970, low-level effects inspired historical studies on atmospheric testing.
While the data was flawed, Harold Knapp, John Gofman, Arthur Tamplin, and Ernest
Sternglass sparked renewed interest in the subject.423 By the mid-1970s, Samuel Milham,
Thomas Mancuso, Alice Stewart, and George Kneale began investigating the long-term
health of Hanford facility workers. While working for the Washington State Public
Health Service, Milham produced the first study. His paper argued that excessive cancer
fatalities occurred among the workers due to low-level radiation. When the AEC learned
of his findings, it requested that Mancuso publically refute them. A University of
Pittsburgh epidemiologist, Mancuso had contracted with the AEC since 1964, researching
the lives and deaths of 35,000 current and former Hanford workers. After declining the
request, the AEC terminated his contract. A year later, Mancuso derived a similar
conclusion to Milham. Hanford workers who received continued low-level exposures
exhibited a 6 percent greater chance of developing cancer than the general public. By
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December 1977, Mancuso and his colleagues, Stewart and Kneale, published their
findings in the journal Health Physics.424
The Mancuso study rattled the scientific community, but it failed to arouse
significant public concern. The controversy did not revive until allegations of negligence
emerged among atomic veterans and NTS workers. In 1975, the Veterans Hospital in
Salt Lake City admitted Paul Cooper, a retired Army sergeant. Cooper had acute
myelogenous leukemia. Cooper participated in the Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII
during Operation Plumbbob. After witnessing Galileo, he completed the Smoky exercise
course, which was contaminated with low-level radiation. According to Army records,
2,232 men participated in Smoky. The causal relationship between low-level radiation
and cancer attracted Dr. Thomas Cosgriff, an epidemiologist. Since leukemia was
associated with radiation exposure, the doctor wondered if there was a link. He contacted
Dr. Glyn Caldwell, chief of the Cancer and Birth Defects Division of Epidemiology at the
Centers of Disease Control, prompted an investigation. By May 177, Caldwell
indentified 3 cases of leukemia among Smoky veterans, a higher rate than expected for a
comparable group.
At the same time, the Veterans Administration denied Cooper’s claim that
leukemia was a service-connected disability. The ailing veteran took his case to the
media, a move that afforded him considerable attention. The dangers of atomic testing
Walter Pincus, “Battle on Radiation Standards, Ever Bitter, Is Now Expanding,” The Washington Post,
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suddenly remerged as part of the public consciousness. Eventually, the media attention
led to a proliferation of scholarship during the 1980s, accusing the federal government of
willfully exposing soldiers to radiation.425 The publicity prompted the CDC to authorize
a detailed study on the fate of soldiers involved in the Operation Plumbbob. Caldwell
contacted the men, and determined their health status and risk of developing leukemia or
other radiation-linked diseases. In 1980, he completed the study, reporting the veterans
contracted leukemia at a higher rate than expected. However, the cases did not correlate
with dosages or assigned units. Out of 10 cases, only 3 participated in Smoky, with the
rest involved in Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII. An eleventh worked at the NTS
during Plumbbob. Caldwell also identified a high incidence of a rare bone cancer disease
among the participants. In the end, insufficient data opened the study to intense criticism
and scientists continued to dispute the dangers of low-level radiation. But scientific
indecision did not end the fear of low-level radiation. The slightest possibility that
radiation exposure caused cancer was enough to fuel the fight for compensation.426
As the Veterans Administration denied most claims for alleged radiation-related
disabilities, the atomic veterans first sought compensation in the courts. But they never
won. In 1946, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, which permitted lawsuits
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against the government. However, the Supreme Court added an exception in 1950. The
Feres doctrine, or doctrine of sovereign immunity, granted the government immunity
from injuries that the armed forces sustained while on active duty.427 Under these legal
conditions, Stanley Jaffee sued for damages in 1979. In 1953, Jaffee had participated in
Desert Rock V during Operation Upshot-Knothole. He developed terminal cancer
several decades later. Jaffee v. the United States was the first case that applied the Feres
doctrine to veterans alleging radiation-connected injuries.428 The doctrine prevailed
throughout the 1980s and was further solidified by the Warner amendment in 1985,
which disqualified suits against AEC contractors. It also barred civilians from alleging
contractor negligence. In comparison to veterans, civilians faired slightly better in the
courts. However, they lost most cases. The biggest obstacle was a loophole in Federal
Tort Claims Act, granting the government immunity from lawsuits regarding policy
decisions. But federal courts defined nuclear testing as a policy decision. From the
sheep case in the 1956, Bulloch v. the United States, to the 1980s, the courts regularly
rejected government liability for testing-related damages.429
The first civilian case that alleged radiation-related injuries involved Baneberry.
Prior to the accident, Harley Roberts was a healthy, 50 year old man. Working at NTS
since 1966, REECo physical examinations revealed he was “essentially an average
individual health-wise for his age” with “a few minor operative problems.” His blood
counts were also a normal range. But within a few months of the accident, Roberts felt
exhausted. As his condition worsened, he complained of fatigue, frequent nosebleeds,
Feres v. United States of America, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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and bruising of the skin. By June 1972, Roberts visited a doctor at Loma Linda Hospital
in California and was diagnosed with blood abnormalities. His cells had 45
chromosomes instead of the regular 46, lacking the C group chromosome. After an
unsuccessful treatment, Roberts was transferred to Oak Ridge Hospital in August 1943.
Oak Ridge diagnosed him with pancytopenia, too few blood cells, and indicated he was
“in a possible preleukemic state.” They discharged him in September 1973. Over the
next few months, Roberts’ condition deteriorated. He went back to Loma Linda Hospital
and was diagnosed with myeloblastic leukemia, cancer of the blood. His treatment failed
and he died on April 17, 1974. The immediate cause of death was progressive interstitial
pneumonia due to a fungal infection. The primary cause was leukemia. Over the next
year, REECo workers William Reed and William Nunamaker died from leukemia as
well. The deaths exceeded the national leukemia mortality rate by 20 times.430
On his deathbed, Roberts concluded that low-level radiation exposure from Baneberry
caused his ailments. Nunamaker agreed. While administering treatment at Sunrise
Hospital in Las Vegas, Dr. Russell Miller recalled his patient believed “he had been
exposed to radiation, excessively” and the exposure induced his leukemia. Their widows,
Dorothy Roberts and Louise Nunamaker, decided to fight for compensation. Represented
by Alan and Larry Johns, they filed a $1.1 million wrongful death suit against the federal
government.431 The Johns brothers were involved in the case since 1974, representing
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Dorothy Roberts and 12 Wackenhut guards that swept Area 12 after Baneberry. At first,
low-level radiation was not central to the case. The Johns brothers filed a suit against
REECo, ERDA, and Livermore for negligence, charging that the government suppressed
information about Baneberry. They requested information that had been deleted from the
Baneberry Summary Report, including the device yield, the nearby fault line, the
workers’ medical records, and geological reports on the emplacement hole. The federal
government’s counsel responded that the information was “classified” in the interest of
“public defense.” Dorothy Roberts and Louise Nunamaker filed their suit in 1976,
charging “gross incompetence” in planning and “wanton and willful disregard for the
safety of plaintiff’s decedent.” Their case focused on four main categories: site selection,
drilling and related activities, evacuation procedures and radiation protection, and
decontamination. Additionally, the suit addressed the long-standing medical dispute on
low-level radiation for the first time in the court of law, arguing that small doses can
stimulate biological damage in cell structures.432
Testimony rested upon whether or not low-level effects could have caused the
workers’ leukemia. To prove their case, the Johns brothers enlisted several expert
witnesses. Dr. Shields Warren provided the highest-profile testimony. Based his
research in Japan and other studies, he had changed his mind about low-level radiation.
Under special circumstances, Warren determined that it was “highly probable” that a
“smaller dose of radiation was adequate to induce leukemia.” He disputed the level of
radiation that the workers received, openly questioning the validity of the REECo
Roberts et al. vs. United States of America, Deposition of Dr. Russell F. Miller, M.D., 2357-2389, Box
3, Folder 1; Widows Lose Baneberry Radiation,” Review-Journal, (January 21, 1983); “NTS Hit With
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radiation records, which calculated that Roberts and Nunamaker received .4 rem and .1
rem. While rad-safe took 7 readings from Roberts’ clothing, each varied considerably.
The figures ranged from 200 mrad/hour to 50 mrad/hour, exhibiting a time-decay pattern.
A reading at 4:00 pm recorded 1 rad/hour. Based on the latter figure, Warren determined
that Baneberry fallout irradiated the Area 12 camp with 11 rads/hour, and Roberts
deceived a dose of 15 rads. The testimony provided the basis of the plaintiffs’ argument.
Warren concluded that low-level radiation could have caused Roberts’ leukemia because
1 rem and above “can produce a chromosomal change.”433
Dr. John Gofman seconded Warren’s findings. A physician and nuclear
opponent, he adamantly rejected the threshold model and argued that Americans were
“overradiated.” Like Warren, Gofman determined that the rad-safe futures were flawed.
In fact, he found that the external dose was “100 times higher to the bone marrow” than
the calculated amount. Finally, Dr. Alice Stewart provided a testimony. A coauthor of
the Mancuso study, she provided statistical calculations on the population involved in
Baneberry. In 1978, Stewart had conducted a follow-up study on the 86 workers who
had required decontamination, observing the number of deaths. Stewart determined that
2 deaths from leukemia among 86 people was “almost unheard of.” Statistically, there
should have only been one. She concluded that the only possible reason for the statistical
abnormality was radiation exposure. Moreover, Stewart argued that Roberts and
Nunamaker were more susceptible to the disease because of their advanced age. Based
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on research in Japan, she also cited that it was “quite common among A-Bomb survivors”
to develop leukemia four years later.434
Warren’s testimony concerned ERDA, noting that it would have a “potential
problematic impact” on the testing program. Since Roberts’ exposure was less than the
permissible dose, it called into question its methods of radiation protection and put
“exposure guides under question.” ERDA resolved that an out-of-court or lost-in-court
settlement was not an option. A settlement would disrupt NTS operations, increasing the
cost of medical screenings and rad-safe procedures. Additionally, it would create a
precedent for future damage claims, raise public fear of radiation, and hurt public and
press approval of NTS operations. ERDA, and later the DOE, decided to play hardball.
They hired expert witnesses to review Warren’s deposition. Health physicist Dr. William
J. Brady, and physicians Dr, R. Evans, Clarence C. Lushbaugh, and Neil Wald
unanimously disagreed with Warren’s claims. They argued that myelocytic leukemia had
not been linked to radiation exposure and that the workers were “well within” the
maximum permissible dose. Roberts received less than 5 rads to his thyroid, not enough
to induce leukemia. Finally, the onset of their leukemia occurred too soon after
Baneberry. The illnesses were “coincidental” to the exposure, not the cause.435
The three-month trial began in January 1979. It was a nonjury case, with Judge
Roger Foley presiding in the Federal District Court of Las Vegas. In June 1982, he
rendered a partial decision. Foley found the government negligent in evacuation and
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decontamination procedures, especially failing to fully decontaminate the workers.
However, he determined that the government applied appropriate safety protocol in site
selection, drilling activities, meteorological studies, and in not evacuating Area 12 camp
prior to the test. But the issue of low-level radiation was harder to decide. Seven months
later, Foley finally issued a verdict. Based on the testimonies, he determined that Roberts
and Nunamaker’s maximum doses were .42 rem and .08 rem respectfully. At those
doses, radiation did not cause their leukemia. Foley based his opinion on “a reasonable
degree of medical certainty,” citing that there was “no credible proof” that low-level
radiation causes leukemia or chromosome abnormalities. Additionally, the latency period
following the workers’ exposure was too short. Foley called the plaintiffs’ theories of
causation “experimental, speculative, and lacking in credible empirical support.”
Furthermore, the testimonies of Warren, Stewart, and Gofman had “little, if any,
weight.”436
The plaintiffs had proven negligence but not causation. But they continued to
fight. In May 1984, the widows filed a motion requesting a new trial or reopening of the
old one to introduce additional evidence. Foley denied the motion. But by the late
1980s, the tide turned in favor of compensating the NTS workers. In 1988, the widows
took their case to the Ninth Circuit of Appeals in San Francisco, arguing that the Federal
District Court in Las Vegas lacked jurisdiction. On October 27, 1989, Foley determined
that his court had jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act and reaffirmed his 1983
ruling.437 But on the same day, Foley decided Prescott v. the United States, a
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consolidated radiation-related injury claim of 240 NTS workers. The government sought
a pretrial motion to drop the claim, based upon immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
However, Foley denied the motion because of two major developments. First,
Alan and Larry Johns had revealed that the federal government and the Nevada Industrial
Commission (NIC) had contracted a secret agreement in 1956. It stated that the AEC
replaced the NIC in considering worker’s compensation claims for radiation-related
injuries. Additionally, it allowed REECo to bypass providing workmen’s compensation
insurance for such injuries. The agreement barred workers from benefits if they claimed
to have radiation-related disabilities. Consequently, the only forum where they could
seek damages was in court. Foley had ruled the agreement was illegal and void in 1981.
The second development was an important Supreme Court opinion. In 1988, the court
negated the clause in the Federal Tort Claims Act that protected nuclear testing as a
policy decision. It ruled that federal officials and contractors were not protected from
negligence while carrying out government programs. In Prescott, Foley determined that
the government could be “held liable for breaching its duties to warn, train, and monitor,
and provide medical treatment [at the NTS].” He recommended that a jury decide if the
AEC failed to provide “objective standards of care for the protection of health and safety
of human beings.” The Ninth Circuit confirmed Foley’s verdict in 1992 and remanded
the case for trial.438
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In the end, compensation fared better in Congress. As the courts continuously
granted the government immunity, it emerged as the best avenue to seek damages. After
Dr. Glyn Caldwell’s investigation, Congress began hearings on the Health Effects of
Ionizing Radiation in 1978. At the same time, organizations formed to help the fight.
Founded by army sergeant Orville E. Kelly, the National Association of Atomic Veterans
helped soldiers seek damages for health abnormalities and genetic mutations.
Additionally, Benny Levy founded the Nevada Test Site Radiation Victims Association
to present NTS workers. Both organizations faced a difficult task. Throughout the
1980s, the effects of low-level radiation continued to be contested. But Congress readily
compensated high-level cases. It provided ex gratia payments, compensation admitting
moral obligation but not legal responsibility, to numerous victims. In 1964, it
appropriated nearly $1 million to Japanese and Marshallese victims of the 1954 Bravo
test during Operation Castle in the Pacific. Since 1977, it also compensated thyroid
cancer victims with $25,000 and provided up to $100,000 death benefits. But atomic
veterans and NTS workers had a harder time linking low-level radiation to their diseases.
In 1981, Congress began meeting their demands. The 1981 Veterans’ Health Care,
Training, and Small Business Loan Act entitled veterans to medical care if they had
service-related injuries. Since low-level effects were hard to prove, Congress passed the
1984 Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, which
outlined how to connect low-level radiation to military service. This act was also
ineffective because the doses were frequently too small to render compensation. The
1988 Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act finally eliminated the burden of
proof. The act automatically awarded eligibility if 13 types of cancer manifested within
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30 to 40 years after radiation-related service. Eventually, NTS workers benefitted from
congressional action as well. The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act of 2000 compensated and provided medical benefits to all government,
contractor, and subcontractor employees involved in the nuclear testing program. After a
long and arduous process, military and civilian employees of the NTS finally received the
compensation they deserved.439
Ending an Era
Heavy defense spending changed the face of southern Nevada after 1940. By the
1950s, Nevada had became known as the “Atomic State,” housing major components of
America’s defense program. Chet Sobsey, assistant to Senator Howard W. Cannon,
penned an article about the “Atomic State,” writing that the state was a place where the
“excitement of the frontier and the challenge of the laboratory” merged for the “benefit of
mankind.”440 But nuclear testing also had a dark side, contaminating the landscape with
radioactive fallout and other toxic materials. Scholarship has been highly critical of AEC
policies, especially regarding occupational health at the NTS. However, the NTS did
orchestrate an elaborate occupational health program with a network of capable medical,
rad-safe, and industrial hygiene and safety personnel. The program adequately protected
workers from both traditional industrial injuries and high-level radiation exposure. The
real issue centered around low-level radiation. Even today, the effects are still unknown.
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While there were no purposeful attempts to expose workers to radiation, the AEC,
DOD, and laboratories knew the risk of nuclear testing. Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly
demonstrated the immediate and long-term dangers, and testing in New Mexico and the
Pacific revealed the hazards of atmospheric testing. Moreover, biomedical scientists
conducted thousands of human radiation experiments to determine the effects of radiation
and radioactive contamination on the human body. Most of the tests were performed,
funded, or supervised by the AEC or DOD. The past experience with radiation helped
the respective parties establish an occupational health program at the NTS based on a
permissible dose. But even though the guidelines protected workers from high-level
radiation, it allowed for repeated exposure to low-levels. The AEC, DOD, and
laboratories knew the stakes. Even though radiation was a relatively new occupational
hazard, most scientists recognized that prolonged, small doses could possibly cause longterm damages. Still, the site’s occupational health program continued to operate
accordingly.441 Therefore, while occupational health at the NTS was extremely
comprehensive, it ultimately failed to completely protect workers. As research evolved
in the 1970s, so did the program, expanding safety guidelines at the NTS. Disasters like
Baneberry forced change as well, reminding the test site that its nature of work demanded
strict and close attention to safety.
As the Cold War drew to an end, the United States entered another unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992. After extending the moratorium, President Bill
Clinton began negotiating a treaty to permanently end testing in 1995. A year later, he
signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting any nuclear weapons test
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detonation. The treaty ended 40 years of atomic testing at the NTS, paving the way for
another industry to reign supreme in southern Nevada and gamble with worker lives:
gaming.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE STRIP
We have had ample evidence that health and safety of Nevada workers can be
disregarded only to our ultimate cost and that the prevention of accidents and the
maintenance of workplaces that are free of health hazards are not only desirable but
achievable goals.
Senator Howard W. Cannon (1979)
As Operation Ranger began at the Nevada Test Site, Las Vegas felt the flash and
roar of the atomic explosions. Testing only 65 miles away could have induced mass
hysteria among the 24,000 residents. But not in Las Vegas. The people loved it.
Ruthanne Welsh, a nightclub chorus girl, routinely watched the bright blasts light up the
morning sky. Charles Smith, a casino dealer, felt that testing was “commercially the
largest advertising feat any city of this size could hope for.” Publicity was the lifeblood
of tourism and testing created plenty of it. Thousands of bomb watchers flocked to the
desert to watch the explosions. To accommodate them, the Las Vegas Chamber of
Commerce printed shot calendars and maps indicating the best viewing points.
Moreover, the Las Vegas Strip developed an “atomic” marketing strategy. The Sands
Hotel sponsored a Miss Atomic Bomb Contest, which featured beautiful women wearing
mushroom cloud bathing suits. First styled at the Flamingo Hotel, the “atomic hairdo”
also emerged as a popular request among hairstylists on the Strip. Likewise, hotels
served “atomic cocktails” at breakfast parties after predawn shots and entertainers wrote
atomic-themed musical numbers. But while the Strip welcomed the publicity, it also
protected itself. Testing effects threatened gaming outcomes. The jolts could turn a dice
or cause a roulette ball to jump its slot. Consequently, some casinos posted signs that
house rulings were final. Despite the danger, tourists continued to visit. When
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newspapers asked if the NTS would hurt the local economy, most tourists felt quite the
contrary; it would actually draw business to Las Vegas. Tony Lucy, a colorful tourist
dressed in western garb, put a shot glass to his mouth and responded: “No, sir. The
people are going to drink and they are going to gamble—regardless.”442
The atom not only brought business to Las Vegas. It changed the face of southern
Nevada industry. The arid desert had emerged as a giant laboratory, hosting cutting edge
experiments in science and medicine that were vital to the American defense industry. It
also attracted a new kind of workforce to the region. As with the Boulder Canyon Project
and Basic Magnesium, the largest contingent consisted of general laborers. But testing
also drew top scientists and physicians to its tables. Henry DeWolf Smyth, a renowned
physicist and member of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1949-1954, often
frequented the Strip’s gambling establishments. Yet, despite the important research
being conducted outside its limits, Las Vegas continued to be stigmatized as “sin city.”
In 1959, Las Vegas bid to host two conferences concerning employment in the nation.
As a region employing workers in various industries, the city seemed an obvious choice.
While it won the bids, opposition emerged from the Department of Labor. Secretary of
Labor James H. Mitchell called Las Vegas “the den of iniquity of the nation,” objecting
to a meeting in the city. Despite his request, the committee upheld the selection.
Mitchell continued his campaign, threatening to not send a representative if the
conference remained in Las Vegas. Robert C. Goodwin, director of the Federal Bureau
of Employment Security, prevented the bids as well. Both conferences were ultimately
moved to other cities. While Mitchell denied making the “den of iniquity” statement,
442
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Goodwin asserted there were simply “too many distractions” to hold a meeting in Las
Vegas.443
Dr. Carl Kaufman, a local dermatologist and onetime public health official,
strongly opposed Mitchell’s comments. He requested that Senator Howard Cannon
“vigorously protest” the Secretary of Labor and remind Mitchell that “part of his salary
comes from the Nevada taxpayers.” According to Kaufman, Las Vegas was not the den
of iniquity. The doctor thought it was an excellent locale to practice medicine. The
region promised “blue skies, wide open spaces, beautiful weather, and wonderful friendly
people,” and “a sense of freedom that [was] not expected elsewhere.” But while
Kaufman enjoyed practicing medicine in Las Vegas, the medical community was
stigmatized the city as well. In 1961, the American Medical Association (AMA) chose
Portland over Las Vegas for its convention site. AMA officials issued a public statement
that Las Vegas was “not a fit place to hold their annual convention.” Senator Cannon
immediately denounced the statement, suggesting that the association needed to change
its “antique notions” of Las Vegas, and launched a campaign promoting Las Vegas as a
medical conference destination. The controversy prompted doctors throughout the nation
to write letters of support. Most expressed affection for Las Vegas. Leslie S. Cornfield,
a physician from Inglewood, California, wrote he would rather visit Las Vegas than
attend an AMA conference, and the association did not “truly represent the rank and file
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of doctors.” Evidently, the doctor loved Las Vegas so much that he integrated the city in
his practice, recommending visits as “therapy to a great many patients.”444
The stigma of being a “sin city” was a blessing and curse for Las Vegas.445
Although the stigma successfully promoted the city’s tourist industry, it hampered the
growth of its medical community. While the test site recruited renowned scientific and
medical professionals to its ranks, few stayed permanently in Nevada. Until Sunrise
Hospital offered major incentives in the 1960s, Las Vegas had a hard time recruiting top
medical talent. The image of a corrupt gambling town was undoubtedly a factor. In
terms of postwar population growth, the medical infrastructure also lagged behind and
could not provide adequate care. Moreover, the region still did not have a Veterans
Administration Hospital. During the 1960s and 1970s, the American Legion continued to
push for a hospital. The government responded that it only built new hospitals near
medical schools or in large metropolitan areas. Las Vegas fit neither criterion. As the
city struggled to provide adequate medical talent and health services, its burgeoning
hospitality industry emerged as a very dangerous place of work. The nature of casino
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work coupled with the pressure to maximize profits continuously strained safety
standards on the Strip, creating considerable risk for employees and tourists alike.446
Desert Hospitality
Until the 1970s, Nevada was the only state that allowed casino-style gambling.
New Jersey approved gambling in Atlantic City in 1978. By the 1990s, Louisiana,
Illinois and other states legalized riverboat casinos. A decade later, internet gambling
exploded in popularity. But despite legal gambling (commercial, Indian, and racetrack
casinos) in nearly every state, Nevada remained the only one that legalized it statewide.
Indeed, gambling played an important role in the state’s history. Gambling was common
in mining camps during the nineteenth century. In 1869, the legislature broke from
precedent and formally legalized gambling, providing for its regulation. Over the next 40
years, Nevada was a legalized gambling jurisdiction. But by the turn of the century, antivice movements gained momentum across the nation. As the state enthusiastically
supported various progressive reform measures, it passed a bill prohibiting all forms of
gambling in 1909. By 1915, considerable public protest prompted the legislature to add
an amendment allowing card games and slot machines. The law was unevenly enforced,
leading to the proliferation of illegal gambling establishments. But everything changed
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in 1931. As depression, drought, and unemployment gripped the nation, the legislature
explored options to stimulate the state economy. Since the federal government owned 87
percent of the land, ranchers and farmers opposed increasing property taxes and
agricultural development could not generate enough revenue. Therefore, the legislature
entertained a more controversial option. Since illegal gambling was hard to suppress,
Nevada could legalize it to capitalize on the tax and economic benefits, and tourism. The
bill passed in March 1931, ushering in a new era of industry in the state. 447
After the establishment of Basic Magnesium Inc. and the gunnery school, World
War II revitalized the region. But the gambling industry did not experience big profits
until the postwar period.448 South of Fremont Street sat 4.2 miles of vacant land on
Highway 91. Since the land was not incorporated in the city of Las Vegas, it was not
subject to municipal government taxes. In 1941, hotelier Thomas Hull visited Las Vegas
447
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to expand his “El Rancho” hotel chain, located in Sacramento and Bakersfield,
California, to the city. In a surprise move, he decided against Fremont Street, opting for
the Highway 91 location. The El Rancho opened in 1941, emerging as a prototype for
the roadside hotels that characterized the 1950s and 1960s. The western-themed hotel not
only offered gaming, but also a restaurant, swimming pool, and entertainment. Thanks to
wartime business from defense workers, the El Rancho prospered at first. But various
managerial issues led to labor turnover, prompting Hull to sell in 1942. Over the
following decades, it changed ownership numerous times. By 1960, a devastating fire
closed the property for good.449
While the El Rancho enjoyed marginal success, the property influenced the future
of Las Vegas. It inspired the first “casino suburb” and revealed the profitability of
combining casinos with resort hotels. Guy McAfee, a former vice policeman and
entrepreneur, dubbed the area the “Las Vegas Strip” because of its likeness to the Sunset
Strip in Hollywood, California. McAfee helped solidify the site as a tax shelter as well.
In December 1950, the unincorporated township of Paradise in December 1950 was
established.450 The Strip eventually became synonymous with gambling and
entertainment in the United States. Over the following decades, it expanded from small
hotels with large neon signs to the dense megaresorts that today define Las Vegas’ iconic
cityscape. In the process, the Strip shifted American perceptions about gambling. While
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“gambling” was associated with criminals and sin, it provided “gaming,” a legitimate
recreational activity.451
Occupational health on the Strip varied considerably based on each individual
resort’s management and financial support, and can be divided in two general periods.
The first period was directed by organized crime and the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.452 By the mid-1950s, much of the Strip was mob-owned, but not all.
Organized crime flourished because it was hard for casino owners to get big bank loans.
During the postwar period, the economy had boomed because banks and bond issues
provided loans to support the nation’s growth. But most financial institutions did not
fund vice. Only in rare cases did regional banks fund casinos. The stigma was far too
great. Consequently, capital was the biggest obstacle that faced the Strip.
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But mob funding bypassed the problem. From 1950 to 1958, it invested heavily
into the Strip. But after 1958, the construction boom lulled after an economic downturn
in Las Vegas.453 Moreover, the federal government began investigating the mob’s
involvement in gambling operations. The investigation prompted Nevada to institute
stricter gaming regulations, establishing the Gaming Control Board in 1955, the Gaming
Commission in 1959, and the Gaming Policy Committee in 1961.454 It soon became
apparent that illegitimate capital could no longer support the Strip. Blending illegal and
legal practices, the Teamsters stepped in. In the late 1950s, the union began investing in
commercial development until shifting its attention to the Strip. Instead of gangsters
reaching for shoeboxes of money, the Teamsters arranged to provide loans from
legitimate institutions, such as the Bank of Las Vegas.455 The union helped construct
Caesars Palace, Aladdin, and Landmark. Opening in 1966 at the cost of $19 million,
Caesars Palace inaugurated a new era on the Strip, outshining the first generation of
resorts.456
The second period reflected the shift to corporate ownership. Howard Hughes
began an unprecedented buying spree in 1967, purchasing the Frontier, Sands,
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Castaways, Landmark and Silver Slipper. The eccentric billionaire provided a symbol of
change to the gaming industry, legitimizing investment on the Strip. By 1968,
entrepreneur Kirk Kerkorian began constructing the largest hotel in the world, the
International. He also acquired the Flamingo, reportedly to train his workers for the
opening of the massive resort. Kerkorian was the first person to benefit from the 1969
Corporate Gaming Act, which allowed for corporate involvement in the gaming
industry.457 Historian Hal Rothman calls the 1969 act “the most important event in the
history of modern Las Vegas,” ushering in the corporate era.458
After completing the International, Kerkorian sold his interest in the resort and
the Flamingo to the Hilton Corporation in 1970. The sale marked the first time a
publically-owned corporation owned a casino. Its financial success changed the hotel
industry’s perception of the Strip, inspiring Sheraton and Holiday Inn to invest in casinos.
Kerkorian also continued to reinvent the Strip. In 1973, he opened the MGM Grand,
setting a new industry standard of size and luxury. Costing $120 million, the hotel was
the first megaresort on the Strip.459 Despite its success, the MGM Grand was the only
property constructed on the Strip from 1969 to 1989. Various factors inhibited new
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development, including a nationwide recession. Moreover, the MGM Grand had elevated
the amount of capital needed to construct a comparable resort.
Steve Wynn provided a solution, redefining corporate ownership on the Strip.
With the help of financier Michael Milken, he constructed the site’s second megaresort:
the Mirage. A marked departure from its predecessor, The Mirage was a new kind of
resort. Double the size of the MGM Grand, it cost $630 million to build, with the resort
experience as the main source of entertainment. Wynn’s tropical-themed, volcanofronted hotel had expensive décor and luxury hotel rooms, numerous entertainment
options, a wildlife habitat, and luxury villas. His vision revitalized the Strip, making it a
fashionable destination once again, prompting corporations to invest billions in the site
during the 1990s and 2000s. Most existing resorts were imploded or demolished, and
dense megaresort construction defined the Strip, completing the iconic city skyline. But
the corporations not only transformed the site. Las Vegas expanded as well, from
842,737 million people in 1990 to 1.5 million in 2000. By 2010, the population had
swelled to nearly 2 million.460
Both periods of ownership required a large workforce. In 1955, 6,000 of the
county’s 30,000 wage earners worked on the Strip. By 1975, 40,000 out of 150,000 wage
earners worked in Las Vegas’ hospitality industry. The Desert Inn and Sahara employed
1,200 each, with MGM Grand retaining the most, 4,500 workers. After 1990,
employment rates skyrocketed. In 2005, the Strip accounted for 109,689 employees,
distributing a $4.2 million annual payroll. The same year, 19 of the largest casinos on the
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Strip employed 34.5 percent of the state’s gaming employees and produced 47.4 percent
of the statewide revenue!461
As historian James Kraft outlines in Vegas at Odds, employees worked in four
general categories. The first category involved professionals or semiprofessionals with
previous training, including executive chefs and orchestra leaders. The second category
included white-collar workers— secretaries, clerks, and switchboard operators. The third
category comprised of blue-collar workers, maintaining the gardens, slot machines, and
security systems. Lastly, the fourth, and largest, category consisted of workers with guest
contact, working in gaming areas, restaurants, retail services, lounges and bars, and
entertainment. The resorts staffed enough employees to maintain 24-hour, 7-day a week
operations. They worked in departments based on functionary lines: casino, rooms, food,
beverage, management, entertainment, retail, and others. All the departments interacted
with one another. The casino required workers to perform various tasks at the same time.
The casino host, a member of the management department, delivered complimentary
services to players. Meanwhile, the casino department managed gambling operations.
The pit boss and floormen supervised the dealers, cashiers in the cage cashed out gaming
chips, and slot attendants supervised the machines on the floor. At the same time,
cocktail waitresses, from the beverage department, served drinks to the players.462
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For most positions, educational requirements were minimal. As historian Hal
Rothman argues in Devil’s Bargains, Las Vegas solved the major problem associated
with transitioning from an industrial to a postindustrial economy. The city successfully
emerged from a railroad town to the “Last Detroit,” hiring unskilled workers with barely
a high school education if that. Throughout the two periods, this feature remained
constant. Most resorts also required applicants to submit to physical examinations to
ensure they were in good health. At the El Rancho, doctors determined whether
applicants were “likely to be all hands and feet,” examining dexterity. Steady hands,
good eyesight, and the “ability to hear accurately and speak distinctly” were essential.
The resort did not want to hire employees prone to “accidents, harming themselves or
others, breaking or damaging furnishings and equipment.” Some positions required a
special skill set. All casino workers needed to have good dictation, memory, and
mathematical skills. The resorts administered preemployment exams, testing for basic
math skills, and required certification from a gaming school.463
In general, employee policies were fairly constant as well. After gaining
employment, employees obeyed strict policies regarding appearance and conduct. The El
Rancho wanted employees to be “wholesome” and “clean,” which was the “result of
good health.” The Stardust told employees they represented the company, “regardless of
position,” and stressed the importance of “neat dress, grooming, courteous behavior, and
a smile and friendly word.” Female employees needed to apply makeup in “good taste at
all times” and hairstyles “appropriate to business standards.” All employees were
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expected to be polite, friendly, and dependable. Conversations had to be brief and
limited to times that did not interfere with work, as “prolonged conversations [resulted] in
unnecessary errors,” and employees must “maintain vigilance and alertness at all time.”
Drinking during working hours and repeated tardiness resulted in termination.
Employees were required to maintain a good image at all times, even while off-duty.464
During the organized crime period, upward mobility was achievable. Based on
job performance, dealers easily rose to the management level. 465 The mob famously
treated employees like family, extending work opportunities to employees’ children and
relatives. But during the corporate period, employment became stratified. Management
was reserved for employees with business or hotel school degrees. The move alienated
existing employees and employment patterns ultimately shifted. As industrial jobs had
done in previous generations, employment became a transitional step to white-collar
status. The poor and uneducated, and immigrant populations began working on the Strip,
eventually sending their children to college. If their children wanted to work in gaming,
they returned with the qualifications to snag a management job. As a result, the working
environment changed profoundly under corporate management.466
During the 1950s and 1960s, the resorts mostly hired young, white males to work
in the resorts. In 1960, Nevada had the most young and middle-aged adults in the nation.
A third of the population had only lived there for 5 years. Most immigrated from
California and Texas, with the rest from east of the Mississippi River and the Northern
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Plains. Since the majority of jobs were unskilled labor, turnover was high. Men held the
jobs with the highest paychecks and power, and given ample opportunity to move up the
employment ladder. Women were not as lucky, and had little chance of becoming a
dealer or advancing to management. These patterns reflected the postwar society. After
World War II, most industries discriminated against women and minorities in the
workplace, offering separate pay scales and job positions. Until 1970, the Strip did not
hire female dealers. The city of Las Vegas officially endorsed the practice on November
5, 1958, passing a public ordinance recommending against the practice. A year later,
North Las Vegas banned the employment of female bartenders as well.467
Until the corporate period, women were limited to working as housekeepers,
cashiers, cocktail waitresses, keno runners, restaurant workers, and retailers. However,
female sexuality also played an important role in the Strip’s image. Instead of overtly
selling sex, it sold the possibility. Pretty white women were hired to entertain guests in
shows and topless revues. According the Dunes, its “Casino de Paris” show boasted the
“Perfect Showgirl:” 5 feet 10 inches, 134 pounds, and “harmonizes with the globe’s
curvature with 37-25-37 measurements.” Most Casino de Paris showgirls were
approximately 23 years old and had blue or hazel eyes. In fact, only two women had
brown eyes. 468 While female employees had some privileges, they endured long working
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hours, sometimes abusive bosses, and uninvited sexual advances from coworkers and
guests. Those who became pregnant had no rights and could be fired immediately. Other
women turned to freelance work on the Strip, working as strippers, escorts, or
prostitutes.469
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 eventually helped end gender discrimination on the
Strip.470 During the corporate period, Las Vegas ended its citywide ban on female
dealers in August 1970, and the same month, the Silver Slipper hired the first female
dealer on the Strip. By the mid-1970s, the resorts eventually conceded under Affirmative
Action pressure, employing women in traditionally male jobs. Despite these
advancements, male dealers continued to dominate. In September 1976, only 25 percent
of 2,616 dealers were women. The situation finally improved during the 1980s. On
January 13, 1981, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a complaint on
behalf of a woman’s group. By the end of the month, 19 Strip resorts and 4 unions
settled out-of-court, agreeing to end sexual discrimination.471
At most resorts, while discrimination certainly hindered women, management
restricted minorities to the lowest-paying jobs. In the 1940s, the resorts recruited blacks
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for menial jobs, usually cleaning and housekeeping. By the 1950s and 1960s, black
entertainers headlined on the Strip, but were ushered out the back door to sleep at
boarding houses on the Westside. A January 1962 investigation by the Nevada Equal
Rights Commission reported that no black dealers, waitresses, waiters, bellmen, or office
personnel worked on the Strip, and the resorts only employed a “scattering of Orientals.”
A year later, minorities consisted of less than 20 percent of the workforce, and the resorts
only hired blacks as maids, porters, kitchen help, and busboys. The Riviera was the only
property that employed two black bartenders. The resorts attributed the situation to not
having enough access to qualified non-white applicants.472
The local civil rights movement and Civil Rights Act of 1964 eventually
improved the situation. But the process took time. Local activism started during the
1950s, spearheaded by the NAACP and two black physicians, Drs. James McMillan and
Charles West. Threatening a massive protest in 1961, McMillan convinced the Strip and
downtown operators to end segregation. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission investigated minority discrimination. At the same
time, local riots garnered negative publicity, bringing attention to the Strip’s employment
practices, and the Nevada Equal Rights Commission continued to prod the site. The
Nevada Resorts Association, comprised of the Strip’s largest resorts, conceded in 1970.
It offered a plan to promote blacks to higher-paying jobs. It was a positive step forward,
but did not end discrimination. By June 1971, the resorts entered meaningful
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negotiations for black males, after the NAACP filed a complaint with Judge Roger Foley
at the U.S. Federal Court, and signed a consent decree the same day.473 The decree for all
women did not occur until 1981. By the 1980s, the work environment improved greatly
for minorities, including rising numbers of Asians and Hispanics. The latter population
increased over the following decades, and eventually dominated the workforce.474
Hazards in Wonderland
Gaming is one of the largest sectors of the hospitality industry. By 2000, a casino
existed within a 200-mile radius of 95 percent of all American households. But no other
place rivaled the gaming experience on the Strip. The site offered all segments of the
industry, incorporating lodging, food services, conference planning, theme parks, and
other services. However, unlike other southern Nevada industries, the Strip did not
produce tangible goods. Instead, it trafficked in escape, pleasure, and self indulgence.
This was often a difficult task. While managers at Basic Magnesium Inc. could stop the
assembly line to fix a defect, Strip workers continuously created and delivered
experiences in a scripted environment but uncontrolled health setting. The experiences
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were also produced and consumed at virtually the same time, allowing little margin of
error. Success required a high level of commitment from all employees.475
During the process, workers faced numerous hazards. According the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, hotel workers experience higher rates and more severe injuries than
other employees in the hospitality industry. Additionally, they are 40 percent more likely
to be injured on the job and sustain injuries requiring more days off, job transfers, and
medically-restricted work.476 While numerous aspects regarding the nature of work and
management shifted from organized crime to corporate ownership, the risks associated
with the workplace remained fairly constant. But dangers became increasingly more
present during the megaresort construction boom after 1990, simply because there were
more services provided and a greater number of employees.477
While the Strip was exciting and glamorous, the work was physically demanding.
The resorts required employees to toil nights, weekends, and holidays. Most jobs
required them to stand for longer periods of time. It was a high stress environment as
well. Due to the pressure to work efficiently under a tight schedule, many employees
experienced mental health issues. They were required to tolerate rude and insulting
behavior from guests on a regular basis. As an added tension, most employees depended
on gratuities for income. Physical stressors, such as poor air quality and noise, also
contributed to the problem. Secondhand tobacco smoke filled the hotel interior, and the
casinos provoked audio and visual overload, crowded with people, tables, and slot
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machines. The resorts deliberately omitted windows as well as clocks, and decorated the
rooms with flashing lights and bold colors to generate action among the players. High
noise levels dominated the workplace, produced from the excitement of the games, music
in lounge areas, and coins dropping and automated music from slot machines. Such
stressors prompted the onset of headaches, racing hearts, ulcers, irritability, depression,
and insomnia among employees.478
The lifestyle associated with the Strip increased the prevalence of stress. Few
resort employees had stable salaries; many lived off tips. Their schedules were irregular,
often including late hours or all-night graveyard shifts. Since the jobs made it difficult to
interact with people with normal working hours, employees socialized among
themselves. Barbara Ann Barnett, a registered nurse, worked as a cocktail waitress at the
Hacienda during the 1960s. Casino employees “tended to be like a group,” she
remembered, mimicking the behavior of guests. They “partied a great deal” and “only
thought of the thrill of the moment.” Personal relationships changed quickly and “it was
not unusual to see one person being involved with two or three different people at the
same time.” Consequently, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases among coworkers
was common. Barnett remembered “a lot of drinking and a lot of partying,” which is
why she left casino work.479
Since the environment exposed employees to vice, many developed addictions.
Studies reveal that casino workers had a higher prevalence of pathological gambling
478
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behavior than the general public, given their proximity to and knowledge of the games.
The threat was especially high in the casino department; constantly handling money
lessened its value. Depression, bipolar personality, and substance abuse were also
common. The prevalence of depression was significantly higher among casino workers
than the general population. Alcohol and cigarette dependency was widespread as well,
partly due to Las Vegas’ 24-hour party culture. During his tenure at the Clark County
Health Department, Dr. Otto Ravenholt noticed there was “no doubt a freer atmosphere
for indulgence of alcohol [among his patients]… the same historically was true as far as
cigarettes go.” In a random sampling of casino employees in 1999, 2 out of 5 casino
employees smoked, approximately 50 percent higher than the rate among the general
population. 480 Taken together, gambling, depression, and substance abuse produced
innumerable health issues, including insomnia, intestinal disorders, hypertension, cancer,
cardiac problems, suicide, and potential criminal behavior, which contributed to
disability, morbidity, and premature death.481
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Most job positions required a level of physical fitness. Employees were on their
feet for 8-hour shifts, performing repetitive movements that required awkward positions.
Accidents and injuries were common, reflecting the national average in the hospitality
industry. Based on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 300 logs
in 2003-2005, hotel workers experienced injury rates of 5.2 injuries per 100 workeryears. Trauma accounted for 52 percent of the injuries, 39 percent were musculoskeletal
disorders, and 9 percent were not classifiable. Trauma disorders entailed injuries from a
single event, resulting in lacerations, fractures, or contusions. Musculoskeletal disorders
were repeated trauma onset by repetitive strain, causing carpal tunnel syndrome,
tendinitis, and back injuries. Female employees experienced higher injury rates, with
housekeeping experienced the highest injuries.482
Numerous studies reveal an association between poor working conditions and
reduced health among hotel room cleaners in Las Vegas. Room cleaners and janitors
alike reported high workloads, stress, and work-related pain. After the 1980s, most of
these workers were immigrants who did not speak English and had limited literacy. They
also were unfamiliar with workplace rights, received little training in occupational
hazards, illnesses, or injuries, and rarely used protective equipment. Almost all reported
work-related pain at some point in their career. The El Rancho’s housekeepers
commonly developed arthritis as they got older, which “forbade them to work any longer
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in damp atmospheres.” Likewise, janitors, window washers, and painters experienced
high blood pressure, dizzy spells, and even lead poisoning.483
While the resorts were generally clean, some employees encountered unsanitary
working conditions. In the early 1960s, the resorts imported second-hand restaurant
equipment from Los Angeles to cut costs. The old appliances had a hard time running in
the desert, and did not foster sanitary food storage. When they did not keep perishables
at the proper temperature, a string of food poisoning outbreaks occurred. The situation
prompted the Clark County Health Department, led by Dr. Otto Ravenholt, to intervene.
Ravenholt banned the use of second-hand equipment in Las Vegas. By 1964, the
Flamingo tested his authority. After an inspection of a Flamingo kitchen revealed faulty
equipment and unsanitary conditions, Ravenholt threatened to shut it down. The resort
immediately complied.484
The most prevalent occupational diseases on the Strip were dermatological and
respiratory disorders. In the kitchens, dermatitis, a mild irritation of the skin, was
extremely common. The condition was never fatal or disabling. Nevertheless, dermatitis
was an annoyance and took a long time to heal. Practicing in Las Vegas since the early
1950s, Dr. Harold Boyer, a dermatologist, “saw a lot of occupations with dermatitis
among anyone who worked on the Strip.” Most cases were culinary workers “because of
wet work,” handling “soap and water” and “fish and meat juice.” There were two types
483
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of dermatitis: atopic and contact. Atopic dermatitis resulted from allergies from food,
biological factors, or intake of other allergens, and developed in individuals living in
urban areas with low humidity. In contrast, contact dermatitis developed from touching
irritating substances such as high alkaline soaps, detergents, and other cleaning products.
Employees handling food and cleaning products were instructed to regularly wash hands
and clean with ammonia-based solutions. Boyer noted that “even doctors began to have
dermatitis on their hands from scrubbing so much,” and he even knew one doctor who
“had to give up surgery because he could not scrub.” While doctors prescribed cortisone
heal to heal skin conditions, they often received repeated visits because the disease
resurfaced.485
Respiratory disorders accounted for occupational diseases as well. Many
workers, including bakers, hairdressers, and animal handlers, handled chemicals, gases,
fumes, and dust. They subsequently developed occupational asthma, an inflammation of
the lungs. But the principal cause of respiratory disorders was indoor air pollution.
Combustion sources, oil, gas, kerosene, coal, and wood, contaminated the air, along with
deteriorating building materials and furnishing, asbestos-containing insulation, and faulty
central heating and cooling systems. Microbial contaminants, gases, fungi, and mold also
created adverse health conditions.
On July 15, 1977, the Landmark Hotel experienced a disaster involving carbon
monoxide. The resort was filled to capacity with delegates to a national convention of
Disabled American Veterans, hosting over 900 guests and employees. At 4:10 am, a
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water pipe burst in the sub-basement, short-circuiting the main power panel, telephone
system, air conditioning, and all but one elevator. The power surge also ruptured a
refrigerator line in the butcher show, releasing toxic gas. After the emergency auxiliary
generator turned on, carbon monoxide, phosgene, a poisonous nerve gas, and freon
traveled through the ventilation ducts. A guest, Don Thompson, described the fumes as
“smelling sweet” and “invisible,” but he “knew something was there.” An hour later,
Thompson’s friend, Robert Schriver, was stricken with a mysterious sickness, with
“beads of sweat breaking out all over him.” Thompson tried to call the telephone
operator for medical assistance, but the lines were dead. The elevators were out of order
as well. Taking the stairs, he ran down to the lobby to get help. When Thompson ran
back up the stairs, he experienced extreme shortness of breath. Knowing something was
wrong, Thompson started knocking on room doors on each floor to alert other guests.
Meanwhile, Schriver’s wife, Sue, collapsed and had to be carried out of the room “with a
wet cloth over her nose and mouth.” Sue Schriver remembered the air smelling “stale”
and “sickening.” By 7:00 am, hotel manager Robert Anthony began evacuating the
resort, instructing security guards to rouse sleeping guests and gamblers in the casino.
Anthony remarked that there was “no panic” among the evacuees. Fifteen minutes later,
an ambulance was called for Robert Schriver and the fire department sent an intensive
care unit to inspect the situation.
Five ambulances, three intensive care units, and the police soon arrived. The
authorities put “Operation Disaster” into effect. Firefighter wearing gas masks entered
the resort, evacuating hundreds of unconscious and semi-conscious victims, and
providing oxygen bottles to those sickened by the fumes. Most evacuees sat on the
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resort’s front steps and lawn, gasping for air, crying, and vomiting. The critically injured
were loaded on stretchers or wheelchairs, and transported to local hospitals. Since many
guests had been sleeping, the hospitals admitted them as “John Doe” and “Jane Doe.” A
Sunrise Hospital spokesman reported that many patients “felt the effect hours after being
treated.” One person had eaten breakfast at the resort, went to another hotel and “came
down with the symptoms later.” In the end, few individuals experienced serious
complications. According to Dr. Thorne Butler, a toxicologist at Southern Nevada
Memorial Hospital, carbon dioxide levels varying from 10 to 20 percent were found in
106 people treated. Most were middle aged and elderly. But the event produced one
casualty, Frank Gulla, who was attending the convention. Dr. Sheldon Greene, the
county medical examiner, reported the victim had a heart ailment, but no signs of recent
activity. The cause of death was determined to be carbon monoxide poisoning.486
Such dramatic events, fueled by high concentrations of air pollution, were rare.
The most prevalent threat to employees was long-term exposure to secondhand smoke.
As most of the nation banned indoor smoking, the Strip emerged as a haven for smokers.
Las Vegas was commonly referred to as “California’s smoking section.” While working
at the Nevada Test Site, Dr. Leonard Kreisler determined the tunnels had “better air
quality than some of the old downtown casino hotels.” Until the 2000s, the Strip did not
designate non-smoking areas for restaurants and gambling areas. Dr. Harold Boyer
remembered that “sometimes you couldn’t see across the casino because there was so
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much smoke-filled air.” During the 1950s, women wore beautiful gowns to the casinos,
but when they came home they “smelled like a tobacco pot.” But “that was the way it
was, so you can imagine what it was like smoking and having it in our lungs.” According
to the Office of Surgeon General and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), there was “no risk-free level of exposure to secondhand smoke.” Burning
tobacco released nicotine, particulates, carbon monoxide, tars, and chemicals, helping
regulate the burning rate. The compound attaches to the air, was inhaled by employees,
and deposited onto surfaces as a film.487
Sophisticated ventilation technology did not reduce the risk. While the systems
removed large particles, small particles and gases remained in the air. Furthermore,
operating heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems distributed secondhand
smoke throughout the building. Even a “well-ventilated” casino contained metabolized
nicotine levels 300 to 600 percent higher than other smoking workplaces. Breathing
secondhand smoke affected the heart, blood, and vascular systems, increasing the
prevalence of heart disease. Brief exposure contributed to respiratory symptoms as well,
irrigating and damaging airway linings and triggering asthma, cough, phlegm, wheezing,
and breathlessness. Secondhand smoke was a human carcinogen as well, containing over
50 chemicals that cause lung, breast, and other cancers. In fact, smoke-filled casinos
contained 50 times more cancer-causing particles than highways and city streets
congested with diesel traffic during rush hour!488
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Secondhand smoke was a significant hazard for employees, especially dealers,
waitresses, and security guards. Guests had the option to smoke outside, but employees
could not leave to breathe clean air. Indeed, the resorts outlined strict regulations
regarding how to deal with smoking patrons. Management prohibited many employee
from asking a guest not to smoke, blow away from the tables, or move ashtrays. They
could not fan the smoke away because it might annoy players. The resorts worsened the
problem, selling tobacco products on the casino floor and gift shops. They provided free
cigarettes and cigars to high rollers as well. Despite the health risk, the resorts did not
monitor employees for secondhand smoke complications, arguing they were not liable;
the law specifically allowed patrons to smoke freely indoors. By 2005, a group of
blackjack dealers from Bally’s, Paris, and Caesars Palace, concerned about the effects,
contacted the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and
requested a confidential study of their workplaces. NIOSH performed three onsite
evaluations at each resort, conducting indoor air quality tests and biomarker assessments
of more than 100 non-smoking dealers. The results were not surprising. NIOSH found
numerous tobacco components in the air, including nicotine, 4-vinyl pyride, respirable
dust, solanesol, benzene, toluene, p-dichloromethane, naphthalene, formaldehyde, and
acetakdehyde. They determined that dealers were in the 90th percentile of exposure to
secondhand smoke in comparison to the general population. While dealers had a higher
incidence of respiratory symptoms compared to administrative and engineering
employees, the difference “was not statistically significant.” NIOSH reported that
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tobacco components were found in all areas at levels above the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) safety threshold. Secondhand smoke traveled through air currents and the
resorts’ air ducts to adjacent areas, contaminating the air that employees and guests
considered to be safe.489
The poor indoor air quality, coupled with dry air, heavy air conditioning, and
strenuous show schedules, posed hazards to entertainers as well. Many developed
laryngitis, or “Vegas Throat.” During or following a performance, entertainers
experienced swelling and inflammation of the larynx, rendering them unable to talk or
sing. During the 1970s, headliners such as Dionne Warwick and Neil Sedaka complained
of the disorder. According to Warwick, the “only way” she kept singing in Las Vegas
was “to shut up.” Offstage, she spoke as little as possible. Likewise, Sedaka turned off
his room’s air conditioning unit and set up humidifiers. However, other entertainers
called the disorder a farce. Wayne Newton contended it was “a lot of crap.” He worked
14 days “without a day off” and never contacted the disorder. Newton contended that
many entertainers did not follow proper health regimens. They partied with friends,
drank heavily, and stayed up too late, and were not used to playing 2 shows a night, 7
days a week. Bad behavior strained their vocal chords, not the desert climate. To combat
the problem, the resorts hired ear, nose and throat specialists to treat singers before their
performances, at intermission, and after the show. While building the Colosseum
“Smoke Exposure at Work Killed Casino Dealer, Suit Says,” Westlaw News and Insight, National
Litigation, (March 15, 2011); Steven Green, “Casino Dealer’s Suit Over Smoking Dangers at Wynn Moves
Forward,” Las Vegas Sun, (October 13, 2010); “Study Shows Secondhand Smoke Increases Risk of
Stroke,” Reno Gazette-Journal, (August 18, 1999); Trout et al., “Exposure of Casino Employees to
Environmental Tobacco Smoke;” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Environmental and Biological Assessment of Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Exposure Among Casino Dealers, Health Hazard Evaluation Report, HETA 2005-0076; 2005-0201-3080,
Bally’s, Paris, and Caesars Palace Casinos, Las Vegas, Nevada (May 2009); NL York and K Lee, “A
Baseline Evaluation of Casino Air Quality After Enactment of Nevada’s Clean Indoor Air Act,” Public
Health Nursing, 27(2), 158-163, (2010).
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Showroom in the early 2000s, Caesars Palace installed special technology, including a $2
million humidifier, to protect Celine Dion’s voice.490
Besides vocal issues, entertainment was exceedingly dangerous overall, risking
the health of all the employees involved. While entertainers played large venues,
lounges, and bars, stage crews worked behind the scenes. They unloaded and dismantled
sets, working on elevated platforms, scaffold structures, and ladders, and underground in
the stage pit. Objects regularly fell from the elaborate sets and inadequate ventilation
diminished the air quality. Concert devices posed hazards, as some utilized lasers,
pyrotechnics, fog and smoke machines, and water onstage. Performance interaction was
also dangerous. Productions often involved dancing and fighting scenes, aerial
aerobatics, and the use of roller blades, stilts, and cycles.491
Other shows used wild animals as décor or entertainment, risking animal trainers,
the audience, and animals. Animals had long been a staple in Strip productions,
especially at the Stardust’s “Lido de Paris,” where even elephants were used. The
Ruppert Bears appeared in Frederic Apcar’s “Casino de Paris” at the Dunes during the
1970s. Led by Paul Ruppert, 200-pound Scandinavian brown bears drove cars, rode
bicycles, and walked on a tightrope. Between the shows, a bear named Susie “played”
the slots, baccarat, and craps on the casino floor. Her trainer helped count her
winnings.492 The Tropicana and Flamingo had exotic birds outside in the 1980s, and by

“Vegas Throat Like the Plague for Some Singers,” Jet, Vol. 54, No. 17, (July 13, 1978), 61; Eliot
Tiegel, “Call Wayne Newton Mr. Las Vegas,” Billboard, (December 8, 1973); Gina Kolata, “Body and
Mind: The Lost Voice,” New York Times, (January 15, 1989); “Vegas Beat – Timothy McDarrah: Dion’s
Caesar Show a Mist-See,” Las Vegas Sun, (October 23, 2002).
491
See “Entertainment and the Arts,” Jeanne Mager Stellman, ed., Encyclopedia of Occupational Health
and Safety, Fourth Edition, Vol. III, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1998), 96.2-96.7.
492
For the Ruppert Bears at the Dunes, see “All in a Nights Work,” Las Vegas Sun, (September 21, 1973);
“Casino Attraction,” Vegas Visitor, (August 30, 1974); “Casino Hit,” Las Vegas Sun, (June 27, 1975);
“Bear Hug,” Review-Journal, (October 5, 1974); “Dog Talk: Some Bear Facts,” The Plain Dealer,
490

294

1989, The Mirage also put animals on display, thanks to the cooperation of the resort’s
headliners Siegfried and Roy. During the mid-1990s, the MGM during the mid-1990s
put a lion habitat in its casino and Mandalay Bay even built a Shark Reef exhibit with
fish and reptiles.
While the animals attracted business, disturbances could provoke them to attack.
Besides flesh wounds, bites and scratches spread diseases, increasing the risk of
infections and infestations. The highest profile animal attack occurred among tigers.
Ray Horn and his partner, Siegfried Fischbacher, had headlined at the Mirage for over 13
years. “Siegfried and Roy” blended illusions with exotic animals, attracting worldwide
attention. The show was so popular that they signed a lifetime contract in 2001.
Fischbacher worked as a traditional magician and Horn handled the animals. Pat Dingle,
director of the Las Vegas Zoo, described Horn as “fearless among animal trainers.” But
in reality, they were “still wild cats.” During a 7:30 pm show on October 3, 2003, a tiger
lunged at Horn’s neck, dragging him offstage. Audience members said “he looked like a
rag doll” in the tiger’s mouth and could hear Horn’s screams from behind the curtains.
He was immediately ambulanced to University Medical Center’s trauma center. Horn
was critically injured, suffering substantial blood loss, a stroke, and partial paralysis.
Doctors preformed a decompressive craniotomy, removing part of his skull to relieve
pressure on his swelling brain. They transferred him to UCLA Medical Center in Los
Angeles for long-term recovery and rehabilitation. According to Dr. Stephen Miller,
Horn’s personal physician, the situation could have been much worse if the tiger had bit a
major artery. The incident demonstrated the risk of working with wild animals.
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Additionally, the resorts needed to enact improved safety measures to protect guests. No
barriers existed between the tigers and the audience. In fact, the audience may have
provoked the attack. Steve Wynn claimed the tiger had been distracted by a woman with
a “big hairdo” sitting in the front row. When the woman tried to touch the tiger, Horn
jumped between them. Both Wynn and Fischbacher defended the tiger, claiming he was
trying to protect Horn, not kill him, dragging his trainer offstage like a cub.493
According to the Department of Labor, violence was the leading cause of
fatalities in the hospitality industry. Moreover, the hospitality industry was one of the
most dangerous industries in the United States, with a higher rate of occupational
violence even than that experienced by police officers. Two types of violence occurred
on the Strip. Explicit violence directed towards an employee or patron, while implicit
violence was not intended for them. An example of the latter were casino robberies.
During the organized crime period, robberies were relatively rare, as most thieves
deemed it too risky to steal money from the mob. But after corporate ownership, takeover style robberies increased in popularity. During the 1990s, “robbers became more
blatant, people more violent,” explained Lt. John Alamshaw. Armed men approached the
cashier cage, demanding cash payments. Some robberies involved minimal violence.
The thieves collected the money and disappeared. But others inflicted bodily harm on
employees or ended in shootouts. From 1998 to 2000, a series of heists occurred at the
Treasure Island, Bellagio, New York-New York, Mandalay Bay, Desert Inn, and MGM
Grand. At the Treasure Island on October 30, 2000, a gunman undertook a casino heist,
“Siegfried and Roy Bring Illusions Into Your Home,” Review-Journal, (November 6, 1994); “Tiger
Attack Not Unprecedented” Las Vegas Sun, (October 6, 2003); Miguel Marquez, “Roy of Siegfried and
Roy Critical After Mauling,” CNN Report, (October 4, 2003); “Horn Still Critical After Attack,” Las Vegas
Sun, (October 6, 2003); “Roy Still Critical, Show Is Cancelled Indefinitely,” Las Vegas Sun, (October 7,
2003); “Siegfried: Tiger Confused, Tried to Protect Roy,” Las Vegas Sun, (October 9, 2003).
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jumping over a casino cage at 12:30 am. After pistol-whipping a cashier in the head, he
collected the money, and fired shots at security guards as he fled. The cashier was treated
for non-life threatening injuries. After the incident, the Treasure Island installed bars on
the cage to prevent robbers from entering. A month and a half later, another robbery
attempt occurred. The robber, surprised to see the bars, fired shots into the cage.
However, the cashiers had taken cover under the counter. Frustrated, he shot Mauro
Torres, a security guard, in the back. Torres was transported to a local hospital and listed
in fair condition.494
The social environment of the Strip encouraged other acts of violence. The site
sold sin. Patrons were expected to spend large sums of money, gamble, and consume
copious amount of alcohol. In return, the Strip promised “what happens here, stays
here,” offering partying during the day and night, sex, and fantasy, with no consequences
for bad behavior. The chaotic setting led to high incidences of violence, fueled by
inebriation, fatigue or lack of sleep, loss of income, aggression, or other social issues.
Casino parking lot and hotel room muggings were very common. All employees were
susceptible to unruly guests, even headliners. When Elvis Presley preformed a midnight
show at the Las Vegas Hilton on February 18, 1973, four inebriated men attempted to
jump onstage. Presley’s bodyguards and hotel security intercepted three of them, but one
man made it onstage. The startled singer offered to shake his hand. Instead, the man
lunged at him and began an assault. A fight quickly ensued onstage. Presley, a selfproclaimed “karate expert,” dropkicked the attacker, sending him flying offstage and
“Rash of Casino Robberies Tied to Trend Toward Violence,” Las Vegas Sun, (December 2, 2000); Lisa
Snedeker, “Lone Gunman Robs Treasure Island, Injures Cashier,” Las Vegas Sun, (October 30, 2000); Jace
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eds., Hotel Management and Operations, (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 227-228.
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breaking a table. One witness said the singer was “so upset that it took all of his guys to
hold him back once the fight got started.” Presley later apologized to the audience: “All I
can say to any of you is, if you want to shake my hand, fine. If you want to fight, I’ll
whup your ass.” All four men were arrested on drunk charges, but eventually filed a $4
million suit against Presley and the Las Vegas Hilton charging battery. Other lawsuits
from the incident followed. Rose Marie Leach, an audience member, suffered an eye
injury while one of the men climbed onstage. In her suit, Leach alleged that the resort
“negligently failed” to protect her from the “riotous guests.” The Las Vegas Hilton
settled out of court.495
Sin City Health
Considering the occupational hazards, the Strip was a fairly dangerous place of
work. To ensure operations ran smoothly, the resorts exercised different management
patterns, varying considerably from the organized crime period to corporatization.
During the former, the Strip ran like a family business with offsite investors demanding
quick returns. The mob’s pattern of financing, ownership, and management became
institutionalized at the Desert Inn in 1950. Wilbur Clark, part owner of the El Rancho,
bought land on the Strip in 1945. He envisioned building a luxury resort that rivaled the
Flamingo, but ran out of money during its construction. Clark turned to a group of
Cleveland businessmen, led by mobster Morris “Moe” Daliz. The group invested $1
million in the Desert Inn in return for 74 percent ownership. Clark became the “front
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man” of the Desert Inn, a locally-respected businessman and owner of the resort. But in
reality, he had limited control. At the Desert Inn and its predecessors, the resorts
functioned as two separate entities: the casino and all other departments. At the Desert
Inn, Daliz moved to Las Vegas to oversee gaming operations, employing others to run the
hotel. In comparison to corporate ownership, their management style was simplistic, but
mobsters managed their businesses well. Despite popular belief, almost all ran honest
games. The working environment was also harmonious. The resorts engaged in an
almost familial relationship with their employees, paying them well and offering
numerous opportunities for upward mobility. The relationship was thanks to Culinary
Union Local 226, representing Strip and downtown employees in most job
classifications. Negotiations with the Culinary were generally easy, since the resorts
were not overly concerned with the cost of operations; they made plenty in the casinos.
No one signed a contract and no one broke a deal. The system worked because employer
and employee had common ground. Both wanted to make money, a relationship
reflecting quintessential Las Vegas. Additionally, the mob was quite familiar with
unions, which were key institutions for hyphenated American immigrant neighborhoods
in cities back East.496
Occupational health during the organized crime period reflected its management
pattern. While the program was limited in scope, it was based on industry standards.
The resorts offered health and life insurance policies, and unions provided benefits as
well. The American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA), an entertainment union
representing the showrooms and cabarets, offered “welfare benefits” to participating
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members. Its employment contract mandated a contribution from all the resorts, with the
employees’ duration of engagement days determining the amount. The resorts also
offered worker’s compensation through the Nevada Industrial Commission (NIC).
However, workplace safety was not a high priority. This was not its fault though. In
comparison to other industries, hospitality appeared to be relatively safe. Indeed, the
resorts instituted safety protocols, outlining proper lifting and how to avoid slips, trips,
and falls. But they did not devote much effort to instructing employees about workplace
safety. The resorts were aware of the various hazards, thanks to high numbers of NIC
claims and frequent labor turnover. To combat both problems, the El Rancho shifted
disabled employees, unable to perform their original job, to other positions. Painters
sometimes became “affected by lead poisoning” and with advancing years, could not
stand on high scaffoldings “because of dizzy spells.” Protocol suggested transferring
them “to jobs as wall washers or furniture polishers—work not too far removed from
their former work without its hazards.” In theory, the policy solved turnover issues and
potential workers’ compensation claims. The thinking was that longtime employees
would have “greater loyalty” to the resort, which limited “hospitalization, profit sharing
plans, or benefit payments.”497
After corporatization, employees experienced a drastic restructuring of their
workplace. While elected corporate officials handled management, they determined
policy and profitability, not daily operations. For instance, Baron Hilton explained that
his company was “not involved in the day-to-day operations,” but monitored “the profit
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and loss statements of the hotel.” In contrast to the organized crime period, the
corporations took “a truly long-term outlook.” Hilton was not interested in quick returns.
The corporations reorganized the Strip, tightening management control to create an
efficient and productive workforce. The management pattern resembled most
corporately-owned American industries. Other southern Nevada industries, including
Union Pacific, Six Companies Inc., Basic Magnesium Inc., and Reynolds Electrical and
Engineering Co. Inc., implemented similar structures. As a result, the Strip’s
management pattern closely resembled the industrial workplace. The corporations
streamlined policy, establishing departments overseeing marketing, accounting, auditing,
and financial and legal needs. Kirk Kerkorian’s management at the MGM Grand was
particularly intricate, featuring a board of 7 corporate officers, 9 senior directors, and 57
lower-level managers and supervisors. Each supervisor had clear job descriptions and
authority, and communication between the levels were defined clearly.498
The corporations incorporated human resources management (HRM) as well, a
concept that gained popularity among American industries in the 1960s.499 HRM merged
personnel management with modern psychology, seeking to maximize the resort’s return
on human capital investment and minimize financial risk. The department set up
numerous strategies and policies. It recruited, hired, and fired employees, and handled
training and development, performance conduct and behavior management, and
conducted studies on employee retention and loyalty. HRM managed compensation and
Kraft, Vegas at Odds, 16-17, 29-31.
While the term “human resources management” (HRM) did not garner widespread use until the 1960s,
personnel management existed since the late nineteenth century. During the 1950s, the term HRM
designated the expansion of personnel management to include modern psychology. Behaviorists working in
psychology determined that employees could not be regarded as replaceable; they needed job security, self
expression, communication, and recognition. Nurturing an employee’s psyche thus created a more stable
and productive workforce. See Rudiger Pieper, Human Resource Management: An International
Comparison, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1990), 42-43.
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employee benefits as well, offering retirement benefits, and medical, prescription, vision,
dental, and life insurance for employees and their dependents. Some resorts provided
legal assistance, a credit union, child care, and transportation benefits, and employee
discount programs. When the MGM Grand hired an employee, HRM outlined the
resort’s personnel policies, administering a pamphlet signed by President Alvin Benedict.
The pamphlet specified the resort’s “objective and philosophy,” emphasizing that
employees were part of the MGM Grand “family,” and employer and employee had
similar goals. “The secret to a successful organization is teamwork,” the pamphlet
explained, “where people work together for common interests and goals.” To boost
morale, the MGM Grand promised “positive personal recognition” and other perks if
employees performed exceptional work.500
In terms of occupational health, the corporations streamlined safety awareness
and threat protocol, adopting programs similar to other corporately-owned industries.
While none devoted entire departments to safety, they hired inspectors to investigate
conditions, and outlined policies in employee manuals, pamphlets, and flyers. The
corporations established emergency procedures for fires, bomb threats, violence, and civil
disturbances, and stressed accident prevention. The Summa Corporation’s Landmark
emphasized that it was “good business and sound leadership to prevent accidents.”
Safety was more important than “expediency and short cuts,” and employees needed to
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reduce the chance of accidents and “show good faith” by complying with the ordinances.
They were instructed to report all accidents immediately to their department heads and
fill out reports at the security department and worker’s compensation illness claims. The
Landmark’s ultimate goal was to “suffer no accidents in any of our operations.” The
Stardust ordered employees to report all hazards and injuries immediately to supervisors,
regardless of “how slight you may consider them.” To teach about workplace safety, the
corporations offered classes, covering essentials such as lifting heavy objects. The Sands
hosted a fire prevention class in its parking lot in 1968. Employee graduates received a
certificate of completion.501
While corporatization prioritized occupational health on the Strip, national and
state developments also boosted the cause. The 1960s were defined by social revolution.
At the forefront, Americans protested the Vietnam War and engaged in the civil rights
and women’s rights movements. The environmental movement gained momentum as
well, increasing public attention to the degradation of the natural environment by
humankind and technology. In particular, it highlighted the impact of chemicals
polluting the air, water, animals, and plant life, and eventually boosted efforts in
occupational health.502 As American industry evolved during the 1950s and 1960s,
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occupational injuries and illnesses increased in frequency and severity. The federal-state
partnership, established by Frances Perkins during the New Deal, no longer adequately
dealt with modern threats in the workplace. The environmental movement’s attention to
chemicals prompted the Public Health Service (PHS) to produce a report revealing that
new chemicals were emitted in the workplace every 20 minutes, and linked cancer to
occupational pollutants. The report prompted health and labor advocates to call for a
national effort to fight hazards in the workplace. By 1968, Congress began deliberating a
series of bills devoted to the cause and reached a compromise in 1970, passing the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The act created the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), a federal agency authorized to set and enforce safety and health
standards across the nation.503
OSHA encouraged the states to follow suit. Nevada originally passed the Nevada
Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1955, but it was completely redrafted in 1973.
The state became one of 27 states to approve its own Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (Nevada OSHA), operating under the NIC. OSHA authorized and
monitored the state plan, providing up to 50 percent of its operating costs. While the
Strip was not immediately impacted by both agencies, Nevada OSHA demanded changes
to its current occupational health program. The agency mandated that every resort
furnish a workplace “free from recognized hazards” that could cause “serious injury or
movement are Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971) and Paul Erlich, The
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death to his employees.” It required that each hire an employee or department devoted to
health and safety. Nevada OSHA outlined its program based on four components:
employee education, self-inspection, accident investigation, and recordkeeping. It
distributed handbooks on accident prevention, began conducting inspections, and
published a pamphlet, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards,” for all industries. 504
Eventually, OSHA and Nevada OSHA enhanced occupational health on the Strip, but the
process took time. The resorts were initially uncooperative and fought some of the new
standards throughout the 1970s. But any resistance was based on financial cost, not an
obvious lack of concern for employee health. The resorts did comply with suggestions
that enhanced existing programs, devoting more energy to education about the
importance of OSHA and workplace safety.505
While occupational health varied based on an individual resort’s management,
employees experienced minimal changes in medical care. The resorts contracted health
504
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insurance to third-party insurance carriers, or workers received union benefits. They
typically sought medical care at Las Vegas’ two major hospitals: Southern Nevada
Memorial Hospital (renamed University Medical Center) and Sunrise Hospital. Thanks
to federal funding during World War II and the Hill-Burton Act, Southern Nevada
Memorial rose to prominence during the postwar period.506 Hill-Burton loaned federal
funds to improve America’s hospital system, designating monies to achieve a minimum
of 4.5 beds per 1000 people. Southern Nevada was an ideal candidate. Due to the
postwar population influx, local hospitals were overcrowded and in need of
modernization. Hill-Burton invested over $2 million in Southern Nevada Memorial,
which helped the hospital become southern Nevada’s most innovative medical facility.
In the late 1960s, the hospital opened a burn treatment unit, one of 24 in the nation and
the only of its kind in a 10,000 square mile radius, serving parts of Arizona, California,
and Utah. According to founding physicians Drs. John Batdorf and Kirk V. Cammack,
since there were “few facilities” like the burn unit, “doctors from UCLA and other
hospitals came to see it to pattern their facilities after ours.” With 285 beds, an intensive
care unit, and emergency and cardiac care equipment the hospital hosted sophisticated
surgeries as well. Dr. Harold Feikes, a thoracic surgeon, acquired the first heart-lung
machine and performed the first open-heart surgery in Las Vegas at the same time.
Throughout the 1970s, the hospital continued to advance, functioning as a major medical
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center in the West and teaching institution for physicians, nurses, and ancillary specialties
associated with the University of Nevada School of Medicine.507
By the 1960s, Sunrise Hospital emerged as the top for-profit hospital. Most
physicians that moved to Las Vegas during the postwar period had established their
practices at Southern Nevada Memorial. However, since it was a county hospital, they
were obligated to care for indigents. Some doctors resented the arrangement, desiring a
private hospital to expand their practices and profits. The Strip agreed. The resorts
wanted to send guests and headliners to a luxurious hospital, not a place serving the poor.
Consequently, several local physicians in the 1950s approached a group businessmen and
investors, including investor Irwin Molasky, casino executive Moe Dalitz, and others, to
build a state-of-the-art hospital, designed to become the most magnificent medical center
in the southwest. The group received funding from First Western Savings and Loan
Association, and the Teamsters Union, purchasing a tract of land on Maryland Parkway.
The site was purposely close to the Strip and the Las Vegas Country Club, providing
upscale housing for physicians and a golf course. Since the Teamsters funded its
continued expansion, Sunrise was commonly called the “Teamsters Hospital.” The
facility opened in 1958, with 60 beds, a rose garden, fountain, mosaic tile, and a slab
from the Valley of Fire decorating the entryway. The hospital offered perks for doctors,
including free office space and cars if they used the facility. The promotion worked.
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Sunrise easily recruited young physicians from all over the nation. Within a year, the
hospital staffed 58 physicians and surgeons.508
The hospital was an immediate success, thanks to the Teamsters and thousands of
captive patients. Sunrise functioned, at least at first, as a company hospital for the Strip.
To ensure its profitability, Jimmy Hoffa mandated that the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and Culinary Union Local 226’s medical funds only paid for medical
treatment at Sunrise. Like other employee-funding health care systems, Hoffa deducted
the cost each month from the workers’ paychecks. Besides caring for employees, the
hospital provided added benefits. According to popular myth, Sunrise allegedly aided in
casino skimming operations, however the practice has never been confirmed.509 Another
benefit provided was complementary surgeries. During the 1950s and 1960s, comps
were extremely popular among the Las Vegas medical community. Doctors performed
surgeries for the various crime syndicates in exchange for discretion and under-the-table
cash. The practice became less frequent after the corporatization of hospitals during the
1970s. Dr. Kirk Cammack, a trauma surgeon, preformed numerous comp surgeries,
usually at Sunrise. The doctor referred to Las Vegas as the “last wild West of medicine”
and epitomized young physicians practicing in the city. Las Vegas changed them. Dr.
Leonard Kreisler referred to it as becoming “Vegasized.”510 Many doctors were family
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men, well-trained in their specialties. But the lifestyle – money, sex, and glamour –
corrupted them. Cammack divorced his wife and went on to marry four more.511
By the late 1960s, Teamsters funding helped Sunrise become the largest
proprietary hospital west of the Mississippi. After a five-story expansion in 1966, the
hospital had 325 beds, and the first intensive care and coronary units in Las Vegas. In
1969, American Medicorp (AMC), a hospital corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
bought the hospital. The purchase marked a shift in southern Nevada medicine, ushering
in the expansion of for-profit, corporately-owned hospitals to meet the needs of the
growing community and rising medical costs, providing increased business management.
Without the Teamsters mandating that employees use the hospital, corporatized Sunrise
developed programs to attract patients during the 1970s. It embarked on an aggressive
advertising marketing campaign. Hoping to entice patients on the weekends, one
program offered a “revolving charge courtesy card” that provided a 5.25 percent rebate
and recuperation trip for Friday and Saturday admittance. If patients scheduled for
surgery on Monday checked in on Saturday, another program entered them in a
Mediterranean cruise lottery. Since managed care did not exist yet, it was the “golden
opportunity” for Sunrise, as there was very little oversight. Dr. Otto Ravenholt said it
was “like getting customers into your casino who had a credit card that you could charge

511

Dr. Kirk V. Cammack preformed a comp surgery on Perry “Golddollar” Rose, “the bodyguard of a
Texas gambler” (Benny Binion), who suffered a gunshot wound to the abdomen. Golddollar was a 6’6 tall
African American and “very quiet, but at the same time very intimidating.” While waiting for a follow-up
appointment in Cammack’s office, Golddollar overheard an irate family “screaming and hollering” at the
doctor. Threatening a malpractice suit over the death of their drug addict daughter, family members
stormed out of his office. But several days later, they changed their mind. The family told Cammack they
dropped the lawsuit and asked him to “please tell Mr. Perry Rose that we are not going to sue and there will
not be any problem.” When the doctor asked Golddollar what happened, he said “ Doc, I don’t know what
you’re talking about.” Cammack never mentioned the subject again, calling it “a malpractice suit avoided
by Frontier Desert Justice, Texas Style.” See Kirk V. Cammack, M.D., F.A.C.S., “Frontier Desert Justice,”
Greasewood Tablettes (Winter 1998-9).

309

everything to—and they did!” The programs were nevertheless controversial, garnering
national attention for “attracting” patients. But eventually advertising became a staple in
the medical community, increasingly gaining popularity during the 1980s and 1990s.512
For onsite injuries and ailments, the Strip retained “in-house” and “on-call”
physicians to treat workers and guests. The in-house concept gained popularity during
the 1960s, becoming a staple during corporatization. Mirroring other corporately-owned
industries, the resorts retained physicians as members of the staff. Usually trained in
internal medicine, they maintained offices on the property, providing basic medical
treatment to workers and guests. A full-time physician benefitted the resorts twofold.
The doctors monitored and treated employees to ensure the resorts retained a healthy
workforce. As added luxury, they provided premier and immediate care to entertainers
and guests. Dr. Thomas Newman, the Hilton company doctor, was nicknamed “Flash”
because he seemingly appeared instantly to treat patients. Meanwhile, Dr. Joseph L.
Fink, the Caesars Palace company doctor, treated patients in the “Caesars Palace Medical
Center” for over three decades, administering emergency aid throughout the property.513
The Strip retained on-call doctors as well, a service typically reserved for guests
and entertainers only. The most famous was Dr. Elias Ghanem, dubbed by the media as
the “physician to the stars.” Moving to Las Vegas in 1971, he administered medical care
to entertainers, including Elvis Presley and Robert Goulet. “I think it is the personal
touch they like,” said Ghanem. “They call at 2 o’clock in the morning and I go.”
512
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Ghanem established the first of many outpatient clinics in 1977, Las Vegas Medical
Centers, located behind the Hilton. He also contracted with 9 resorts, providing on-call
services. To boost business, Ghanem allegedly bribed security guards on the Strip to
send emergency cases to his clinics. Besides treating guests, he cared about the health of
employees, showing unprecedented compassion to striking laborers. The Frontier strike,
lasting 1991 to 1998, was the longest successful hotel strike in American history. 550
workers, protesting wage cuts and elimination of their pension plan, respected the picket
line for the entire strike. The resort revoked health insurance privileges, but Ghanem
offered complementary medical care at his clinics, delivering over 100 babies for free.
He protected the Strip’s boxers as well. During his tenure with Nevada Athletic
Commission, Ghanem instituted new safety measures, mandating testing for HIV,
Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C, and enhancing protection in the boxing rings. When reports
surfaced that Evander Holyfield had a hole in his heart, Ghanem refused to let him fight
until he sought testing at the Mayo Clinic. “I have to wear hats because I am on the
commission and we generally want fights,” he explained, but “I am also a doctor” and
was obligated to protect the fighter’s life.514
The Strip Ablaze
While corporatization improved aspects of occupational health on the Strip, the
induction of megaresort construction by Kirk Kerkorian at the International and MGM
Grand presented new risks. Prior, the resorts resembled beachfront hotels, built low and
sprawling. As the resorts grew, so did the hazards, and construction-related injuries
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increased in frequency. At the International and MGM Grand, Kerkorian contracted with
Taylor Construction Company, a company that constructed Caesars Palace and Riviera.
Workers built the largest resorts in the world, 1,512 rooms at the 30-story International
and 2,200 rooms at the 26-story MGM Grand. During the construction process, the
workers faced the same hazards as before, just on a grander scale. Similar to megaresort
construction at CityCenter, electrocutions and falls for scaffolding were common, as well
as injuries from heavy equipment and inhalation of dust or other particles. Workers were
also pressured to finish in record time. This led to inadequate risk perception, trying to
get the job done as soon as possible.515
While the megaresort size increased construction hazards, it also created new
building code deficiencies, a problem evident during the MGM Grand and Las Vegas
Hilton (formally the International) fires in 1980 and 1981. While not the first on the
Strip, they were the most deadly. In earlier years, fires were not as common. On June
16, 1960, a kitchen in the El Rancho burst into flames at 4:30 am. The resort’s
trademark, a 50-foot windmill, dramatically crashed through the casino after the roof
collapsed. Structural damage closed the El Rancho permanently. However, there was
only one reported casualty, a fireman with a cut hand. The sprawling building design
helped minimize human health damages, allowing employees and guests to easily locate
exits. Additionally, most guests were far away from the blaze, sleeping in cottages 150
feet from the main building. Four years later, a welder’s torch ignited a fire on the
Sahara’s rooftop during an air conditioning install, resulting in $1 million in damages.
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As with the El Rancho, the hotel portion of the expansive property was not affected and
guests were never in immediate danger. In fact, the Las Vegas Sun reported that “life
went on as usual at the swimming pool” as “swimmers splashed and floated on their
backs while firemen scampered along the roof fighting the flames.” Smoke inhalation
felled several victims, including hotel executive Herb McDonald, an employee, and a few
firemen. Small fires continued throughout the next decade. In 1969, a blaze at the
Stardust injured 17 people; one died from a heart attack. Several years later, a Holiday
Inn manager died from smoke inhalation after falling asleep while smoking in a bed at
the resort.516
Fatalities were few because the Strip resorts were still mostly horizontal; vertical
construction, especially after 1965, changed everything. The MGM Grand fire and its
deadly aftermath was directly related to deficiencies in the new megaresort design.
During construction from 1970 to 1973, the resort adhered to the Uniform Building Code
(UBC) Standard, 1970 Edition. But in an effort to save money, it only met the minimum
requirements. The resort ignored suggestions by Clark County Fire Marshall Carl Lowe
to include a comprehensive sprinkler system, and only installed sprinklers in the
basement, showrooms, and a 26th floor high roller casino converted to meeting rooms.
“The building code was a little outdated for that time in Las Vegas,” Lowe explained, “I
would have loved to have seen sprinklers [in the MGM Grand].”
While the UBC Standard mandated that all materials were of fire resistant or
noncombustible construction, the MGM Grand utilized flammable cellulose acoustical
ceiling tiles and adhesives throughout the resort. At the time of construction, compelling
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evidence existed that the latter was a fire-spread substance; the state of Connecticut
actually banned its use. In terms of décor, the MGM Grand also had to present
“sufficient technical data to substantiate the proposed use of any plastic material” to
satisfy the UBC Standard. It somehow received approval to use carpets and slot
machines containing harmful plastics, materials that fueled the flames and created a
deadly mixture of toxins. During the fire, the construction design turned the stairwells
and Heating, Ventilating, and Air Condition (HVAC) system into chimneys, spreading
smoke throughout the casino and upper floors. There were no clear exits, and many
emergency doors and exit routes were locked. Moreover, the resort did not have an
automatic smoke detection system, and installed a faulty fire system amplifier, delaying
notification to employees and guests. There was no paging system to order evacuation
instructions, or a fire control room to pinpoint its point of origin and vent smoke out of
areas.517
It was a recipe for disaster. On November 21, 1980, an electrical fire ignited in a
pie display case at the Deli restaurant. The fire incubated for several hours before its
detection. When an employee opened the door, it quickly spread, prompting the resort to
call the fire department at 7:15 am. When the firefighters arrived, the cellulose acoustical
ceiling tiles burst into a massive fireball. Fed by plastics in the carpet, wallpaper, PVC
piping, and adhesives, it spread 19 feet per second. When the fire reached the entrance
on Las Vegas Boulevard, it burst through the front door, injuring valet attendants and
517
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guests, and engulfing parked cars. As the casino became a deadly inferno, horrified
firefighters watched as oblivious players continue to gamble. But the most dangerous
place was not in the casino. It was the 18th to 26th floors. The smoke raced up the
stairwells and elevator shafts, creating heat conditions on the 18th floor and above. Faulty
smoke dampers also circulated fumes through the HVAC system, accelerating the spread
of the poisonous air. Guests were completely unaware, as no fire alarm sounded.
However, as a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) study reveals, they did not
exhibit panic behavior, rationally attempting to save their lives. After smelling or seeing
the smoke, they alerted each other, offered refuge, put towels around doors to limit
smoke, and opened balcony doors or broke windows to foster better ventilation. Groups
traveled together to the stairs to escape, but were unable to leave after the doors locked
behind them. Trapped, many succumbed to the heat and smoke. Others fought the
conditions and reached the roof. The 20th and 23rd floors ultimately claimed the most
lives, with 14 each.518
At 8:00 am, Dr. Otto Ravenholt learned that an all-alarm fire had broken out on
the Strip. As director of the county emergency medical services (EMS) system and
coroner, he was directed to tend to the injured and collect the dead. When Ravenholt
arrived, it was a shocking, “chaotic sight.” Firefighters and victims scrambled around
equipment pieces, and “dark plumes of smoke” rose from the MGM Grand. “One didn’t
need details to know that this was a major disaster in progress,” he recalled. Along with
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the fire department, Nellis Air Force Base sent helicopters to fight the fire and rescue
victims. The resort had been filled to capacity, housing over 5,000 employees and guests.
By the time of Ravenholt’s arrival, two-thirds had been evacuated. Most guests had no
shoes on and were in their night clothing. All were in a state of shock. At one point, the
temperature inside the building approached 10,000 degrees, almost enough to melt the
steel gliders and collapse the building.519
At 9:00 am, Ravenholt entered the property with firemen to help evacuate victims.
It struck the doctor how many supposedly “noncombustible” materials had fueled the
fire. Even sculptures that were not very flammable burned became the temperatures were
so high. The rescue mission was a very “physically demanding task,” according to
Ravenholt. The 26-story resort had no working elevators, so rescuers climbed the stairs.
At Ravenholt’s request, firefighters moved the deceased to a side room instead of the
front of the hotel; he did not want to feed the “intense media” coverage. Additionally,
physically moving the dead competed with saving lives. Ravenholt described the
evacuation process as “very dramatic business.” As firemen extended their ladders to
rescue the first 10 floors, the helicopters attempted to evacuate floors 11-26. People
leaned “out of the windows with black soot coming from their nostrils or towels over
their faces” and the helicopters tied ropes around them, pulling them to safety. Ravenholt
ultimately helped evacuate over 700 people, but encountered many causalities. He found
a bell captain sitting in a chair, looking out an open window. The chair had tipped back,
but the man was still “sitting on the chair with his toes sticking up, dead.” “That was the
case with 10 to 20 people,” he recalled, dying “completely unsuspecting in their rooms”
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or waiting for the emergency to pass. The victims that did survive were “essentially
walking wounded”; few were brought out stretchers, but most had been poisoned by
gasses and lack of oxygen.520
When Ravenholt joined the temporary fire department headquarters at the Barbary
Coast, he determined the total number of deceased. The doctor started the figure at 20.
By 10:30, he had raised it to 70. “One would have to see the pictures of the deceased to
get a sense of how difficult it was to make the count,” Ravenholt explained. “Only the
bodies in the casino had been burned; a half dozen were severely charred, having been
near the registration area when the fire swept across the top of the casino.” Helicopters
had also transported bodies to the morgue before the count began. In the end, 85
employees and guests died, with 83 identified on the day of the fire. Two days later, a
female employee was found in a service elevator on the 26th floor. The 85th died several
weeks later. Fatalities in the towers resulted from asphyxiation secondary to carbon
monoxide poisoning; the carbon monoxide levels ranged from 25 to 66 percent
saturation. The rest succumbed to smoke, burns, and myocarditis.521 One woman died of
a massive skull fracture after jumping from the tower. Over 600 people suffered major
fire-related injuries, mostly due to smoke inhalation, and were transported to local
hospitals for treatment.522
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After the MGM Grand fire, Governor Robert List appointed a “blue ribbon panel”
chaired by Kenny Guinn and Thalia Dondero to recommend reforms to prevent future
hotel fires. But at the urging of several state senators and other casino power mongers,
they did not recommend installing and retrofitting hotels with room sprinklers. It took
another tragedy, the Las Vegas Hilton fire, to force change. After the MGM Grand fire,
two arson attempts occurred at the Royal American and Dunes. Both erupted after an
arsonist ignited drapes and bedspreads, but the flames were extinguished before any
extensive damage. On February 10, 1981, Philip Bruce Cline, a busboy at the Hilton,
claimed he dropped a marijuana cigarette while engaging in a homosexual act. The
cigarette torched nearby drapes, burst out the window, and quickly roared up the side of
the 30-story resort. Smaller fires also erupted in a storage room and service elevator on
the 2nd and 3rd floors, and in a 9th floor hose stuffed with combustible material. The
existence of the smaller fires discredited Cline’s story, clearly pointing to arson. Like its
predecessor, the Hilton had no sprinklers, smoke detectors, or public-warning systems. It
only had a manual pull alarm, which malfunctioned. But unlike the MGM Grand, mass
panic ensued. Frantic guests broke windows, scaling the tower on makeshift ropes of
sheets and rushing stairwells to escape the suffocating smoke. In the end, 242 people
were injured and 8 people died; one jumped or fell to his death on the tennis courts. The
others succumbed to smoke inhalation.523
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Several weeks later, another arson fire broke out at Caesars Palace, but the flames
were confined to one hotel room. The Strip had turned into something of a war zone.
During Cline’s trial, “copycat” arsonists set dozens of small fires at adjoining complexes
to the Strip. On one weekend alone, 16 blazes erupted at two resorts and an apartment
building. Acts of violence continued to threaten the Strip, including bomb threats. The
bombing at Harveys Wagon Wheel at Lake Tahoe in August 1980 had put the Strip on
high alert, because for weeks afterward dangers of callers threatened to bomb major
resorts in northern and southern Nevada. By 1984, the resorts refused to negotiate
improved health insurance coverage for their employees, prompting a violent strike of
17000 employees. “It was an interesting time, but a difficult one,” remembered Senator
Richard Bryan. “It was protracted, and it was ugly. Las Vegas received a lot of negative
publicity.” The picketers were volatile and the police investigated bomb threats at
several resorts. On April 12, an explosive detonated in the MGM Grand swimming pool.
Luckily, the blast only caused minor damage and there were no injuries. Police also
discovered a small explosive between two slot machines at the Tropicana.524
As the resorts increased security, the legislature frantically deliberated how to
make the Strip safe. The UBC Standard, used at the MGM Grand and Hilton, contained
codes dating back to the 1940s. It did not deal with the problem of high-rise buildings.
Indeed, the megaresort was a new kind of beast, with high-rise towers, shopping malls,
atriums, and widespread use of plastic materials. But the MGM Grand and Hilton were
not the only resorts that lacked fire protection. A Clark County manager report named 11
others that lacked comprehensive sprinkler system, including the Flamingo, Desert Inn,
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and Riviera. Five months after the MGM fire, the legislature passed the strictest fire
protection standards in the nation, mandating sprinkler systems in buildings higher than
55 feet and requiring sprinklers. At the MGM Grand, the resort installed a $5 million fire
and life safety system, promising employees that they worked at “one of the safest hotels
in the world.” While it had been a “long trying time,” the resort assured that the MGM
Grand was the “most luxurious,” and safe, hotel in the world.525
The MGM Grand and Hilton fires inspired an unprecedented industry-wide
response to raise protection standards. The resorts were newly-built and codecomplacent, debunking the myth that fires were only a concern in older and poorer
facilities. In 1981, NEPA published a detailed overview of the MGM Grand fire,
exposing the chronic threat of fires in the hotel industry. The organization, charged with
creating and maintaining minimum standards for fire protection, issued a set of code
compliance and safety requirements. In 1980, U.S. fire departments reported that only
one out of nine hotel and motel fires had sprinkler systems. Detectors existed in onefourth. By 1997, two-thirds of high-rise towers had sprinkler systems and three-fourths
had installed fire detectors. The heightened level of protection led to a dramatic drop in
hotel and motel fires, and fire-related deaths. After 1983, only two hotel or motel fires
killed 10 people or more nationally. The influence of Nevada’s law spread globally.
Hilton and other hotel corporations voluntarily retrofitted their hotels in New York City,
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Chicago, and other cities with sprinklers. Many nations also mandated the use of
sprinklers in high-rise resorts as well.526
The MGM Grand restitution trial and subsequent retroactive insurance case had
profound legal ramifications. The restitution trial had 2000 plaintiffs and over a hundred
defendants, including the MGM Grand and its construction contractors, architects,
engineers, and suppliers. The claims consolidated into 1,327 lawsuits against 118
companies. Attorney Michael Cherry, appointed “Special Master” of the litigation,
supervised the scheduling and handling of over 4 million documents and 1,400
depositions, and U.S. District Judge Louis Bechtle of Philadelphia presided. Meanwhile,
the MGM Grand realized that its existing insurance policy, a $30 million premium,
would not adequately handle the claims. Consequently, it negotiated and obtained a
retroactive insurance policy, securing an additional $170 million coverage. This type of
supplementary insurance, backdated to November 1, 1980, was unprecedented, involving
approximately 30 carriers in 4 different insurance layers.527
The insurance companies assumed it would be a long settlement process. In the
meantime, they could make money from other investments. But Kerkorian wanted to
settle quickly, as the lawsuit was bad for business and the victims had suffered enough.
In 1983, he took matters into his own hands, directly settling all wrongful deaths,
personal injuries, and property damage and business lost claims. The “global
settlement,” which included most of the defendants, totaled $134 million. MGM Grand
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alone settled its claims for $30 million and agreed on $75 million for the remainder. But
not one defendant admitted negligence. After the settlement, the retroactive insurance
carriers refused to reimburse Kerkorian, claiming he paid too much. Kerkorian hired Bill
Shernoff, a bad faith lawyer, to seek full reimbursement and punitive damages.
However, before the trail began, the insurance companies approved an $87.5 million outof-court settlement. In the end, retroactive insurance was “just bad policy,” according to
Shernoff, because it made insurers “insensitive to settling quickly.”528
The MGM Grand restitution trial and retroactive insurance suit were landmark
cases in the realm of legal history. In re MGM Grand established an important legal
precedent in mass tort litigation, cases in which hundreds of plaintiffs sue multiple
defendants for negligence in matters in toxic substances, catastrophic events, or faulty
pharmaceutical products and medical devices. According to Michael Cherry, later an
Associate Chief Justice, “the things we learned from [MGM Grand] paved the way for
how we conduct today’s massive consumer trails.” Over the following decades, mass tort
litigation, involving breast implants, tobacco, radioactive fallout, chemical plant
explosions, and airplane crashes, cited In re MGM Grand. Moreover, the retroactive
insurance case was the first and last of its kind in the United States. Since it was such a
huge loss, the investment was not sound. Carriers never sold retroactive insurance again.
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Fortunately for Kerkorian, he also had interruption insurance, which helped him renovate
his resort and open it by August 1981.529
Great Expectations
Following the MGM Grand and Hilton fires, occupational health became a top
priority on the Strip, with the new standards producing a dramatically safer workplace.
There were close calls, but not major disasters. Most problems originated from electrical
malfunctions, kitchen grease, or the careless flick a lit cigarette, and arson continued in
isolated cases. In 1986, a jury convicted Thomas Edward Little Owl for starting a series
of small fires, including one at the Sands. During the 1990s, the under-construction
Stratosphere caught fire and another Hilton blaze reported $1 million in damages, forcing
the evacuation of six floors. By 2003, a lit cigarette ignited a laundry chute, with 6
people treated for smoke inhalation. But the most dramatic event since the MGM Grand
and Hilton fires occurred in 2008 at the Monte Carlo, also a Kerkorian-owned hotel. On
January 25, welders were constructing a bridge on the roof of the resort. While using
hand-held cutting torches, molten matter ignited a flame that spread to the architectural
façade. The fire alarm did not go off because no detectors existed on the roof. When
Monte Carlo President Aton Nikodemus noticed the flames and smoke, he manually
triggered the fire alert system and ordered an evacuation. The resort evacuated 5000
guests and 950 employees from the premises. Security guards and engineers knocked on
and entered 3,002 rooms to make sure every guest evacuated. However, the fire itself
was short-lived. Thanks to the quick response of the fire department, it was extinguished
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in only 74 minutes. At a press conference, Fire Chief Steven Smith remarked that the
MGM Grand fire had dramatically changed fire protection on the Strip, bragging that “we
have the best fire safety in the world in the resort corridor of Las Vegas.” In the end, the
Monte Carlo fire produced no life-threatening injuries, with only 5 guests and 8
employees treated for smoke inhalation. Still, the hotel remained closed for several
weeks due to water damage sustained on virtually all 32 floors.530
Besides fire protection, the 1980s were also a major adjustment period for
worker’s compensation and employee-funded healthcare. During the 1970s, critics began
to scrutinize the NIC and worker’s compensation in Nevada. Employees regularly
complained about its incompetence, mostly regarding evaluation of injuries, delay in
hearings, and approval of surgical procedures. Frustrated with the high costs, employers
also wanted the state to allow “three-way system” coverage: the state fund, and options
for self-insurance and private insurance. Reform measures ultimately addressed both
grievances. 531 In the early 1980s, legislators voted to allow qualified employers to
purchase self-insurance. They also abolished the NIC and replaced it with the State
Industrial Insurance System (SIIS), a public corporation providing worker’s
compensation, and safety and rehabilitation services. However, the reform measures did
little good. During the 1980s, worker’s compensation costs for medical care and
530
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indemnity benefits increased tenfold. The average SIIS premiums, per $100 of payroll,
rose from $2.47 in 1988 to $3.31 in 1991 alone. By 1993, legislators proposed measured
to remedy the SIIS’s financial crisis as well as increase benefits to injured workers. In
1999, it authorized the privatization of SIIS, doing business as Employers Insurance
Company of Nevada (EICON). With privatization, Nevada began operating in a “twoway” worker’s compensation market composed of private carriers and self-insured
employers. While EICON alleviated some issues, employees continued to complain
about problems inherent in the system.532
The treatment of employee-funded healthcare also shifted. While the resorts had
offered health insurance, they purchased fully insured plans. In short, companies hired
health insurance companies to assume the financial risk. While the plans reduced
liability, they were expensive. At the same time, the American health care system
reached a crisis point. With no mechanisms to control prices, medical inflation
skyrocketed during the 1970s, rising costs of medical care, hospital construction,
physician salaries, and pharmaceuticals. Fully insured plans subsequently rose as well.
In 1973, President Richard Nixon attempted to fix the problem. The Health Maintenance
Organization Act institutionalized the use of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
which required employers with 25 employees or more to offer federally-backed managed
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care plans. Modeled after plans like the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program,
HMOs reduced costs by setting guidelines under which doctors could operate and
limiting the range of treatment available. By the 1980s, the Reagan Administration
continued to encourage HMOs, pushing them to engage in private capital sources, and
passed the Preferred Provider Healthcare Act of 1985, easing restrictions on Preferred
Provider Organizations (PPOs). Participating providers agreed to provide services at a
discounted rate. In turn, PPOs paid a high percentage of costs when subscribers used innetwork providers, allowing them to seek health care outside the plan at a higher rate.533
The medical community was initially resistant to managed care because it
threatened profit levels. But as the number of organizations increased, doctors became
active participants for the guaranteed income. In Las Vegas, Dr. Elias Ghanem took it
one step further, founding his own PPO-style organization, Prime Health. At the same
time, the Strip felt the financial burden of offering fully insured benefits. By April 2,
1984, tensions rose to a boiling point between the unions and management after the latter
refused to negotiate improved health insurance coverage and wages. The 1984 strike was
violent, prompting hundreds of arrests, bomb threats, assaults, and serious economic
repercussions for the resorts. Several months later later, the parties reached a
compromise. Employees received most of their demands, resulting in the Culinary
Health plan that members used for the following decades.534
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But the strike did not fix the rising health insurance costs. Ghanem offered a
solution. To lower costs, he proposed providing self-insured plans, in which employers
took on the financial risk. The self-insured market had grown substantially since the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, recognizing the plans as a viable
option and exempting them from most state-mandated benefits. In 1984, Ghanem and his
associates proposed to Circus Circus Enterprises to enroll employees in a self-insured
plan with Prime Health. William G. Bennett, head of Circus Circus, accepted the offer.
The program was a success, reportedly saving the resort $1 million in its first year. A
year later, the Culinary Union entered a multimillion dollar contract with Ghanem to
provide health care to over 30,000 union members and their families. By the 1990s,
managed care programs like Prime Health increased in popularity. Initially, self-insured
and manage care programs helped decrease medical costs. But the influence was shortlived, with the cost of healthcare premiums increasing 98 percent from 2000 to 2007.535
After the advent of managed care, the Strip’s occupational health program
received another boost in the effort to curb medical costs: employee wellness programs.
Employee wellness was hardly a new concept, employing practices reminiscent of earlier
occupational health programs. During the 1920s, the Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad
provided to workers onsite health care, health screenings, and to limit alcohol abuse and
late-night partying, recreational activities to support a healthy body and mind. In turn,
the it expected its healthy workforce would produce greater profits and cut costs.
Beginning in the 1980s, the Strip and numerous corporations nationwide began
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employing the same techniques, only expanded. MGM Resorts sought to create “a
culture of health,” citing that its “commitment to the health and wellbeing of our
employees runs deeper” than typical health packages. Besides health and saving plans, it
offered a “Healthy Living Wellness Program” to help employees “make positive choices
in their life.” MGM Resorts sought to “foster emotional wellbeing” and provide financial
incentives to encourage the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle. Employees had access to
an on-call nurse who answered questions about health and nutrition, and assisted in
finding a physician and triage. Health professionals also provided free health screenings,
such as monograms, dental care, and blood pressure checks, and a confidential Employee
Assistance Program, covering substance abuse, gambling addiction, grief, and weight and
stress management.536
By the mid-2000s, Harrah’s Entertainment, later Caesars Entertainment, took a
more proactive approach to employee wellness. The largest gaming corporation in the
world developed a two-pronged plan, offering employees better health services, and
subsequently cutting costs. The result was Harrah’s Health and Wellness Center, a $2.5
million venture operated by Whole Health Management, Inc. Opening in 2007, the
19,000 square-foot health and wellness center boasted a fitness complex and medical
clinic. Clinical staff diagnosed and treated chronic conditions, providing vaccinations,
prescriptions, nutrition education, counseling, and physical therapy. Meanwhile,
employees practiced yoga, ran on treadmills, and lifted weights in the gym. According to
Chairman Gary Loveman, Harrah’s sought to provide “easily accessible and affordable
health and wellness service directly to our employees.” With the new employee wellness
536
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programs, the Strip reused old techniques to maintain a healthy workforce. As employers
learned nearly a century before, the best way to safeguard employee health and profits
was to offer occupational health programs in-house.537
By the mid-2000s, Strip executives and boosters had great expectations. It
appeared the place had the capacity for unlimited growth and profits. In terms of
occupational health, the Strip had developed a highly innovative program, pioneering
nationwide standards that ranged from comprehensive fire protection to employee
wellness programs. Indeed, its ideas served as a benchmark for the entire hospitality
industry. But the success was short-lived. In the 1990s, several construction workers
died while building the Luxor pyramid, the Stratosphere, and the Venetian. But fatalities
were extremely rare in comparison to the demanding work the job entailed. However, in
2006, a succession of construction worker deaths at CityCenter, the Cosmopolitan, and
other properties revealed serious problems in occupational health. While the contractors
blamed the deaths on worker carelessness, investigators discovered numerous safety
violations. Inexperienced workers, not trained properly in workplace safety, regularly
operated faulty equipment and walked on hazardous scaffolding. Meanwhile, OSHA had
actually weakened requirements, not enhanced them, removing standards that could have
prevented the deaths. Nevada OSHA failed to protect the workers as well. While it
investigated the deaths, Nevada OSHA withdrew or vastly reduced fines after meeting
privately with the contractors. Nevada unions, the workers’ major advocate, failed to
push for improved conditions as well. Even with the help of regulatory agencies, unions,
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and safety standards enacted during the twentieth century, occupational health continued
to fall second to profits.538
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EPILOGUE
THE EXPLOSION
Properly regulated, industries that handle hazardous materials need not pose safety threats
to their employees or the general public. Nevada’s economic development future is
bright, and our remarkable population growth will continue well into the 21st century.
The Commission feels that the recommendations on the following pages will create a
desirable environment in which all Nevadans can live and work without fear for their
safety.
Bob Miller, Chairman of the Henderson Commission (1988)
Roy Westerfield started his workday like any other. May 4, 1988 typified early
summer in the desert, sunny and warm in temperature. After arriving at the Pacific
Engineering Company of Nevada (PEPCON) plant, he began his normal duties as a
comptroller. PEPCON was one of two American companies that produced ammonium
perchlorate, an oxidizing chemical used in high performance solid propellants. The
chemical was a critical component in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) program, providing a reaction that boosted space shuttles into orbit. PEPCON
housed its operations in an industrial center in Henderson west of the Basic Magnesium
Industrial Complex. Founded by a former BMI manager in 1955, the company began
producing ammonium perchlorate at the request of the Department of Defense (DOD) in
1959. Over the following decades, PEPCON ran its business in a relatively isolated part
of town. But urban sprawl in the 1980s situated a new subdivision, Green Valley,
dangerously close to the plant. At the same time, PEPCON lost its primary client. At
liftoff on January 28, 1986, the Challenger disintegrated after its right solid rocket
booster failed. The disaster killed 7 astronauts on board and prompted NASA to put its
program on hold. Yet, PEPCON still maintained its lucrative government contract, so it
continued with business as usual. With the production lines still running, the company
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filled its aluminum storage bins to capacity. To create more space, it stored the overflow
in stacked polyethylene drums situated around the property. Taken alone, ammonium
perchlorate and polyethylene did not present a hazard. But together, they formed a
“classic fuel and oxidizer scenario,” according to Dr. Michael Fox, an explosion expert,
burning “like a roman candle.”539
On May 4, 1988, PEPCON had approximately 8 million pounds of ammonium
perchlorate onsite. At 11:30 am, a welding torch ignited a small fire in a batch house
building, which quickly spread to the polyethylene drums. Five workers tried to douse
the flames, but high winds and ammonium perchlorate residue hampered their efforts.
By 11:45, the situation had quickly escalated and most workers fled for their lives. But
Roy Westerfield, along with wheelchair-bound Bruce Halker, stayed behind. Westerfield
called 911 to notify the authorities, telling the dispatcher: “Emergency! We need the fire
department. All of you can get here. Immediately!” When asked the problem, he
chillingly responded: “Oh, we’ve got… everything’s on fire.” Those were perhaps his
last words. The fire traveled rapidly along the polyethylene bins, finally reaching the
main storage unit. The explosion was massive, reminiscent of an atmospheric nuclear
test at the Nevada Test Site. It was the equivalent of 250 tons of dynamite and registered
3.5 on the Richter scale in California! Spewing a toxic glass cloud hundreds of feet in the
air, the explosion ripped a gas line out of the ground. A powerful shockwave followed.
Employees of PEPCON and a nearby marshmallow factory, Kidd and Co., desperately
539
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tried to outrun it, dodging smoldering scrap metal and huge shards of glass. The
shockwave decimated Kidd and Co., and spread to Green Valley, violently shattering
windows, flipping cars, and buckling garage doors.540
Then it was over. With nothing left to burn, the explosions subsided by noon.
Emergency medical services and the fire department arrived at the scene, evacuating a
five-mile radius around the plant. An hour later, authorities determined the airborne gas
was a respiratory irritant but not highly toxic. Crews in protective clothing began the
clean up process, hampered by leaking anhydrous ammonia and acid residue. By 8:00
pm, they found the body of an unidentified man. It was Bruce Halker. “The clothes were
blown off the body,” recalled County Fire Chief Roy Parrish, “it was not a pretty sight.”
Roy Westerfield’s body was never recovered. At their funerals, the men were
remembered as martyrs, opting to stay behind to call for help even though death was
imminent. While the death toll was remarkably low, the disaster injured 372 employees
and bystanders, mostly treated for lacerations, concussions, and burns. Property damage
to surrounding businesses and homes in Henderson was also extensive. Like MGM
Grand, PEPCON did not have enough insurance, with only $1 million in coverage. A
courtroom battle resulted in a $71 million settlement divided among the victims and their
families. PEPCON tried to pin the accident on Southwest Gas Co., but a jury concluded
the explosions did not result from a natural gas leak. After the incident, the company
retreated to Utah. Changing its name to Western Electrochemical Co., it built a plant in
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an isolated area outside of Cedar City. Unfortunately, history repeated itself in the new
locale. On July 30, 1997, another explosion killed one worker and injured four.541
The PEPCON disaster was a grim reminder that southern Nevada’s industries
were profoundly dangerous. The incident brought into question the positioning of heavy
industry in an urban area. It also exposed that the state of Nevada, in an effort to attract
industry, was virtually laissez-faire in its regulation of occupational health. As evidenced
by PEPCON, the longstanding policies threatened the wellbeing of employees and
residents alike. When Governor Richard H. Bryan toured the devastation, he declared
Henderson a disaster area. “It’s a miracle there weren’t more deaths,” he said. To ensure
it never happened again, Bryan assembled a commission to examine the state of heavy
industry in Nevada. The Henderson Commission, chaired by Clark County District
Attorney Bob Miller, held nine hearings, receiving testimony about health and safety, fire
prevention, zoning, insurance, and the transportation of hazardous materials. According
to the final report, the results were “unsettling.” The state had very limited information
about its industries. It could not identify the location, utilization, and transportation of
hazardous materials. At its current state, the Commission determined Nevada could not
“completely insure the safety of its residents.” The report found numerous failures in
policy. Heavy industry was not inspected enough. There were also “literally hundreds of
hazardous materials” transported on Nevadan highways and roads everyday.542
Based on the testimonies, the Commission developed 43 recommendations to
improve health and safety in the workplace. To establish industry accountability to the
541
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community, it recommended that companies provide detailed analysis of their operations
and safety programs, and the Nevada OSHA open records to the public. The
Commission proposed to bar hazardous industries from residential areas and apply
steeper penalties for violations. If a company could not reduce hazards, it had to relocate
out of state. To implement the Commission’s recommendations, Governor Bryan
established a Task Force headed by the State Fire Marshall and later, the Division of
Emergency Management. By 1991, most of the recommendations were enacted by
legislative action, the various regulatory agencies, and OSHA mandates. But a follow-up
investigation, ordered by now-Governor Bob Miller, revealed continued lapses. One of
the biggest problems was the federal government. In the name of national security, the
federal government remained evasive about it hazardous materials installations in the
state. Moreover, companies under federal contract maintained they were exempt from
state fire and health codes, a complaint reminiscent of Hoover Dam and the Nevada Test
Site. Another concern was funding. Most municipal fire departments, charged with
inspecting heavy industry, had the support to provide only one inspection annually. The
Commission had recommended four inspections.543
While PEPCON redirected occupational health and safety in a positive direction,
its influence was short-lived. On January 7, 1998, a succession of explosions at the
Sierra Chemical Company, located east of Reno, killed 4 workers and injured 6.
Governor Miller responded by creating the Commission on Workplace Safety and
Community Protection, which outlined 29 additional recommendations, but they did little
good. On September 17, 2001, an explosion at Depressurized Technologies International
543
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(DTI) in Minden resulted in a death and 4 critical injuries. An investigation revealed
numerous safety violations. By October 15, Las Vegas experienced its first major
disaster since PEPCON. AutoTech Inc. manufactured high-powered model rockets, and
housed 2,500 pounds of ammonium perchlorate and 800 pounds of magnesium. At 12:15
pm, two explosions erupted in the plant. Firefighters immediately arrived and
extinguished the blaze with high-pressure hoses. While they battled the blaze, water
seeped into a drum of magnesium, a water-reactive element. The contaminated drum
“flashed” at 4:20 pm, resulting in a third explosion. The fire burned all night, destroying
the 60,000 square-foot building and five surrounding businesses. In its aftermath, one
worker died and four received medical attention for varying degrees of burns. Three
firefighters were treated for smoke inhalation. Las Vegans were shocked to learn that
ammonium perchlorate, the chemical implicated in PEPCON, was stored in their
backyard. One resident summed up the sentiment: “They put our lives and our homes at
risk– whoever issued those permits should have their brains examined.” In reality,
AeroTech did not have a permit to manufacture hazardous materials. A regulation
loophole allowed the company to bypass authorization because it did not generate
hazardous waste. After a thorough investigation, Nevada OSHA determined that
AeroTech did not “disclose the true nature of [its] business” to county licensing and
regulatory agencies. Moreover, it found that the company’s safety program did not meet
Nevada Administrative Code.544
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Taken together, PEPCON and AeroTech reveal historical trends in southern
Nevada’s occupational health program. PEPCON was a monumental disaster that
brought considerable attention to safety in the workplace. The new standards
recommended that municipal fire departments inspect high-risk industries at least once
annually. Clark County initially complied and conducted regular inspections of
AeroTech and other hazardous installations. But after 1995, the inspections stopped. For
five years, AeroTech was not inspected once. According to Fire Chief Earl Greene, the
megaresort construction boom contributed to the fire department’s negligence. To ensure
the MGM Grand fire never happened again, inspectors focused their attention on the
massive resorts. They did not have the time or resources to regularly inspect Clark
County’s 1,800 high-risk facilities. Greene cited that “it [had] been a major headache
keeping up with the growth.” After the AeroTech incident, Clark County acknowledged
the system needed major improvements, increasing the inspection staff by 50 percent and
ensuring that high-risk installations were inspected annually.545
PEPCON and AeroTech illustrate southern Nevada’s boom and bust approach to
occupational health. Since Las Vegas’ founding in 1905, industries in the region
consistently strained safety standards, an action fostered by the conservative nature of
state politics. Nevada is a pro-business state. To stimulate the economy, it actively
pursued new industry, promising limited intervention and a favorable tax structure.
Under this model, occupational health was destined to fail, and laissez-faire subsequently
eroded of the quality of workplace safety. With the exception of Six Companies and
arguably the contractors and federal agencies operating the Nevada Test Site, nobody
intentionally put their employees in harm’s way. Failures resulted from the capitalist
545
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spirit. For over a century, southern Nevada industries famously provided cutting-edge
technology and the next greatest experience in entertainment. But because of the
pressure to maximize profits, occupational health suffered and continued until a
cataclysmic disaster. Marked failures in occupational health – carbon monoxide
poisoning at Hoover Dam, atmospheric nuclear testing and the Baneberry disaster, the
MGM Grand and Hilton fires, and PEPCON – forced change. Faced with bad publicity
and public outcry, southern Nevada scrambled to rebuild its image and occupational
health program. Federal, state, and municipal agencies led the movement by reviewing
existing policies and mandating new ones. Occupational health boomed. But the success
was fleeting. Because the state was pro-business and promised limited intervention,
transitioning to a regulatory state was highly unpopular. As a result, the new standards
were difficult to enforce. The state and municipal governments also faced longstanding
budgetary issues, lacking adequate funding for inspections and implementation. In some
respect, the federal government hampered efforts as well, undermining the authority of
state and municipal regulatory agencies. Yet, each boom in occupational health
experienced some successes. The new regulations and institutions undoubtedly
encouraged a safer workplace; even with limited funding and undermined authority, the
Mining Inspector, Nevada Industrial Commission, and Nevada Occupational Safety and
Health Administration improved conditions. The underlying problem is that occupational
health in southern Nevada is a cyclical process of remembering and forgetting. When 12
construction workers died in 18 months on the Strip from 2006 to 2007 while
constructing CityCenter and the other megaresorts, people were horrified. It seemed
unprecedented. Unfortunately, the deaths were consistent with the region’s history of
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occupational health. In a place where profit is king, safety has consistently been
overlooked until it is too late.
Failures in southern Nevada’s medical infrastructure also attributed to the
substandard quality of occupational health. When the railroad founded Las Vegas’ first
hospital in 1905, it functioned as a temporary medical facility, sending its most serious
cases to Los Angeles. A century later, the practice continued to exist. The poor
reputation of southern Nevada medicine has been well documented, infamously leading
governors, mayors, and numerous community leaders to seek treatment in other states.
The situation was caused by rising costs in medicine during the 2000s, sending health
care in the United States into a tailspin. Southern Nevada was particularly hard hit. In
2004, the American Medical Association (AMA) listed Nevada as one of 19 states
experiencing a crisis in medical liability coverage. Some insurance rates increased 300
percent in 2002! The cost increase was credited to excessively costly malpractice
litigation. Consequently, southern Nevada medicine experienced a mass exodus, as
doctors were forced to raise prices, retire, or move. Most chose the last option. The
crisis reached a breaking point on July 4, 2002. After nearly all of its 58 surgeons
resigned, the UMC trauma center closed. The exorbitant premium costs made
performing high-risk surgeries impractical. While the trauma center reopened 10 days
later, medical liability coverage continued to plague southern Nevada throughout the
decade.
A byproduct of the crisis was a diminished quality of health care. In 2007,
Nevada ranked last in quality of care, 47th in access to care, and 41st for mortality rates.
Its residents had limited access to physicians, with one of the lowest physician to

339

population ratios in the nation. It was ranked 49th in nurses, 25 percent below the
national median, and last in immunization coverage to children under 3. Ultimately, the
low quality of care hurt patients. In a groundbreaking two-year investigation, Las Vegas
Sun reporters Marshall Allen and Alex Richards analyzed a state database that detailed
every inpatient hospital visit from 2000 to 2010, totaling 2.9 million cases. The
information, coupled with over 150 patient and medical insider interviews, produced
troubling results. Preventable injuries, life threatening infections, or other damages
occurred 969 times in Las Vegas hospitals in 2008 and 2009. Additionally, the hospitals
had higher-than-expected incidences of surgical injuries, ranging 34 to 174 percent over
the national average. One physician blamed the crisis on “a culture of mediocrity” in
southern Nevada medicine, comparing his coworkers to world-class sprinters satisfied
with running slow. “The standards are so low they don’t even recognize a problem that’s
starting them in the face,” said the doctor.546
How did the quality of health care become so poor? The southern Nevada
medical infrastructure was founded by the railroad, a pattern similar to that found in other
western towns. In fact, the Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad modeled its employeefunded hospital after Sacramento, California. What separated Sacramento from Las
Vegas? While Sacramento experienced crises in health care, its quality of care remained
intact. Why? The city had numerous academic medical centers at its disposal, including
546
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University of California, Davis, University of California, San Francisco, and Stanford
University. Academic medical centers consisted of three interrelated parts: a medical
school that trained physicians; clinical trial and laboratory science research; and the
delivering of health care services. The benefits were endless. They fostered leadingedge medicine, raising standards in innovation, excellence, and research. While training
future doctors, academic medical centers studied their surrounding community’s needs,
developing innovative treatments accordingly. Additionally, they provided patients that
needed the most assistance with access to care.
Most metropolitan areas, including Sacramento, had access to both public and
private centers, promoting healthy competition. The combination of these factors
prompted a rise in quality of health. Southern Nevada was the only American
metropolitan area of its size that did not have an academic medical center, thanks to
University of Nevada, Reno. Consequently, the region developed a so-called “culture of
mediocrity.” While UMC was a teaching hospital, working with University of Nevada
School of Medicine in Reno, little research occurred there. The hospital’s primary goal
was to serve indigents and the poor. Without an academic medical center, the region did
not have enough residency and fellowship programs to convince locally-trained doctors
to stay. Furthermore, America’s best doctors did not practice there because it lacked
cutting-edge medicine.547
Of course, southern Nevada did not have an academic medical center because
northern Nevada controlled the legislature and Board of Regents during the 1970s.
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According to Kathy Silver, the CEO of UMC, the lack of academic medical centers and
the region’s unrestricted capitalist culture had eroded the quality of health care. Las
Vegas, according to Silver, had “a lot of dedication to building infrastructure that
generated money.” In contrast with academic medical centers, private hospitals were not
“mission driven as it relates to research and academics.” They sought profits. Southern
Nevada medicine was, and has always been, an industry. The system was founded and
cultivated by the region’s major industries: the railroad, Six Companies, Basic
Magnesium, and the Strip. Its development was fragmented, with no overarching
evaluation of the region’s needs and no plan for future growth. As a result, the medical
infrastructure established could not adequately serve the rapidly growing demographic.
In 1905, the railroad built the first hospital in southern Nevada, designed to ensure
workers’ health. At the same time, Dr. Roy Martin established a for-profit hospital,
capitalizing on something the company town lacked: health care for families. Eventually,
a county hospital emerged to meet the needs of indigents and the poor. The system
worked until the 1930s. But when thousands of dam workers arrived, the hospitals were
overwhelmed with patients. After Six Companies built a hospital in Boulder City, the
situation improved somewhat and the crisis subsided when the project ended. However,
World War II prompted another population spike. To serve workers and families, Basic
Magnesium built a hospital. After the war, thousands of Nevada Test Site and Strip
employees continuously migrated to the region, which the hospitals could not support.
The Teamsters responded by providing a solution, funding the construction of Sunrise
Hospital.
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But by the 1970s, the various industries could no longer adequately support
southern Nevada medicine. Therefore, it evolved, becoming its own industry. Southern
Nevada embraced the nationwide trend towards corporate healthcare. By the 2000s, the
region had the highest concentration of for-profit hospitals of any urban area in the
nation. Under corporate direction, the hospitals were very profitable. During the 1980s,
Humana Sunrise Hospital reported 25 percent profits. But corporate leadership directly
hindered the ability to offer quality care. According to Larry Matheis, executive director
of the Nevada State Medical Association, southern Nevada hospitals were “shaped by
market forces – entrepreneurship, cutthroat competition, and the bottom line.” The
culture of seeking profits led to the largest public health notification in American history.
In 2008, unhygienic practices exposed 40,000 patients of the Endoscopy Center of
Southern Nevada to infectious diseases, including Hepatitis C and HIV. The staff reused
syringes, allowing viruses to transfer from one patient to another. According to reports,
the Endoscopy Center authorized the negligent practice to cut costs.548
Since 1905, southern Nevada transformed from a railroad outpost to the site of a
dynamic metropolis that captivated the world. In measurements analyzing 1993 to 2007,
the Brookings Institution ranked Las Vegas’ economy fourteenth among 150
metropolitan areas in the world; but by the late 2000s its future seemed unclear.
Confronting a nationwide recession, the state’s unemployment rate reached 13 percent in
2010. The same year, the Brookings Institution reversed its ranking of Las Vegas, citing
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it as one of the worst economies in the world, and the city’s dependence on domestic
tourism and construction directly hindered its recovery. Southern Nevada faced a chronic
foreclosure crisis, with the second-highest bank-owned properties in the nation.
Environmental concerns, including water scarcity, threatened the region as well. In this
context, the prospect for improved occupational health in southern Nevada is dim. Until
it reforms policy to consistently promote workplace safety, companies will continue to
gamble with lives.549
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